Analysis of space systems for the space disposal of nuclear waste follow-on study. Volume 2: Technical report by unknown
~. 
.. 
{ ..:. '-.. 
t 
".- . . ".-
--.--. &._ .. 
A Reproduced Copy 
OF 
NASA-CR-161992 
Itj8"J..CJO /f/1l/3 
Reproduced for NASA 
by the 
NASA Scientific and Technical Information Facility 
1111111111111 1111 11/1/ 1111111111 11111 1111 1111 
NF01670 
FFNo 672 Aug 65 
LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER 
Ll8RARY, NAS./\ 
HAr.~PTorj, VIRGINIA 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19820014143 2020-03-21T08:19:38+00:00Z
(NASA-CR-1~1192) ANALYSIS or 5PACE SYSTEMS 
FOR THF SPACE DISPOSAL Of NUeLEA? WASTE 
FOLLOW-ON STUDY~ VOLUME 2: TECHNICAL 
BEPORT Final Report (80eing Aorospace Co., 
N82-22017 
Unclas 
~A __ "~J._~"."'''~'''''''''' _ ...... '_ ......... ..,-,""'....-._ ~._ ....... _.''''''' ............. .,. ........... _, ....... _ ..,..~ ...... _._~,-....,.~_.'" .. _ ... _~ ___ ........... __ .......... __ • _ ........ ----.~ .. ._ 
..... 
.., , 
~~ 
'" C 
-<l • 
ANALYSIS OF SPACE SYSTEMS 
FOR THE 
SPACE DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 
FOLLOW-ON STUDY 
VOLUME 2 
TECHNICAL REPORT 
1982 
DI80-26777-2 
Contract NAS8-33847 
DPD 609 
DR4 
Submitted to 
The National Aeronautics and Space AdminiStration 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
by 
Boeing Aerospace Company 
Seattle, Washington 981244 
, 
i 
;. 
, 
! 
i 
I , 
j 
i 
1 
r 
I 
I 
\ 
i 
! 
i 
! , 
! 
I , 
I 
1 
1I 
: I 
1 
~ 
i 
\ 
iJ 
· " '- ..... , ... ,-.. --~~ .. _---- "". 
0180-26777-2 
FOREWORD 
This Boeing Aerospace Company (BAC) study is an integral part of the ongoing 
Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (ONWI) managed DOE/NASA program for study of 
nuclear waste disposal in space. The research effort reported here was performed by the 
Boeing Aerospace Company Upper Stages and Launch Vehicles organization as a follow-on 
effort to NASA contract NAS8-33847 from June of 1981 until February of 1982. The 
objective of the follow-on study was to define the major impacts on the space system 
concepts selected 1n the 1980 study that would result from changes in the reference 
nuclear waste mix from the PW-4b mix used in the 1980 study. 
Information developed during the study period is contained in this two-volume final 
report as listed below: 
Volume 1 Executive Summary 
Volume 2 Technical Report 
Inquiries regarding this study should be addressed to: 
C. C. (Pete) Priest 
NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center 
Attention: PS04 
Huntsville, Alabama 35812 
Telephone: (205) 453-2769 
or 
Richard P. Reinert, Study Manager 
Boeing Aerospat::~· Company 
Mail Stop 8F-74 
P.O. Box 3999 
Seattle, WA 98124 
Telephone: (206) 773-4545 
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1.0 INTRODUCnON 
Since 1970 a number of concepts for space systems for nuclear waste disposal have 
been studied and evaluated. This stud/ has built upon the results of the 1980 MSFC/BAC 
study of space disposal to identify the effects of alternative waste mixes on the space 
systems identified for the reference PW -4b mix in the 1980 study. This effort i;l a."l 
integral part of the ongoing ~ASA/DOE program for evaluation of the space option for 
disposal of certain high-level nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined 
geological repositories. This introduction provides a brief overview of the study 
background, scope, objective, guidelines and assumptions, and contents. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
NASA and DOE are conducting a sustaining level assessment of nuclear waste 
disposal in space. The 1980 study of space systems for disposal of nuclear wastes 
(contract NAS8-33847) investigated reasonable alternative space system concepts (space 
transportation systems, payload protection systems, and space destinations) to dispose of 
the reference nuclear waste (Purex PW -4b waste mix in cermet form) used in prev ious 
MSFC studies. The output of this study resulted in selection of several alternative space 
system concept~ with high merit for further indepth study and evaluation. 
The follow-on effort described in this report emphasized the determination of the 
effects of 'Jariations in the waste mix on the space systems concept to allow determina-
tion of the space systems effect on total system risk benefits when used as a complement 
to the DOE refere!lce mined geological repository. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of the current NASA/DOE joint space system study is to 
determine if the space option for disposal of nuclear waste can be used to decrease the 
overall risk associated with disposal of high-level radioactive waste in the reference DOE 
mined geological repository. 
The objective of this study was to determine the effect of alternative waste mixes 
on the space systems defined in the 1980 MSFC study. The study was conducted in 
associa~ion with parallel studies performed by Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCl) and 
Battelle Pacific Northwest laboratories (PNl). Specific objectives of the 30eing study 
included (l) determination of the parameters required for characterization of alternative 
waste mixes or forms and the ranges of these parameters for the waste mixes or forms 
cc r lpatible with space disposal, (2) establishment of waste form rategories representing 
J~,~; 
~>­
" 
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all parameters and the full range of their bounds as determined in task 1, (3) assessment 
of the effect of the representative waste form categories on the space systt!ms selected 
in the 1980 study effort and selection of a reference space system approach for each 
category, and (4) definition of the selected space system. 
1J SCOPE 
The study was conducted during a 9-month contract period (6-1-81 to 4-::~ -~;;;~~ 
divided into a 7 -month technical effort followed by 2 months for preparation anrl r!elivery 
of the final report. Maximum use was made of the parallel study efforts conducted by 
Battelle and of past studies, particularly the 1980 MSFC/BAC study, to focus the 
resources of this study on its immedia~e objectives, restricting additional analyses and 
definition to only those areas specific to the study. Anaiyses were sufficient to (1) scope 
the full range of parameters characteristic of alternative waste payloacis and (2) assess 
the impact on alternative space systems to a sufficient depth to allow comparison with 
the alternative systems defined in the 1980 study in the areas of technical feasibility, 
safety, perforonance, and reliability. 
1.4 GUIDELINES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
General guidelines and assumptions used in the study are as follows: 
1. Maximum IJse was maae of past studies and other associated da~ as appropriate. 
2. The reference concept for nuclear waste disposal in space was based on the concepts 
recommended in the 1980 space systems study. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
The waste mixes and forms to be analyzed were those defined ~."l the DOE Waste 
Mixes for Space Disposal Study. 
Waste mix thermal loading was restricted to values low enough to preclude post-
burial meltdown. 
Liquid and powder states for waste forms were not considered. 
Cost estimates for elements of the space systems are in 1980 dollars. 
7. Containment requirements to be used as a starting point for the waste payload 
systems study are defined in the 1980 space systems study. Requirements were 
reviewed and appropriate recommendations made during the course of this study. 
8. Estimates of waste form quantity for disposal were based on a 4480 ~THM/year 
rate of HLW generation. 
9. Consideration of destinations other than the reference circular heliocentric orbit dt 
0.85 AU was eliminated. 
2 
\ 
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10. The waste payload primary container thickness was held constant at 223 • .5 mm for 
all waste payload configurations. 
1 • .5 CONTENTS 
The following paragraphs briefly describe the contents of this volume. Volume 1 
serves as the Executive Summary for Volume 2. 
Section 2.0 summarizes the study effort to determine space disposal waste mix 
parameters. Parameters identified and their importance to the space disposal concept are 
described in section 2.1. Section 2.2 describes the values for the parameters. 
Section 3.0 characterizes the waste forms defined in section 2.0 by incorporating 
manufacturing and other constraints to define the physical configuration of waste forms 
and to provide a basis for waste payload design in sections 4.0 and 7.0. 
Section 4.0 describes the impact of the alternative waste forms on the space 
system. Primary impacted areas include the waste payload system, launch system, and 
orbit transfer system. The" effort concentrated on defining space systems suitable for the 
disposal of waste forms whose quantities required relatively low launch rates (less than 
five launches per yead. 
Section .5.0 summarizes the rationale fer selection of the reference space system 
described in sections 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0 and pro\'ides an overview of the system elements 
and operation. 
Section 6.0 describes the trajectories and performance requirements for the 
reference space system delivery mission and details the mission sequence for the nominal 
rescue mission. 
Section 7.0 describes in detail the elements of the reference space system, including 
the waste 'payload system, launch site facilities, launch vehicle systems, orbit transfer 
system, and flight support system. 
Section 8.0 describes the operations of the reference space system, including launch 
site ol'erations, flight operations for the nominal delivery mission, and flight opera!ions 
for the deep-space rescue mission. 
Sections 9.0 and 10.0 summarize the conclusions and recommendations resulting 
from the study. 
3 
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2.0 OETERMINA nON OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WASTE 
FORMS SUITABLE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
The objective of thi~ task ~as to identify characteristics of candidate waste forms . . .. 
relevant to the design of waste payloads for space disposal and to establish the range of 
values of these characteristics that bound the fulll"ange of candidate waste forms. 
The approach taken was to use the waste mixes selected by Battelle Northwest 
Laboratories in a parallel contract. Waste mixes selected include iodine 129 in the form 
of lead iodide, elemental technetium, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratories cermet 
high-level waste mix. A survey of past studies indicated that these three mixes represent 
the full range of waste form parameters specified in past studies. Waste form 
characteristics were identified in six areas relevant to the space disposal mission. Areas 
were identified from review of past studies and from the general engineering backgrounc1 
of the 1980 studies. Once identified, characteristics were evaluated by a comprehensive 
literature search conducted by Boeing Aerospace Company. This search provided values 
for most parameters and identified ar:eas where further research would be required to 
establish values. 
2.1 IDENnFICA nON OF VI ASTE FORM PARA."tETERS 
Parameters identified are shown in Figure 2.1-1, with relevant mission areas 
specified. Parameters were identified in six primary areas: nuclear, strength of 
materials, mechanical, th~!rfrial, "manufacturing, and chemical and crystal structure.""" " 
Parameters identified were evaluated for their relevance to mission areas of risk, flight 
rate, and waste payload design. Emphasis was placed on identificatIon of parameters 
relevant to risk and flight rate. Fabrication parameters were identified as a consequence 
of risk, flight rate, or as required for the level of detail necessary for waste payload 
concept definition in section 7.0. This effort provided a guide to the relative importance 
of evaluating the identified parameters. 
2.2 EVALUATION OF PARAMETERS 
Values of the parameters identified in section 2.1 for the candidate waste forms are 
shown in Figure 2.2-1. Areas where further research is required to establish parameter 
values are noted. 
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RELEVANT MISSION AREA 
AREA PARAMETER RISK FLIGHT OES.I.GN/ RATE FAB 
QUANTITY ( Kg IrmlM) y 
NUCLEAR TYPE OF NUCLEAR RADIATION EMITTED f/ p( Y 
HALF LIFE (YEARS) Y 
ULTIMATE TENSILE 5TRENGTH OR MODULUS OF RUPTURE (Pa) ;I 
STRENGTH YIELD STRalGTH IN Cot1PRESSION (O.2kOFFSETJ (Pa) y 
OF YIELD STRENGTH IN TENSION (O.2%OFFSET) (Pa) Y MATERIALS POISSON S RATIO PI' 
YOUNG S MODULUS (Pa) y 
DENSITY (9/CM ) y- JV' 
MECHANICAL MELTING PO lilT ('C) V DOILItIG POINT ~ C) Y 
COEFFICIEIIT OF LIUEAR EXPANSION ( lO·6/,C) r 
THERMAL LOAD IIIG (w/kg) w r V ~ 
THERMAL THERMAL C01mUCTlVlTY (iii7cJ y y' 
SPECIFIC HEAT (CAL/9:C) y L 
MANUFAC- FABRICATION 
.f-TURING HANDLING AND ASSEMBLY 
CHEMICAL CHEMICAL STABILITY Y OR 
CRYSTAL (Kg ISOTOPE ) Y STRUCTURE WASTE FORM LOADING 1(9 WASTE FOl<R 
Figuro 2.1-1. Waste Form Parameters 
2.2.1 Nuclear 
Primary nuclear parameters include the quantity of each waste mix, radiation 
emission characteristics, and half-life. 
Quantity is expressed in kilograms of waste form per metric ton of heavy metal and 
ranges from 0.40 kg for the lead iodide waste form to 47.38 kg for the cermet. Quantity 
is the primary factor in determination of the flight rate for each waste form. 
Radiation emission characteristics determine the waste payload shield requirements. 
Mass of the shield required for each waste torm is the second key factor in determining 
flight rate. Radiation emission for the lead iodide and technetium waste forms is low-
energy beta particles at relatively low levels of emission. Effective shielding for these 
levels of radiation is provided by even minimal containment provisions. The cermet waste 
form emits high-energy gamma radiation and 13 MeV neutrons. Extensive shielding is 
required (up to 20 cm of steel and graphite reduces the radiation level to about 0.6 rem/hr 
at a distance of 1 m from the waste form outer surface). 
Oetemdnation of half-life is required to aid the evaluation of long-term risks. Half-
lives for the waste mixes considered range from about 200,000 years for the technetium 
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to 1.7 x 107 years for the iodine 129. The cermet wash; form contains a variety of active 
waste oxides with a wide range of half-lives. 
2.2.2 Olemical or Crystal Structure 
Chemical and structural parameters include chemical stability and wast'! form 
loading. All three candidate waste forms are relatively inert. At room temperature, 
technetium will tarnish slowly in moist air; cermet, in effect, rusts. The primary 
container serves as a corrosion barrier for all waste forms considered. 
Waste form loading, in terms of kilograms of waste mix per kilogram of waste form, 
ranges from 0.56 kg for the lead iodide to 1.00 kg for the elemental technetium. 
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2.2.3 Mechanical 
Waste form mechanical properties are important for determining flight rate (density 
and accident effects), risk level {melting point and boiling point), and waste payload 
design (coefficient of linear expansion). Values for these candidate waste form param-
eters are ta!?ulated in Figure 2.2-~. The coefficients of linear expansion for lead iodide 
. . . . 
and technetium were not found in the literature search and may have to be determined by 
further research. 
2.2.4 Strength of Materials 
These properties include ultimate tensile strength or modulus of rupture, yield 
strength in compression, yield strength ill tension, Poisson's ratio, and Young's modulus. 
These variables are useful primarily ir .he evaluation of accident effects. 
Values are shown in Figure ::.2-1. Values of all properties for lead iodide and of 
strength properties for technetium were not found in the literature and may require 
further research to determin r'. Values for cermet were obtained by using the analogous 
characteristics of the eSSf ,tially similar superalloy hastalloy-G. Further refinement of 
cermet properties WOlllr, lequire a dedicated research effort. 
2.2.5 Thermal 
Thermal f'.operties can impose limits on maximum waste payload size due to , 
contraints impJsed by passive radiative heat dissipation in the space environment and by 
post-burial meltdown. 
Wa~te form thermal loading govems the amount of heat to be dissipated. Values 
range. ~ (om 8 x 10-5 W /kg for lead iodide to about 1 W /kg for the cermet. 
Thermal conductivity governs the center temperature of the waste form. All waste 
f:"1, ms have a high enough thermal conductivity to prevent exceeding waste form tempera-
ture limits at the center of the waste form based on radiative heat dissipation at the 
space disposal destination. 
Specific heat is important for calculation of transient temperature response during 
evaluation of action conditions. Values range from a low of 0.04 for lead iorlide to 
approximately 0.14 for the cermet waste form. 
2.2.6 Manufacturing 
Handling and assembly constraints imposed by radiation and fabrication characteris-
tics govern the wast~ form manufacturing processes and assembly of the waste payload. 
Radiation emission from iodine 129 and ,technetium are low enough to allow glovebox 
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handling. The high gamma and neutron radiation levels of the cermet waste form require 
remote handling at all stages of waste form fabrication and assembly. 
Fabrication of the lead iodide waste form can be accomplished by casting it in place 
inside the steel radiation shield and primary container. This is made possible by the 
relatively low melting temperature of 402°C. The refractory nature of technetium and 
the cermet requires fabrication by powder metallurgy processes using uniarial press and 
sintering techniques. 
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3.0 CHARACTERIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE WASTE FORMS 
The objective of this section is to take the waste forms defined in section 2.0 and 
incorporate manufacturing and other constraints to define the physical configuration for 
each waste form to be used as a basis for waste pay load design in sections 4.0 and 7.0. 
The approach used was to coordinate with Battelle Northwest Laboratories in a 
parallel contract to determine fabrication constraints applicable to selected waste forms, 
allowing definition of candidate waste form configurations for use in the waste payload 
design effort. Two basic configurations were defined for the three candidate waste 
forms, ilIustra ted in Figure 3.0-1. 
WASTE 
MIX 
• GRANULES 
Pb 1129 
LJ ~ 10 lElIEH~ 
fllOfJfUtJ 
BILLETS 
Tc99 
CERMET 
Figure 3.0-1. 
" , 
I \ :~ 
• MELT/CAST 
;; ~WASTE 8,' FORM 
_
el,. BILLE~S 
I _ 
'. -"~CORE 
• MECHAN I CAL 
LOAD INTO CORE 
STRUCTURE 
Wa3te Fcrm Configuration.s 
The technetium and cermet waste forms are fabricated as right cylindrical billets 
with height equal to diameter. Corners are rounded to accommodate the uniaxial press 
and sintering process. Size of the individual billets is limited by constraints imposed by 
the press and sintering fabrication process to approximately 50 mm maximum dimension 
(height or diameter). Several thousand of the technetium or cermet billets would be 
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stacked in a hexagonal c1ose-packed array to provide maximum volumetric efficiency in 
packing the spherical radiation shield and primary container. Both the exact size and the 
total number of billets are selected as functions of the payload size to maximize packing 
density. 
The lead iodide waste form used for disposal of iodine 129 would be melted and cast 
in place within the· sphericaf radiation shield and primary container to yield a monolithic 
spherical waste form. Although, theoretically, 10096 volumetric efficiency could be 
approached using this method, a more conservative figure of 9096 was assumed to allow 
for voids and shrinkage during the casting process. 
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•• 0 ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE WASTE MIX FORM IMPACT ON SPACE SYSTEMS 
Primary space system areas impacted by the adaptation of alternative waste mixes 
include space disposal destinations and the trajectories required to reach them, the waste 
payload system and systems for the protection of the waste payload, and launch and orbit 
transfer systems as a consequence of reduced launch system capacity and launch rate. 
Flight support systems were treated parametrically using data from the 1980 study. 
Waste payload protection systems were deemphasized as the result of the decision at the 
first working group meeting to use the orbiter as the basis for protection of the waste 
payload. 
The 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit destination was selected as the study baseline as it 
was the best characterized destination studied and because earlier studies show it 
satisfies all stability requirements for permanent disposal of nuclear waste in space. 
The basic task became the evaluation of the impact on the waste payload system 
itself and on orbit transfer and launch system components. The evaluation was conducted 
in three parts. In the first, the impact of alternative waste forms on the waste payload 
system was de·ermined. Parametric expressions were developed for the net mass of 
waste form delivered as a function of waste payload system total mass for each of the 
three alternative waste forms. In the second, the capability of launch systems optimized . 
for low launch rates (less than five launches per year) was determined. In the third, 
candidate orbit transfer systems were characterized parametrically and matched to the 
launch systems and waste payload systems to determine the most effective system in 
terms of net mass of waste form delivered per mission for low-launch-rate scenarios. 
4.1 ALTERNATIVE WASTE MIX/FORM IMPACT ON WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM 
CONCEPTS 
4.1.1 Candidate Waste Payload Configurations 
Candidate waste payload configurations developed to accommodate the waste forms 
defined in section 3.0 are shown in Figure 4.1-1. 
Both configurations use the shield concept developed in the MSFC 1980 study. The 
shield assembly is the primary barrier against release of the waste form and encases the 
core and waste form billets inside a seamless shell of Inconel 62.5 superalloy, 224 mm (8.8 
in.) thick. This shell is further protected by a layer of graphite in the form of 228 
interlocking tiles, .50 mm (I.97 in.) thick, and a final outer steel shell, 4.3 mm (0.19 in.) 
thick. 
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Tc99 OR 
CERMET 
WASTE 
FORM 
BILLETS 
• CCtlST~T SHIELD THICmESS 
STEEL (ZZ4mm) 
GlWHITE ( SOml!) 
STEEL (4. Jlnll) 
SHIELD ASSY 
Pb 11Z9 110NOLITHIC WASTE FORM 
(CAST IN PLACE) 
IODINE 129 
Figure 4.1-1. Waste Payload Con/iguratfon.s 
Technetium or cermet waste form bi11ets are stacked in bores drilled in a solid 
stainless stee~ waste form support structure or core. The shield assembly is fabricated in 
two halves, which are assembled around the core and electron beam welded into a single 
seamless unit. 
In contrast, the iodine 129 waste form is cast in place inside an assembled spherical 
shield. The molten lead iodide is poured in through a small aperture which is welded shut 
following the casting operation. Closeout tiles are installed over the welded plug in the 
metal shield. 
Parametric mass breakdowns for the three reference waste mixes are shown in 
Figures 4.1-2 through 4.1-4. Each figure presents the mass of the shield assembly, waste 
form billets, and, if used, the waste form support structure or core as a function of gross 
mass of the waste payload. 
4.1.2 Cermet Waste Payload Characteristics 
Figure 4.1-2 shows the mass breakdown of the cermet waste payload. The relatively 
high proportion of the waste form mass devoted to the shield assembly is apparent, aS'is 
the increased volumetric efficiency realized in the waste payload with increasing total 
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mass. The strong effect of volumetric efficiency on the net mass of waste form delivered 
in each waste payload for the cermet is apparent. 
4.1.3 Technetium Waste Payload Characteristics 
Figure 4.1-3 presents the mass breakdown for the technetium 99 waste form. The 
increased mass of wacte form for a given waste payload can be seen as can the relatively 
reduced impact of the mass of the core. The increased efficiency is due to the high 
density of the technetium 99 elemental waste form. 
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Figure 4.1-4. Waste Payload Parametric MaS8 Breakdown-Lead Iodide (Pb Ii29) 
4.1.4 Iodine 129 Waste Payload Characteristics 
Figure 4.1-4 shows the mass breakdown for the lead iodide waste form. Because of 
the monolithic cast nature of the waste form, no mass is required for a waste form 
support structure. The effect of economy of scale on packaging efficiency can be seen. 
4.1 • .5 Parametric Characterization of Candidate Waste Payload System Masses 
The ratio of total waste payload mass to the mass of waste form delivered is 
compared for the three candidate waste forms in Figure 4.1-5. 
Technetium 99 shows the most favorable ratio due to its high density. The lead 
iodide is the second most efficient due to the high volumetric efficiency of the c.lst-in-
place method of waste payload fabrication. The relatively low density of the cermet was· 
the least efficient in terms of packaging of the three waste forms considered. 
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These parametric characterizations, relating waste form mass delivered to gross 
mass of the waste payload, served as the basis for total space system performance 
estimates in section 4.4. 
4.1.6 Cermet Waste Payload Thermal Analysis 
A thermal analysis of the cermet waste payload was conducted with -:.wo objectives: 
(1) to determine that core melting did not occur with the reference waste form thermal 
loading in the destination orbit at 0.85 AU and (2) to determine the maximum waste form 
thermal loading compatible with avoidance of core melting using radiative heat dissipa-
tion at the reference destination. 
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Thermal modeling and analysis of the waste payload were performed for the 
reference destination orbit and wasf-: form. An upper limit for the waste form 
temperature was determined to be about 700°C, well below the 12000 C melting point. 
Additional analysis showed that a waste form thermal loading of 0.022 W Icm3 would be 
required to attain the 12000 C melting temperature. A detailed description of the thermal 
analysis conducted is in Appendix C. 
4.2 LAUNCH SYSTEMS 
The objective of the launch systems task was to evaluate the candidate launch 
systems defined in the 1980 MSFC study to determine the be:lt choice of launch systems 
for candidate waste forms requiring only two to five launche~; per year, instead of the 50 
to 60 launches per year required by the cermet waste form. 
The approach ll~ed was to apply the risk criteria used in the 1980 study and to 
reevaluate the cost effectiveness of the candidates ba~d on the reduced launch rate. The 
revised cost trades resulted in selection of the following two candidate laurtch systems: 
1. For single launch missions, the existing space transportation system (STS), capable 
of transporting 29,500 kg (65,000 Ib) to low Earth orbit (LEO). 
2. For dual launch mis3ions, two STS launches with on-<lrbit rendezvous. 
4.2.1 Candidate Launch Systems 
Candidate launch vehicles from the 1980 study are illustrated in Figur~ 4.2-1, along 
with key characteristics in the areas of risk, cost, and performance. Major elements of 
each candidate are listed. 
Risk is expressed in terrns of whether or not the vehicle possesses an intact abort 
capability. In the event of a malfunction, winged orbiters are able, in most cases, to 
jettison the external tank and glide back for a landing at the launch site or at an alternate 
field. Shuttle derived vehicles (SDV) do' not have this capcl.bility. 
Performance is expressed in terms of payload bay size and the payload that the 
candidate vehicle can lift to a 28.5-deg inclination crbit at an altitude of 260 km. 
Cost is expressed in terms f)f the design, development, test, and engineering 
(DDT&E) required to implement the candidate, the production cost per unit, and the cost 
per flight. 
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Figure 4.2-1. Lcnmch Vehicle Characteristic! 
4.2.2 Selection of Low-Launch-Rate Syste.ns 
Launch system selection was accomplished by comparison of life cycle costs (LCC) . 
for the candidate vehicles. Costs for the lO-year reference mission were compared by 
calculating the number of flights required for each candidate s}'stern to lift the full 
mission cumulative mass to low Earth orbit. The life cycle cost was calculated by 
multiplying the launch cost from Figure 4.2-1 by the total number of flights required to 
dispose of the reference cermet waste form. TIlis total was added to the DDT&E cost 
estimate to derive an estimate of each system's mission life cycle costs. 
Figure 4.2-2 compares launch system life cycle costs and shows some of the key 
assumptions used in their calculation. The ordinate shows an estimate of launch system 
life cycle cost in billions of dollars. Cumulative mass in thousands of metric tons is 
plotted on the abscissa, along with years from program start for the reference mission .. 
scenario. 
Launch costs for the four candidate systems are represented by the four lines 
running from left to right. The slope intercept represent~ DDT&E for initial deployment 
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Figure 4.2-2. LatDlch Vehicle Li/e Cyclo Coot Compari!on 
of the launch syst~m; values range from zero for the reference shuttle to about $3;2 
billion for the uprated shuttle 'teamed with the liquid rocket booster (LRB) version of the. 
shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicle. The slope of each line is proportional to the cost 
per flight. 
Vertical dotted lines represent the reference cermet mission mass tr~nsported to 
LEO for the reference mission (approximately 27,OOOt over 10 years) and for the sum of 
both iodine 129 and technetium (approximately 2,OOOt over 10 years). 
The choice of the most cost-effective launch system for both cermet and Tc 99 plus 
iodine is apparent. The combination of uprated STS plus SOV with LRB's is the most 
cost-effective for the launch rate required by the cermet waste payload by approximately 
$4 billion. At the low launch rate required by the iodine and technetium waste forms, the 
existing 65K STS is the most cost-effective choice, showing a total cost of $1 billion less 
than the cost of the next most effective candidate. The cost savings is due to eliminatlon. 
of DOneE expenses for launch vehicle development, made possible by use of an existing 
system. The risk advantages of the winged orbiter are retained. 
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4.2.3 Launch System Performance 
Performance characteristics of selected single- and dual-launch systems for space 
disposal of nuclear waste are summarized in Figure 4.2-3 for both high- and low-launch-
rate systems. The performance parameter shown for each option is the net mass at 
startburn (just after deployment from the launch systf:m) of the entire orbit transfer 
system, including injection and placement stages and the waste payload. The mass of 
airborne support equipment (AS E) retained in the orbiter cargo bay has been subtracted 
from the launch system capacity. These values were used as the basis for total system 
performance estimates in section 4.4. 
~ LOW LAUNCH HIGH LAUNCH RATE ~ATE Pb 1129 OR Tc 99 UTILIZATION . CERMET/HLW) OPTION 
UPRATED STS: STANDARD SHUTTLE: 
SINGLE LAUNCH ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM MASS AT STARTBURN MASS AT STARTBURN: 
32,250 Kg 26,625 Kg 
UPRATED STS+SDCLV, 2 STANDARD SHUTTLES; 
LEO RENDEZVOUS. LEO RENDEZVOUS 
DUAL LAUNCH ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 
MASS AT STARTBURN MASS AT START BURN 
81,647 Kg 53,678 Kg 
Figure 4.2-3. Lcnmch System Perfa-mance 
4.3 ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
The objective of the orbit transfer system task was to review the candidate systems 
identified in the 1980 study in order to define the optimum orbit trans~..:r system for the 
low-launch-rate STS required for disposal of the iodine and technetium waste forms. 
The approach was to apply the new constraints imposed by the revised choice of 
launch systems to the candidate orbit transfer systems and vehicles identified in the 1980 
study. The resulting candidate vehicles, systems, and perforrr..lnce were parametrically 
character ized. 
Five systems were selected as being compatible with the revised launch system 
constraints, including single-stage systems using cryogenic chemical propellants and 
electric propulsion, two-stage systems using aerobraking to enable reuse of the injection. 
stage, and use of storable liquid and electric second stages. Performance of all five· 
systems was parametrically characterized for use in total system performance evaluations 
in section 4.4. 
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c-t 4.3.1 Identification of Candidate Orbit Transfer Systems for low Launch Rates 
The review of candidate orbit transfer systems applied constraints derived from the' 
1980 study of reuse and from the revised selection of launch vehicles. Reuse optiO.1S 
involving all-propulsive chemical propellant injection stages were eliminated for not being 
cost effective when compared to the aerobraked-return option. Reuse of solar electricf\i 
stages (SES) was also determined to be uneconomical. 
Use of cryogenic placement stages (CRYO SOlS) was ruled out due to the len3t~1 
constraints imposed by use of the 65K STS without the shuttle-derlved vehicle. The 18.3m 
cargo bay length of the STS is not sufficient to contain both a low-density cryogenic 
placement stage and an aerobraked injection stage. The far more compact storable 
propellant and solar electric placement stages can be easily accommodated. 
The results of this screening process are illustrated in Figure 4.3-1. Systems 
identified and their designations include: (1) a single-stage e};pendable solar electric 
IYITOII 
--L--
STAGING II r---------'--------, 
o=rnoNi 
"---,r----' 
--1---
1 
ftl.usl 1 OPTIONS 
I. 
--1---r--'+---, 
Figure 4.3-1. 
stage (OTS-5), (2) a single-stage expendable 'long-life orbital transfer vehicle (OTV) (OTS.;. 
0, (3) a multistaged system using a reusable aerobraked cryogenic injection stage and an 
expendable solar electric propulsion second stage (OTS-4), (4) a multistaged system using 
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a reusable aerobraked cryogenic propellant injection stage with an expendable storable 
liquid propellant second stage (OTS-2), and (5) a multistaged system using an expendable 
cryogenic propellant injection stage and an expendable storable liquid propellant second 
s..:age for placement (OTS-3). 
4.3.2 Definition of Candidate Orbit Transfer System Vehicle Elements 
The following vehicles are required for the candidate orbit transfer system options: 
1. Injection stages 
a. Reusable, aerobraked, cryogenic injection stage (OTS-2, -4) 
b. Expendable cryogenic injection stage (OTS-3) 
2. Placement stages 
a. Storable propellant solar orbit insertion stage (5015) (OTS-2, -3) 
b. Solar electric placement stage (OTS-4) 
3. Combinations of injection and placement stages 
. . 
a. LOiLH2 long-life DTY (OTS-l) 
b. Solar electric stage (OTS-.4, -5) 
As the first step in determining the performance for the range of orbit transfer· 
system options, point designs and parametric mass relationships were developed for the 
candidate vehicles. Point designs were taken from the 1980 study and are documented 
there. Parametric mass relationships were extended to cover the smaller propellant. 
loadings required of orbit transfer systems using the existing STS. The resulting point 
design vehicles are illustrated with some of their key characteristics in Figure 4.3-2. 
Parametric relationships for mass at burnout to mass of propellant were generated 
from the point design mass sta:ements described. The burnout mass versus propellant 
mass relationships are shown for chemical propellant injection and placement stages in 
Figures 4.3-3 and 4.3-4, respectively. A series of points were selected from these curves 
and used for the performance analysis. Point design masses were generated on an 
individual basis for the two solar electric stages. 
21 
1 
! 
I 
,,1 
I 
1 
I 
J 
, 
\ 
t! 
i ___ 
• i 
i 
I 
~ 
1 
l 
1 
! 
1· , 
j 
./ 
. <._., ... ,~,~.~ .••• _ •. :...;op·"r. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
0180-26777 -2 
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INT DfSIOM CHARACTERISTICS It:cl--- .. 
CONFIGURAnON USAGE CIIJUSIONS 
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Figure 4.3-2. Orbit Tramfer S>,"tem Vehicle" and Characteristic! 
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Figure 4.3-4. Parametric MClS3 Characterization of SOlS Configuration 
4JJ Parametric OlaracteriZation'of Candidate Orbit Transfer System Performance 
The candidate vehicles described in the previous section were assembled into' 
candidate orbit transfer systems. The following orbit transfer systems were identified in 
section 4.3.2 for the nuclear waste disposal mission: 
1. Solar electric stage (OTS-5) 
2. Long-life L02/LH2 OTY (OTS-I) 
3. Aerobraked OTY/SES (OTS-4) 
4. Aerobraked recoverable OTY/storable SOlS (OTS-2) 
5. Expendable OTY/storable SOlS (OTS-3) 
Parametric payload versus weight relationships were developed to determine the. 
maximum payload capabilities of the different orbit transfer systems for each of the 
launch options. To obtain these relationships, the vehicle definitions of section 4.3.2 and 
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the mission parameters from the 1980 study (see sec. 6.1) were used as inputs to the 
Boeing OTV Payload and Sequential Mass Calculation (PSMC) code. Given a stage burnout 
mass and propellant capacity, PSMC calculates propellant consumption, losses, and stage 
mass for each event in the mission profile. 
Payload and start mission mass are iterated until calculated propellant consumption 
and burnout mass match the specified values. The program incorporates a complete 
mission profile of time and delta-V for each event. The type of burn, either reaction 
control system (RCS) vr main engine, and corresponding starOt-stop losses can be specified. 
Boiloff and electrical power system losses are calculated from the timeline and specified 
loss rates. The loss rate is specified as a function of propellant capacity to handle 
different stage sizes. A detailed mission sequential mass statement listing event, delta-V, 
propellant usage, losses, and mass is printed along with a summary mass statement. 
In addition to basic stage masses from the mass trending curves, a 254-kg interstage 
is carried by the OTV/SOIS combinations. This is jettisoned by the OTV after injection 
into heliocentric transfer. A payload adapter mass of 227 kg was added to the SOlS 
burnout masses. The output of the code provided a parametric characterization of the 
performance of each candidate system option as illustrated in Figure 4.3-5. 
Figure 4.3-5. 
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Orbit transfer system mass is plotted on the ordinate as a function of delivered 
payload mass, plotted on the abscissa. Variables include both solar electric and storab!e 
propellant SOlS propulsion and two injection stage options: aerobrake return for recovery 
and expending the injection stage without recovery. Single-stage options include the solar 
electric stage and the llOTV. The mass at startburn of each candidate system can be 
determined for any waste payload mass between 2500 and 15,000 kg. 
These performance characteristics, along with those of sections 4.1 and 4.2, 
provided the basis for the total system performance comparisons in section 4.4. 
4.3.4 SOlS Reliability Optimization 
A primary input to the concurrent risk analysis being conducted in a separate BCl 
contract was reliability figures for the orbit transfer system vehicles. Figures were 
required for the injection stage and SOlS of the reference space system (see sec. 7.0). 
Reliability values for the injection stage were available from past studies. The SOlS, 
however, was sufficiently different in the configuration of its avionics system to require a 
separate analysls. 
A preliminary analysis of the SOlS as defined for the 1980 study indicated it has a 
total mission reliability prediction of 0.901, with the major failure probability occurring 
during the dormant cruise phase. The failure potential is nearly equally divided among the 
four major subsystems. 
This level of reliability was determined to be inadequate to meet system safety 
guidelines. Accordingly, a study was conducted to determine the optimum level of 
redundancy in the major subsystem areas. The analysis traded mission reliability against 
weight and indicated that SOlS mission reliability can be increased from the original· 
equipment design value of 0.901 to 0.995. The reliability of the optimized SOlS design is 
limited to the 0.995 region by certain equipment where redundancy is not practical. 
Results of the study are summarized in Figure 4.3-6, which illustrates the 
relationship between the composite mass of key subsystems (primary avionics, propulsion, 
and RCS) and system reliability. The circled lines represent individual configurations 
evaluated. Case 1 is a single-string configuration shown as a reference. The vertical 
dotted line at 1000-kg system mass intersects the reliability curve at a value of 0.91, 
which represents the reference configuration from the 1980 study. The second vertical 
dotted line at about 1290 kg represents the selected value for reliability. At 0.9927, it 
approaches the asymptote of 0.995 imposed by fundamental system limits. Added mass 
amounts to 313 kg •. 
26 
'. , 
~~'" '._~_ .. _".~_.' .. ___ ~.",."~. __ '._ ... "." .... ~ ........ ~ • .t:'>"'e:-o-,.~_ ..... __ .. __ :. 
0.116 
O.u. 
0.112 
0.111 
0.00 
~ 0.88 ..J 
iD 
«( 
:J 0.88 w 
ac 
~ 
w 0.84 14 
>-
OIl 0.82 
0.80 
0.78 I· 
I 
0.78 I 
0.7. 
0.72 
800 1000 1100 
Figure 4.3-6. 
31UI 
0180-26777 -2 
1200 1300 
SYSTEM MASS (~III 
FAILURE RATE 
• DORMANT FAILURE RATE· 
1/10 OPERATING 
1400 1600 
., Comput., 
., Bollory 
• Quad ,odundont HI .11_ 
• Quod ,odundM\I T.poll._ 
.N2H. TInk 
• ~H. Mll'lilol<l 
.~ _, Iromground 
& FiN! "kobility: 
.To IUrt bu,n: 0.9960 
• Bum complo!ion: 0,9969 
5015 MCl33 and Reliability Optimization Study Results 
Added components with reference to the 1980 study configuration are also show'n; : 
along with values for the overall stage reliability. Redundancy management is assumed to 
be handled from the ground. 
A ,detailed description of the methodology and assumptions used in the optimization 
is contained in Appendix D. 
4.4 PARAMETRIC PERFORMANCE CHARACTERIZATION OF LOW-LAUNCH-RATE 
SYSTEMS FOR THE SPACE DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 
The objective of this section was to combine the results of sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 
to define the performance of concepts combining launch, orbit transfer, and waste 
payload systems. 
For each launch system, the efficiency of the candidate orbit transfer systems for 
transport of each candidate waste form was compared, using the parametric mass and 
performance data from sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
Review of the comparison allowed selection of three candidate orbit transfer 
systems for the Single-launch option and two systems for the dual-launch option. These 
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systems are viable candidates for disposal of waste forms requlrmg low launch rates 
(equivalent to less than five launches per year of the existing STS). 
4.4.1 Candidate Total System Concepts 
There are a total of 18 distinct concepts for space disposal of low-launch-rate (Tc99 
and Pb I~21 waste forms. The concepts ~re formed by combining one of tWI) launch 
system options (single or dual launch) with one of the five orbit transfer system options, 
yielding 10 possible space disposal transportation options. One orbit transfer option (use 
of a single-stage solar electric orbit transfer system) is not compatible with the 
d'Jal-Iaunch system because of its low demands on paylaod. This yields a total of nine 
candidate space transportation systems, which are illustrated in Figure 4.4-1, showing the 
system deriv~tion, characteristics, and designation. Any of the candidate systems can be 
used to dispose of either of the low-launch-rate waste mixes, yielding a total of 18 
concepts. 
SYSTEM 
LAUNCH 
SYSTEM 
OPTIONS 
ORBIT 
TRANSFER 
SYSTEM 
OPTIONS 
TOTAL 
SYSTEM 
OPTION 
DESIGNATION 
Figure 4.4.1. Identlfication of Candidate Orblt Transfer SY3tem3 fcx- Low Launch 
Ratp.s 
4.4.2 Total System Performance Evaluation 
The 18 concepts identified in section 4.4.1 were evaluated for relative performance 
using a technique which allows direct and simultaneous graphic comparison of total. 
system performance by combining parametric characterization of orbit transfer systerrl .. 
performance and waste payload systems. 
28 
0180-26777-2 
ORIGINAL p~'?E 1S 
OF PQOq QUALITY 
Figure 4.4-2 summarizes the parametric relationship between launch system, orbit 
transfer system, and net mass of payload delivered for each candidate waste form. 
Launch system payloads are :;hown as vertical dotted lines on the left half of the chart. 
Candidate orbit transfer system payloads are determined by the intersection of the 
vertical lines, representing launch system payloads, with the slanted lines, representing 
orbit transfer system performance. 
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Figure 4.4-2. Parametric Performance Characteristic3 of Orbit Tra1l$fer System3 
fa- Cermet, Pb Ii2~ and Tc99 Wa3te Fa-ms 
Gross payloads of candidate orbit transfer systerns are represented by the horizontal. 
dotted lines which extend into the right half of the plot. Intersection of these lines with 
the curves representing gross mass of the waste payload to net mass of waste form 
carried determines the net mass of waste form de!ivered by each candidate combination 
of launch system, orbit transfer system, and waste form. Using this technique, perform-
ance of any orbit transfer system option can be rapidly evaluated in terms of net waste 
form delivered per launch. 
Typical systems evaluated included the ~ ~;O best chemical propellant options for 
both single-launch and dual-launch scenarios and the single-stage electric option used in 
the single-launch mode. Further discrimination of systems would require detailed 
definition of relative life cycle costs to determine the most cost effective. All 
candidates are comparable in terms of risk. 
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Results of the evaluation of candidate systems are summarized in Figure 4.4-3. The 
performance of low-launch-rate systems using one or two launches of the 65K STS with 
various orbit transfer systems is shown in terms of waste form mass delivered and 
equivalent flights per year for the candidate system. Performance of the reference 
system described in sections 7.0 and 8.0 is shown for reference. 
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5.0 REFERENCE SPACE SYSTEMS SELECTION AND OVERVIEW 
This section summarizes the rationale for selecting the reference space system, 
along with an overview of system elements and operation. More detailed information on 
system elements and operation is contained in sections 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0. 
5.1 REFERENCE SPACE SYSTEM SELECTION 
The reference space system was selected at a joint working group meeting in August 
of 1981, between Boeing Aerospace Company, Battelle Northwest Laboratories, Battelle 
Columbus Laboratories, and the \1arshall Space Flight Center. The selected waste mix is 
the cermet high-level waste mix, with 95% of the cesium and strontium removed, as 
developed by Battelle Northwest Laboratories. This waste mix was the only one of the 
three considered which showed the potential for long-term risk reductions when compared 
to the reference mined geologic repository. 
Thl! space system used to transport the reference waste mix from the launch si te to 
the 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit destination was selected from the candidates recommended 
at the conclusion of the 1980 MSFC Space Disposal Study. The system selected combines 
the lowest risk of any concept considered with the highest performance of the recom-
mended systems. Of the four systems recommended for further study at the end of the· 
1980 effort, the reference system was judged to be most compatible with the direction of 
ongoing NASA studies of future space transportation systems. 
5.2 REFERENCE SPACE SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The following section provides a brief overview of the system elements and 
operations described in detail in sections 7.0 and 8.0. 
'.2.1 System Elements 
Major elements of the reference system, shown in Figure 5.2-1, include: 
1. The waste payload system, which supports and protects the waste form during 
ascent and orbit transfer operations. 
2. The flight support system, which provides a mechanical interface between the wa.ste 
payload system and the launch vehicle system and which has provisions for 
mechanical transfer of the waste payload system to the orbit transfer system i~ 
LEO. 
3. The launch system, which transports the waste payload system and orbit transfer 
system from the launch site into a 270-km-altitude low Earth orbit. The 
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LAUNCH SITE FACILITIES 
Figure 5.2-1. Reference Space System Ma/a- Elements 
launch system is composed of two vehicles: one that carries the waste payload and 
flight support system (FSS) and the other, the orbit transfer system. The waste 
payload system is carried. in an uprated version of the existing STS using liquid' 
rocket boosters. The uprated STS has a payload capacity to LEO of 47,000 kg. The. 
orbit transfer system is carried to LEO in a shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicle' 
which replaces the winged orbiter component of the space transportation system 
with an expendable cargo shroud and a reusable propulsion and avionics module. The 
shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicle provides increased internal volume for payload 
accommodation and has a payload capacity of 84,000 kg. 
4. The orbit transfer system, which transports the waste payload from LEO to the 
destination heliocentric orbit at 0.85 AU. The orbit transfer system is composed of 
a reusable injection stage and an expendable SOlS. A waste payload adapter on the 
front of the SOlS allows docking with the orbiter and provides mechanical support 
for the waste payload during orbit transfer operations. 
5. Launch site facilities, which consi5t of a nuclear payload processing facility (NPPF),. 
for assembly and integration of the waste payload system with the FSS, and the 
facilities required for turnaround of the launch vehicle systems and the reusable 
portion of the orbit transfer system. 
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S.2.2 System Operation 
Figure 5.2-2 is a schematic of key mission operations for the reference space 
system. Key events include: 
® 1011 .' SOLAR ORBI, ® 5 SHUTDOWN ,'" INSERTION _\ 
INJ£CTlONANO ~-
- ........ ~ SOIS.SEPAR:TION c: .i) ? 4~ . \ ~~.~~ ----~~ISE. 
~/I ~ ~ 'S'\ ~(~OI4STAGE I / \ \ V. RETRO BURN ~ ~sn ~;:!~PUUION PAYLOAD ~\ .. AVIONICS . LAUNCH TO ~" / MODULE I . LOIY EARTH ORBIT . RE-ENTRV ~ (ORBITER) // ,: ~ ..... ,,'" .@ /~ 
ORBITXF~R ~./ ~~s~~~ ~~~~~~RBlT / • INJECTION STAGE (CARGO LAUNCH VEHICLE! .".. ,/,/./ 
____ AfROGllAtaNG MANEWER 
__ .~~ INJ~ONSTAGE 
RECOVERV ~~ ORBITER RE-ENTRY 
AND LANDING 
Figure 5.2-2. Reference Space System Mission Operation.! SUmmary 
1. Launch of the cargo launch vehicle which places the two-stage orbit transfer system 
into LEO. 
2. Launch of the waste payload to LEO in the uprated space shuttle. 
3. Rendezvous between the orbit transfer system and the orbiter in LEO. 
4. Transfer of the waste payload to the orbit transfer system from the FSS which 
supports it in the orbiter cargo bay. Subsequent to waste payload transfer, the 
orbiter walts in LEO for recovery of the first stage of the orbit transfer system. 
5. Injection of the expendable SOlS into heliocentric transfer orbit by the recoverable 
first stage. 
6. After a l65-day coast in transfer orbit, injection of the SOlS and the waste payload 
hlto th~ destination heliocentric orbit at 0.85 AU. 
7. Recovery of the injection stage for reuse, following a retroburn and aerobraking 
maneuver which inserts it into LEO. 
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6.0 REFERENCE SPACE SYSTEM TRAJECTORIES 
AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Three basic mission profiles are used in the space disposal of nuclear waste: the 
delivery mission, Earth orbit rescue mission, and the deep-space rescue mission. The 
delivery mission transports the nuclear waste payload from the launch site to its final 
destination orbit at 0.85 AU. Rescue missions provide for rendezvous of a rescue vehicle 
with the waste payload after a deJivery mission failure with subsequent transfer of the 
waste payload to the final destination. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first describes the mission profiles, 
trajectory elements, and performance requirements of the deJivery mission. The second 
and third sections describe mission prllfi.Jes and pe:formance requiremen':s for Earth orbit 
and deep-space rescue missions, respectivl!!Y. 
6.1 DELIVERY MISSION 
The delivery mission takes place in three distinct phases: ascent of the uprated STS, 
which transports the payload from the launch site to LEO; injection, which places the 
SOlS and waste payload into tile heliocentric transfer orbi t; and placement, which leaves 
the expended 5015 and waste payload in the destination circular orbit. 
- -
6.1.1 Uprated STS Ascent Mission Profile 
A typical ascent trajectory profile for the uprated shuttle is shown in Figure 6.1-1, 
which iJJustrates altitude as a function of range. Major events and time are noted. 
The shuttle is launched with the three orbiter space shuttle main engines (SSME) 
burning in parallel with the two LRB's. The ascent trajectory reaches a maximum 
dynamic pressure (Q) of 650 Ib/ft2 approximately 60 sec after launch at an altitude of 
10,214m. At 108 sec, the total load factor reaches the first stage maximum value of 2.6 
g's. LRB separation occurs at approximately 126 sec at an altitude of 45,263m, 51.4 km 
downrange from the launch site. The LRB's are recovered and returned to the launch site 
for reuse. After LRB separation, the orbiter continues to ascend, using the three SSME's 
which prOVide thrust vector control. The total load factor reaches a maximum value of 
3.0 g's (longitudinal) at 415 sec and remains at that value until 470 sec, when the main 
engine cutoff (MECO) sequence is initiated. 
MECO takes place 478 sec after liftoff, when the orbiter has reached an altitude of . 
110,1 55m. The external tank (ET) separation occurs at MECO. After a short coasting 
period, the orbi tal maneuvering system (OMS) engines are fired at 514 sec to provide the 
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additional velocity needed to insert the orbiter into an elliptical orbi t having a minimum 
apogee of 369 km. The OMS engine cutoff occurs 648 sec after launch at an altitude ot 
133.9 km, when the orbiter is 299 km from the launch site. An additional OMS burn at 
~!X>ge'! is used to circularize at the 370-km orbit altitude. Velocities, ranges, and altitude 
for m ljor asc.ent events are shown in Figure 6.1-2. 
(vent Time Altitude" I (min) (sec) (km) 
. 
I!;nitbn ·3.46 0.056 
(SSME+ LRB) 
Uftoff ·3.4!S 0.056 
Begin pitchover 7.2 0.166 
Maximum dynamic 1 9 13.3 
pmsuro 
. 
LRB separation 2 4 47.3 
MECO 8 3& 117.5 
External tank 8 50 118.4 
sep3ration 
OM5-1 ignition 10 39 126 
OMs.l cutoff 12 24 133.9 
OMs.2 ignition 43 58 369.0 
OMs.2 cutoff 45 34 370.0 
• Altitude referenced to orbiter center of gravity above 
geodetic representation of Earth's surface • 
•• Rotational velocity of Earth at KSC latitude of 28.50 N. 
Inertial Range Velocity- • (kml Im/secl 
410 0 
410 0 
410 0 
740 6.4 
1537 38.1 
7823 1334 
7832 1427 
7d13 2220 
--
-. 
769,1 2!j9~ 
7615 '57~ 
7686 16u.a 
Figure 6.1-2. Urrated 51'S Ascent Trajectory and Event! 
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6.1.2 Shuttle-Derived Cargo Launch Vehicle (SDCLV) Ascr:nt Mission Profile 
The SDCLV trajectory profile is essentially identical to that of the uprated STS. 
6.1.3 Launch System Coordination 
Launch of uprated STS and SDCLV into the same 38-deg inclination orbit, 4 hr 
apart, minimizes orbit transfer system on-orbit dwell time and allows two STS contingency 
launch opportunities within 24 hr of the SDCLV launch. 
The SDCLV is launched first using a launch azimuth (referenced to true north) of 
about 70 deg. This places the SDCLV (and its payload, the orbit transfer system) into a 
38-deg inclination orbit. The SDCLV launch takes place as the Earth's rotation places 
KSC under the 38-deg orbit ground track, as the orbit track overflies KSC to the north. 
After 4 hr, the Earth has rotated about 60 deg, bringing KSC under the 38-deg orbit 
ground track again. The uprated STS is now launched heading south at an azimuth of 110 
deg and is inserted into the same 38-deg orbi t as the SDCL V, about 400 km behind the 
SDCLV. This provides the correct initial location for subsequent rendezvous and docking 
maneuvers. The 4-hr interval between launches allows the SDCLV to complete just under 
three orbits-sufficient time to allow verification of orbit transfer system status prior to 
launch commit for the uprated STS which carries the waste payload. 
6.1.4 SOlS and Waste Payload Injection Mission Profile 
The SOlS and waste payload injection mission profile is illustrated in Figure 6.1-3 • 
The mission consists of two primary phases: injection, which leaves the SOlS and waste 
payload in the heliocentric transfer orbit, and OTV recovery, which brings the OTV bac t( 
to LEO for recovery by the shuttle and subsequent reuse. 
Injection. The objective of the injection segment of the mission is to achieve the 
desired aphelion velod ty for the transfer from 1 AU to 0.85 AU. This requires escaping 
the Earth's gravitational field with an excess velocity, in a direction opposite to Earth's 
heliocentric motion, that will reduce the heliocentric velocity to the transfer orbit 
aphelion velocity. Earth escape is achieved via a hyperbolic orbit. The required 
hyperbolic velocity at perigee is 11.000 km/sec. Since in LEO, Vc = 7.730 km/sec, the 
change in veloci ty required for SOlS injection is 3.270 km/sec. 
The geometry of the escape orbit is shown in Figure 6.1-4. Key parameters of the 
departure hyerbola soown include rp' the radius at periapsis; e, the orbital eccentricity; a, 
the semimajor axis; ~, the angle between asymptote and line of apsides; and b, the semi-
minor axis. Values for these parameters for the reference injection mission are soown ·in 
Figure 6.1-4. 
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ESCAPE ASYMPTOTE 
TO SUN. 
Reference Mf3!fon Departure Hyperbola Geometry 
Figure 6.1-.5 depicts the 'orientation of the escape orbit with respect to the 
heliocentric transfer orbit. The right ascension of the low Earth orbi t must be selected' .. 
such that intersection of the LEO plane with the plane of the heliocentric transfer orbit is 
perpendicular to the radius vector from the Sun. Its value varies directly with the time of 
year and inclination of the orbit. For any inclination and launch site location, there is a 
daily launch opportunity that allows the hyperbolic injection to be achieved without any 
delta-V penalty for plane change. 
OTV Recovery. In the reference mode of operation for the nuclear waste mission, 
the OTY boosts the SOlS carrying the waste payload into the hyperbolic orbit. The OTY 
then retrofires into an elliptical orbi t returning it to LEO. At LEO a further reduction in 
velocity circularizes the orbit. The LEO braking maneuver is accomplished by aerobrak-
ing. Aerobraking technology was assumed to be already developed in the time frame o~ 
interest in the nuclear waste study. Because an aerobraking OTY has much better 
performance than an all-propulsive OTY, this mode was selected for the reference 
38 
( 
I 
I q 
, 
,I 
J 
1 
, 
l -' 
j 
~. 
/ 
, '. 
/ 
PLANE OF LOW EARTH 
ORBIT, INCLINED 28.5 dol 
TO EOUATOR 
0180-26777 -2 
Figure 6.1-5. Orientation of Mi33ion Departure Hyperbola in Relation to 
Heliocentric Traruf er Orbit 
mission; in addition, the impact of staging time on total return delta-V is lessened when 
an aero braked OTV is used. Aerobraking system weights are essentially independent of 
the magnitude of velocity reduction in the aerobraking maneuver for the range· of 
velocities of interest here. As a result, the initial retro delta-V essentially becomes the 
total return deJta-V (the delta-Vat apogee of the ellipse is about 10 m/sec). The 
. recovery mission profile selected for the aerobraked OTV injection stage limits the ini tial 
retro deJta-V to 0.4 km/sec and alJows a staging time of 410 sec after MEeO. The total 
injection mission timeline and delta-V's are listed in Figure 6.1-6. 
6.1.' Placement Mission Profile 
Figure 6.1-7 illustrates the placement mission profile. The injection mission places 
the SOlS and payload into a Hohmann transfer orbit to the 0.85 AU heliocentric orbi t 
placement location. Primary events following injection include an optional trajectory 
trim maneuver at about injection plus 10 days to correct for injection inaccuracies. An 
approximate 16.5-day coast to periapsis of the transfer orbi t is followed by orientation and 
the placement burn of 1.283 km/sec at the 16.5-day point. Key parameters of the 
heliocentric transfer orbit include e, the orbital eccentricity; a and b, the semimajor and 
semiminor axes, respectively; r p' the orbit radius at periapsis; and r a' the orbit radius in· 
apoapsis. Values of these pararneters for the reference mission are shown in the figure. 
Total placement mission timeline and delta-V's are shown in Figure 6.1-8. 
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Event 
Duration 
(hr) 
Ascent & rendez 7.06 
LEO ops 11 
Escape inject 0.55 
Sta in 0.17 
ET (hr) 
-
Delta-V 
(m/sec) 
etrolOJect • 
Coast 20.08 38.96 0 
Trans inject 0.01 38.97 3.04 
RECOVERY Coast 20.08 59.05 19.8 
Aeromaneuver 0.08 59.13 0 
Coast 0.75 59.88 O· 
Phase inject 0.05 59.93·67.1 
Coast 3 62.93 0 
LEO eire 0.05 62.98122 
Trim 0.05 63.03 3.04 
Dock 4 67.03 0 
Reserves 0 67.03 76.2 
Figure 6.1-6. Injection and OTY Recovery Mission Timeline and Delta-Y'" 
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ET 
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6.2 RESCUE MISSION 
The study of abort mode options documented in reference 1 provided definitions 
of rescue mission initial conditions-either a circular Earth orbit at an altitude of 40,000 
km or below, or an elliptical heliocentric transfer orbit with apoapsis between 1.0 and 
0.8.5 AU and periapsis at 0.8.5 AU. Rescue mission trajectories are needed for both Earth 
orbit and deep-space rescue locations. 
6.2.1 Earth Oi'bit Rescue Mission Profile 
Figure 6.2-1 illustrates the key events for rescue of vehicles stranded in an abort 
holding orbit. Launch opportuni ties to heliocentric transfer orbi t from the holding orbi t 
Figure 6.2-1. 
"-ABORT HOLDING 
ORBIT 
DEPARTURE HYPERBOLA 
KEY EVENTS 
1. PHASING ORBIT INJECT 
2. TRANSFER ORBIT INJECT 
3. CIRCULARIZE IN HOLDING 
ORBIT: RENDEZVOUS AND 
TRANSFER OPERATIONS, " " 
4. HELIOCENTRIC TRANSFER" 
ORBIT INJECT 
High Earth Orbit Rescue Trajectory Sch.?matic 
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OCcur at 6-month interval~ as the plant) of the holding orbit becomes perpendicular to the 
Earth-Sun line. Launch opportunities for transfer of rescue systems to the abort holding 
orbit occur once per day. 
Performance required for rendezvous in Earth orbit was established by an analysis of 
abort options for failures during the injection bum. Maximum radius for drcular storage 
orbits is about 4 x 104 km; failures which would result in larger radii are more easily 
handled by abort to transfer orbit. Delta-V's required for rendezvous with the failed 
vehicle in the higher drcular orbits are approximately 3.2 to 3.5 km/sec; :.ubsequent to 
waste payload transfer to the re3cue vehicle, injection takes approximately 2.0 km/sec, 
followed by a standard placement. 
6.2.2 Deep-Space Rescue Mission Profile 
Figure 6.2-2 illustrates the three-burn deep-space mission trajectory. This profile 
provides for rendezvous with the malfunctioning vehicle at its second perihelion and 
/;
EARTH AT INITIAL 
SOlS INJECTION 
FAILED SOlS AT 
PURSUIT PHASE 
INJECTION 
EARTH AT SOlS 
CIRCULARIZATION 
FAILURE DETfCTION(Z, 
KeyeyeNTs 
I. INJECTION OF SOlS INTO HELIOCENTRIC 
TRANSFER ORBIT WITH P~RIHELION AT 
O.ll5AU. 
2. SOlS CIRCULARIZATION BURN FAILURE: 
SOlS ANO WASTe PAYLOAD STRANDED 
IN TR"NSFER ORBIT. 
3. LAUNCH OF RESCUE SYSTfM INTO 
HELIOCE!>ITRIC TRANSFER ORBIT W:,H 
PERIHELION < 0.85 AU (CRUISE PHASE 
INJECTION,. 
4. 1ST BURN OF RESCUE SYSTEM LOWERS 
APHELION TO 0.85 AU (PURSUIT PHASE 
INJECTION'. . 
II. 2ND BURN OF RESCUE SYSTEM 
MATCHES VELOCITY FOR RENDEZVOUS 
WITH FAILED SOlS (RENDEZVOUS PHASE 
INJECTION'. 
Figure 6.2-2. DeerrSpace Rescue Trajectory Schematic 
offers reduced del ta-V when compared to two-impulse transfers. This trajectory. is 
applicable to a wide range of SOlS failures and provides for maximum mission times· of" 
under 2 years. 
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Performance requirements for deep-space rescue missions are bounded by the case 
of total SOlS failure. For a typical three-impulse transfer (Fig. 6.2-2), injection delta-V 
to a 0.8.5 AU perihelion is in the range of 3 • .5 km/sec, with two intercept delta-V's of 
approximately 1.2 km/sec each used for rendezvous with the target at the target's second 
periheJion, followC'd by a final 1.18 km/sec placement bum. Total rescue mission duration 
from launch to placement is 0.84.53 years or about 308 days. 
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7.0 DEFINITION OF REFERENCE SPACE SYSTEM ELEMENTS 
Primary elements of the reference space system were shown in Figure 5.2-1. They 
include: 
1. The waste payload system (sec. 7.1) which contains and prott'Cts the waste payload 
durin·g all mission phases and which shie!rls personnel and other system elements 
from the waste payload radiation. 
2. Launch site facilities (sec. 7.2) used to assemble the waste payload system and 
integrate it with the launch vehicle and to service elements of the space transporta-
tion system. 
3. Launch system (sec. 7.3) used to transport the waste payload and orbit transfer 
systems from the launch site to a 38-deg inclination, 370-km altitude parking oroit. 
4. Orbit transfer,ystem (sec. 7.4) which carries the waste payload from the parking 
orbit to the destination circular heliocentric orbi t at 0.85 AU. A modified version 
of the orbit transfer system can provide for delivery mission failures by rendez-
vousing with the failed payload transfer vehicle, taking the waste payload on board, 
and transferring it to the reference destination. 
5. A flight support systern (sec. 7.5) which supports the waste payload system in the 
orbiter cargo bay. 
This section is divided into five subsections which describe the characteristics of the 
primary space system elements in sufficient detail to support estima~es of overall 
performance and risk for the total. space disposal concept. 
7.1 WASTE PA YLOAO SYSTEM 
The waste payload system is the space system element which contains and protects 
the nuclear waste material as it is transported from the launch site to the final space 
destination. 
The refe:-ence waste payload system is illustrated in Figure 7.1-1 which shows the 
system general arrangement and summary mass properties. The waste payload system 
consists of two waste payload assemblies weighing 15,332.8 kg each and an inter payload 
support structure (IPSS) which integrates the two waste payloads into a single structural 
unit. The inter payload support structure weigtls 136.0 kg. The entire waste payload 
system weighs 30,801.6 kg. Each waste payload contains 3000 kg of cermet waste form, 
allowing a total of 6000 kg of waste form to be dispos-:d o~ per mission. 
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Figure 7.1-1. Wa.rte Payfoad System General Arrangement 
7.1.1 Interpayload Support Structure 
The IPSS accomplishes four major fllnctions: waste payload structural support, 
waste payload transfer, enhancement of waste payload thermal dissipation, and minimiza-
tion of launch vehicle FSS mass. 
Waste Payload Support. The IPSS, in assodation with the launch vehicle FSS and the 
orbit transfer system waste payload adapter, supports the waste payloads during all phases 
of ascent and orbit transfer operations. 
Waste Payload Transfer. The IPSS carries guide rails to aid waste payload transfer 
from the FSS to the orbit transfer system and between a failed solar orbit insertion stage 
and a rescue vehicle. 
Waste Payload Thermal Dissipation Enhancement. By maintaining approximately 1m 
separation between the waste payloads, the space frame structure provides a free field of 
view (FOY) for passive waste form thermal dissipation. 
Flight Support System Mass Minimization. The same separation minimizes' the 
length of loadpaths in the launch vehicle FSS, minimizing FSS mass. 
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Figure 7.1-1 shows a three view general arrangement IPSS. Key elements of the 
interpayload support structure include (1) the two X-fittings, (2) four axial struts, (3) two 
diagonal struts, (4) two guide rail assemblies, and (,) two lateral trunnions • 
. The two X-fittings are fabricated from titanium sheet, plate, and bar stock. Each 
fitting bolts to two of the interface lugs on each waste payload and supports a single 
lateral trunnio,:,. All s~ruts iflt.erface with lugs on the X-fittings. 
Four axial and two diagonal struts bolt to lugs on the two X-frames to form a fully 
triangulated truss connecting the two waste payloads. The struts use conical end fittings 
machined from titanium bar stock welded to titanium tubing to form an efficient 
monocoque structure. Integral attachment lugs are machined at the tips of the end 
fi ttings. 
Two tubular titanium guide rails provide guidance during waste payload transfer 
operations by rolling on guide rollers mounted on the FSS and waste payload adapter (see 
sees. 7.4.1 and 7 • .5). The guide rails are fabricated from titanium tubing with hemispher-
ical ends to aid in transferring between rollers. Lugs on the inboard side of the rails 
attach to tubular titanium guide rail support struts which interface with the two 
X-fittings to provide fully triangulated support for the rails. 
Two lateral trunnions inter~ace with the FSS and with the waste payload adapter 
latches to secure the waste payload in position. The lateral trunnions carry only V-loads 
In the FSS; X- and Z-loads are carried by the FSS interface trunnions on the outboarde,nds 
of the waste payloads. 
, In the orbit transfer system waste payload adapter, the lateral trunnions carry both 
Y - and Z-loads. X-loads are reacted through the interface trunnion of the aft waste 
payload, inducing reaction loads in the Y-direction on the lateral trunnions. The trunnions 
are machined from steel forgings and held in place by a threaded stud and nut. 
7.1.2 Waste Payload Assembly 
The waste payload assembly accomplishes four primary functions: containment, 
radiation shielding, thermal dissipation, and mechanical interfacing with other waste 
payload system elements. 
Containment. The waste payload provides positive containment for the waste form 
when subjected to the full range of accident and nominal mission conditions specified in 
the system safety guidelines document (ref. 2). Primary threats to containment which 
must be withstood include launch pad accidents, terminal velocity impact, heating due to 
inadvertent reentry, and deep submergence. 
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Launch pad accidents include blast overpressure and fragment impact due to 
detonation of the launch vehicle external tank or liquid rocket boosters and exposure to 
heating from propellant fireballs and ground fires. 
Terminal velocity impact is possible as a result of an ascent accident or an 
inadvertent reentry. Two worst cases exist: impact onto an unyielding surface, which 
maximizes container mechanical stresses, and impact into soil followed by burial, which 
imposes maximum thermal stress on the container due to the waste form thermal output. (Dry soil acts as an effective insulator, allowing the thermal output to heat the container 
with maximum efficiency.) 
Reentry due to failures late in the launch vehicle ascent or a decaying orbit impose 
severe thermal loads on the waste payload container. Vaporization or melting of the 
container must be withstood to maintain containment. 
Deep submergence may follow waste impact on the ocean at any speed. Maximum 
pressures of up to 1.2 x 107 Pa must be withstood. 
Radiation Shielding. The waste payload provides radiation shielding sufficient to 
reduce the combined gamma and neutron radiation flux from the reference waste forms 
carried to a level below 1 rem/hr measured at a distance of 1m from the waste payload 
surface. 
Thermal Dissipation. The waste payload must provide a combination of thermal 
conductivity from waste form to outer surface, sufficient outer surface area, and outer 
surface absorbtivity and emissivity values sufficient to allow dissipation of waste form 
thermal output by passive thermal radiation at the reference 0.85 AU heliocentric orbit 
destination. 
Mechanical Interlaces. ·The waste payload provides mechanical interfaces for .the 
interpayload support structure, launch vehicle flight support system, ,lnd orbit transfer 
system waste payload adapter. to provide mechanical support during ascent and orbi t 
transfer operations. 
7.1.2.1 Waste Payload Assembly Description 
The general arrangement of the waste payload assembly is shown in Figure 7.1.2-1, 
along with a summary mass breakdown. The waste payload is spherical and about 1.6m in 
diameter. It weighs a total of 1.5,332.8 kg, of which .3000 kg is the reference cermet 
waste form. Key features include the 228 steel-graphite tiles, which completely cover 
the outer surface of the waste payload; two cylindrical FSS interface trunnions located 
180 deg apart; and eight interface lugs spaced equally on two drcles, each located 45 deg 
from one of the interface trunnions. Addi tional features include the six survivable beacon 
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Figure 7.1.2-1. Wa..~e Payload AS!embly General Arrangement 
systems set flush with the tile surface and 12 caution and warning labels which provide proper labeling to identify the waste payload and its contents. Primary waste payload elements are shown in the exploded view and iflclude the shield assembly, which accomplishes all containment and mechanical interface funct.ions; the waste form support structure (or core), which supports the waste form billets, adds structural integrity to the shield assembly, and aids thermal dissipation; and the cermet waste form billets, which represent the bottom Hne pa)'load for the entire system. The survivable beacon systems are also primary waste payload elements. The summary mass breakdown shows the division of mass between the major elements. The shield assembly, at 10,&43.5 kg, and the core, at 1459.3 kg, represent 80% of the waste payload mass, Hlustrating the high priority assigned to providing containment of the waste form. The survivable beacon system, at 30 kg, is almost negligible by comparison. The net delivered waste form mass is 3000 kg. The following sections describe the elements in more detail. 
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7.1.2.2 Waste Form Billet 
The waste form billet is the end product of the high-level waste processing 
operations and represents the form in which the high-level waste oxides are installed in 
the waste payload assembly. In each waste payload, 3167 identical billets are carried. 
The billet configuration and key characteristics are shown in Figure 7.1.2-2. The 
billet is 'a right circular' cylinder approximately 60 mm in both diameter and height. The 
I DIMENSIONS IN mm I 
58.58 
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-58!52 . 
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• DIA. SIZED FOR RUNNING FIT 
MASS 
IN WASTE FORM SUPPORT STRUCT. 
BORES 
• 947.3 9 
Figure 7.1.2-2. Waste Fcrm BUret Configuration 
diameter is sized to provide a running fit in the waste payload core. Corners are radiused· 
to aid fabrication and assembly. The billet is fabricated using a uniaxial press and 
sintering technique from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) cermet material with a 
67.4296 loading of waste oxides. Overall density is 6.59 g/cm 3, yielding a total billet mass 
of 947.3g. The resulting material is a hard metal-like substance with considerable 
strength and resistance to smearing. Handling must be remote only due to the billet's 
intense gamma ray and neutron emission. Thermal output is approximately lW per billet. 
7.1.2.3 Waste Form Support Structure (Core) 
The waste form support structure supports the 3167 individual waste form billets in . 
241 vertical bores drilled through a solid 316 stainless steel sphere. The core provides a 
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solid metal path for heat conduction from the billets to the shield. By providing a solid, 
incompressible cor~, the waste fJrm support structure also augments t~e structural 
integrity of the outer shield. Figure 7.1.2-3 shows the core configuration with key 
dimensions and characteristics noted. Primary elements indude the support structure and 
the billet retainers. 
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Figure 7.1.2-3. Waste Form Support Structure (Core) Configuration 
The support structure is basically a sphere, 1076 mm in diameter, with 241 parallel 
.58 • .58-mm-diameter holes bored through in a hexagonal, dose-packed arrangement. __ A 
cylindrical section is machined into the sphere outer contour, parallel to the bores; a 
projecting flange, or key circling the cylindrical section, interfaces with a machined 
groove in the lower shield half to support the core in the shield. The support stucture is 
fabricated by machining from a 316 stainless steel casting. 
The billet retainers are installed in the ends of the boreholes to retain the billets in 
position after billet loading. The retainers are also fabricated from 316 stainless and are 
fastened in place with reversible spring-loaded retaining dips to aid in the automated 
biHet loading operation. 
Combined mass of the core and retainers is estimated at 1459.3 kg • 
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l '. 7.1.2.4 Shield Assembly 
The shield assembly is the primary barrier against release of the waste form. It 
encases the core and waste form billets inside a seamless shell of Inconel 625 superaIIoy, 
224 mm (8.8 in.) thick. This shell is further -protected by a layer of graphite in the form 
of 228 interlocking tiles, 50 mm (1.97 in.) thick, and a final outer steel sheath, 4.3 mm 
(0.19 in.) thick. Overall shield assembly mass for the reference waste payload system is 
10,843.5 kg. Figure 7.1.2-4 shows the assembled waste payload with key features and 
dimension,; of the shield assembly and core illustrated. 
Figure 7.1.2-4. Reference Wa3te Payload Assembly Features and Dimension 
Primary shield elements include the primary container and gamma radiation shield, 
the composite graphite-steel tile assemblies, and the interface fittings. 
Primary Container and Gamma Radiation Shield. The primary container provides 
protection from blast overpressure, fragment impact, deep immersion, and terminal 
velocity impact. The structural integrity of the shield and its thickness provide sufficient 
strength to withstc.nd fragment impact. Its thickness and the essentially incompressible 
core provide stability against buckling due to external pressure imposed by blast or deep 
submergence. The shield absorbs the kinetic energy of terminal velocity impact by plastic 
deformation of shield material and the core. Elongation is limited to values that preclude 
fracture or cracking which couId violate containment. 
Addi tional functions of the primary container include radiation shielding, thermal 
conduction and capacity, and interface mechanical support. 
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The 224-mm thickness of the shield attenuates the intense gamma flux from the 
cermet waste form billets to less than 0.5 rem/hr at 1m. Some neutron flux attenuation is 
also provided. 
The solid container provides good thermal conduction for heat flux from the waste 
billets. The temperature drop across the shield is limited to 77oC. The substantial 
thermal capacity of the primary container minimizes fireball radiation thermal effects on 
the waste payload and the hlgh melting point of the Inconel 625 container material helps 
to withstand the ground fire environment. Mechanical support for the interface fittings is 
provided by 10 bosses machined into the outer surface of the container. 
The container is fabricated in two halves by machining from lnconel 625 hemispheri-
cal forgings. Bosses for attachment or for surface fittings are integrally machined. 
Tapped holes are provided for the interface fitting bolt circles and the studs used for 
attachment of the 228 composite tiles. Grooves machined at the inner edge of the joining 
surface accommodate the core interface flange. 
The primary container is assembled into a seamless shell after core installation by 
electron beam (EB) welding using an automated EB welder (see sec. 8.1, Waste Payload 
Fabrication and Assembly Operations). 
Composite Graphite-Steel Tiles. 288 graphite-steel tile assemblies and two tile cap 
, , 
assemblies completely enclose the primary container. The tiles are the primary method 
of damping the neutron flux from the waste form billets and act as an ablator ~uring 
reentry to protect the primary container and core from reentry heating. 
The tiles vary in size and shape to accommodate their location at various places on 
the waste payload. Each tile consists of a 5O-mm-thick graphite layer, with a 4.8-'!lm 
steel plate bonded to the outside of it. The graphite tiles are stepped so that adjacent 
tiles overlap, preventing direct paths for neutron escape. Each tile has a ceritrat 
counter bored hole which allows it to be fastened to one of the studs installed in the 
primary container. After the tile has been placed over the stud, a washer and nut are 
installed to retain it. A plug of ablator with a steel outer layer is bonded in place over 
the nut to provide additional neutron attenuation and entry protection. An inward, 
cup-like extension of the tile outer steel plate is captured under the tile retention nut to 
provide posi tive mechanical retention of the steel outer sheath. 
All of the tiles except for a single row around the "equat~t" of the waste payload 
are preinstalled to minimize operaticns necessary after the radioactive waste form billets 
are installed. The clear area remaining allows access for the electron beam used to weld 
the shield halves together. Following welding, the single row of closeout tiles is installed 
by an automated tile installation machine. 
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Interface Fittings. Two types of interface Ii ttings bol ted to the bosses on the 
primary container allow attachment of the IPSS. Two FSS interface trunnions interface 
with the launch vehicle FSS and the orbit transfer system waste payload adapter. Eight 
interface lugs provide for ground handling and attachment of the IPSS • 
. Both types of interface fittings are machined from high-strength steel forgings and 
attach to the primary container using an integrated eight-bolt mounting flange and a 
:>O-mm-diameter shear pin. The cylindrical trunnions incorporate a groove used as a 
grapple interface during rescue. The lugs used for ground handling and IPSS attachment 
have a 2:>.00-mm borehole to accommodate attach hardware. An edge distance (e/d) of 
2.0 is used in the lug design. Like the tiles, the interface fi ttings are preinstalled on the 
individual shield halves to provide handling aids and to minimize operations on the waste 
payload after the radioactive waste form billets are installed. 
7.1.2.5 Survivable Beacon System 
Six survivable beacon systems are bolted into place, 90 deg apart, on the surface of 
the waste payload to aid post-accident location. The beacons mount flush to the surface 
of the adjacent till'S; each beacon replaces one tile. They have an outer layer of ablative 
material to protect them from entry heating. Location of the six beacons precludes 
destruction of all six by ground impact or impact of fragments. The beacon is hardened to 
:>O,OOOg impact loading and against peak overpressures. 
The beacons are designed to operate as both radio and sonar beacons. Radio beacon 
signals are emitted at the standard emergency locator beacon system frequencies of 121.:> 
and 21+3.0 MHz using a flush loop-type antenna. A nominal 300-MW-per-channel output is 
provided at a 10096 duty cycle, declining to 100 MW per channel after 1+& hr at _300 C. 
Both radio frequency (RF) carriers are modulated at audio frequencies using a 300 to 1"600 
Hz continuous sweep. 
Power for both RF and sonar signals is provided by a self-contained lithium battery 
pack. Beacons are turned on and armed prior to shuttle liftoff. They remain on standby 
for the shelf Hfe of the battery pack (at least 3 years). 
Activation of each individual beacon is accomplished using built-in sensors including: 
(1) a hardwired command, linked through the SOlS and OTV telemetry links, (2) increasing 
barometric pressure (decreasing altitude), (3) a thermal switch which responds to reentry 
heating or ground fires, and (4) an inertia switch responsive to impact or entry g-loading. 
All of these stimuli will switch the beacon on in the RF mode. Built-in immersion and a 
backup pressure sensor turn off the RF output and divert power to the sonar transducer 
and its power amplifiers. 
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Total mass aUocation used for each individual beacon system is 5 kg. For com-
parison, a NARCO EL T -10 emergency locator beacon (designed for light aircraft with 
similar RF characteri.:;tics and life but without the hardening, entry protection, and sonar 
beacon) weighs 1.6 kg. 
7.2. LAUNCH SITE FACn.ITIES 
Facilities at the launch site are used to build up the waste payload system, integrate 
it with the uprated STS launch vehicle, and provide support for both uprated shuttle and 
SDCLV. The reference waste payload quantity requires 30 flights of each vehicle per 
year. 
SpeCific facility areas include (1) the nuclear payload processing facility NPPF, used 
to ~emble the waste payload system and integrate it with the fJight support system; (2) 
space system support facilities, used to process the launch vehicles; and (3) specialized 
nuclear waste payload cargo integration facilities, used to provide radiation safety for the 
launch crew during waste payload/orbiter integration. 
7.2.1 Nuclear Payload Processing Facility 
The NPPF is ilJustrated schematically in Figure 7.2.1-1 which shows a cutaway of 
the approximately 900_m2 NPPF building. Primary features include the shielded loading 
WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM ASSEMBLY 
Figure 7.2.1-1. Nuclear Payload Processing Facility (NPPF) 
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dock, a sruelded storage area for up to eight waste payload assemblies, a sruelded waste 
payload system assembly station and FSS integration station, an unshielded space for 
storage of flight support systems and interpayload support structures, and an office and 
control area. AU areas except for office and control are accessible to a shielded overhead 
crane. 
Areas accessible to the waste payload are shielded by concrete walls and can be 
c1osedoff when.a waste p?yload is present. With aU waste payloads in storage cells, free 
access to the loading dock, assembly, and integration stations is available for setup. 
Assembly of waste payload systems and FSS integration is accomplished remotely using 
the overhead crane, a turntable at the assembly station, and remotely operated wrenches. 
After the assembled waste payload system is lowered into the FSS, it is rotated into 
launch position and secured by the FSS rotation and latching system (see sec. 7.5). 
In operation, the waste payload assemblies are unloaded in the shielded loaciing dock 
after rail transport from the fabrication facilities using the shielded overhead crane. The 
waste payloads are placed in storage cells prior to assembly and integration. Following 
integration with the FSS, the resulting waste payload cargo is installed in the shielded 
payload canister (sec. 7.2.3) for transportation to the launch pad. The canister loading is 
accomplished in the shielded loading dock area by the shielded overhead crane. 
7.2.2 Space Transportation System Support Facilities 
Operation of the reference launch and orbit transfer systems at a flight rate of 3.5 
missions per year requires additions to the existing STS support facili ties at KSC. 
Primary additional facilities required are illustrated in Figure 7.2.2-1, along with their 
key characteristics and the quantities of each which would be required to support 30 
launches per year. 
Launch Ccmolex. The l<lunch complex consists of the launch pad and associated 
propellant storage and handling facili ties. Primary launch pad elements include fixed and 
rotating service structures (RSS), flame trenches and flame deflectors, and a water deluge 
system. The rotating service structure is used to integrate the waste payload cargo 
element with the uprated space shuttle system. If launch pads are dedicated to specific 
launch vehicles, only the pad used by the uprated shuttle needs an RSS. Crew access to 
the uprated shuttle and umbilicals providing hydrogen vent functions for both uprated STS 
and SDCLV are provided by the fixed service structure. The fixed service structure also 
mounts a 25-ton general-purpose crane. The main flame trench which runs beneath the 
mobile launch platform and flame deflectors safely dissipate the plumes from the liquid 
rocket boosters and space s-huttle mdin engines during launch vehicle liftoff. The water 
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Figure 7.2.2-1. Additional Dedicated 51'S SUpport F'aciUtie3 Required at KSC 
deluge system is used to reduce the acoustic pressure levels to which the launch vehicles are subjected during liftoff. Two launch complexes are required to support the reference concept for space disposal • 
. Mobile launch Platform. The mobile launch platform (MLP) supports all eJements of the launch vehicle during buildup and checkout in the vertical assembly building (VAS) through transfer to the launch pad up until the actual liftoff. The MlP is a box section structure fabricated from steel plate. It contains flame holes to pass the plumes from the liquid rocket boosters and the space shuttle main engines and two 20-ft-tall tail service masts (TSM) which carry umbilical plates that supply propellant and other fluid services to the uprated space shuttle orbiter and the propulsion and avionics pod of the shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicle. Four MlP's are required to support the reference concept flight rate. A single platform configuration would be common to both types of launch vehicles used. 
Vertical Assembly Building. The VAB is a 160m-tall structure that is 218m long and 158rn wide. It contains four checkout cells used for buildup and checkout of both uprated shuttle and shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicles. The four checkout cells are grouped 
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around a transfer aisle which provides for transfer of components during the launch 
vehicle buildup and checkout process. MuJ tilevel workstands at each checkout cell 
provide extensive access to the launch vehicle during the buildup and checkout process. 
Four 139m-high chors provide for launch vehicle exit af-:er the buildup and checkout 
process is completed. Immediately adjacent and connected to the VAB is the launch 
control center which contains two launch processing systems used to control the checkout 
and launch of the space disposal launch systems. The V AS is also used for payload 
integration of the shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicle which is accomplished in the VAS 
rather than at the pad. A single VAS is adequate to support the 35-mission-per-year 
flight rate of the reference space concept. One of the four checkout cells would be 
available at this flight rate to provide for later increases in the number of flights per 
year. 
Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF). The OPF is used for refurbishment of orbiters 
between flights of the uprated spacp. shuttle system and for refurbishment of the 
propulsion and avionics modules used for the shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicle. The 
OPF is also used for removal of the flight support system from the uprated shuttle 
following each flight. Two orbiter processing facilities, each containing two checkout 
bays, are adequate to support the reference flight rate and will leave one spare checkout 
bay to accommodate potential flight rate increases. 
LRB Processing Facility. The LRS processing facility consists of a high bay, support 
shops, and workstands to refurbish the liquid rocket boosters between flights and to check 
out the liquid rocket boosters prior to transfer to the VAS for integration with the rest of 
the launch system. LRS's are checked out in a horizontal position in the high bay. The 
LRS processing facility would be a new design and it is assumed that one LRS processing 
facility would be adequate to support the reference concept flight rate. 
7.2.3 Specialized Nuclear Waste Payload Cargo Integration Facilities 
Modifications to the existing designs for the rotating service structure and muJti-
mission support equipment (M MSE) payload canister allow integration of the waste 
payload cargo element in the uprated STS cargo bay at the launch pad, while minimizing 
restrictions on STS launch preparation activities due to waste payload radiation. 
Shielded Payload Canister. The shielded payload canister (shown in Fig. 7.2.3-1) is 
used to transport the waste payload cargo element from the NPPF to the RSS. A standard 
MMSE payload canister is modified by the addition of radiation shielding material to limit 
external radiation to the limits specified in the system safety guidelines document for the 
shipping cask (par. 2.2.3.5). Additional modifications allow the waste payload cargo 
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PAYLOAD CARolO ELEMENT INSTALLED 
• HANDLE AI NORMAL PAYLOAD CANISTER 
• RETAIN EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION TO PROVIDE 
COMMONALITY vnTH RSS, ORBITER INTERFACES 
• ACCOMMODATE REMOTE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL 
OF WASTE PA YLDAC CARGO ELEMENT 
SHIELDED PAYLOAD CANISTER 
Figure 7.2.3-1. Specialized Waste Payload Cargo Integration Facilitie~ From 
Modification of Ext3ting srs Support Equipment 
element to be installed in the canister and remotely latched into position. The added 
shielding allows the loaded payload canister to be handled using the same facilities as used 
for nonradioactive payloads. An unmodified MMSE canister tranporter is used to carry 
the canister from NPPF to RSS. 
RSS. The RS~ is modified by replacing the general-purpose payload ground-handling 
mechanism (PGHM), used for integration of the wide variety of cargos carried by the ST5, 
with a dedicated PGHM optimized for integration of the nuclear waste cargo element 
(Fig. 7.2.3- 1). 
The dedicated PGHM is permanently installed at the correct station for installation 
of the waste cargo. It is capable of single-axis translation only. The payload attach 
points on the PGHM engage the payload STS interface trunnions and are designed for 
remote engagement and disengagement. 
The dedicated PGHM is mounted inside a shielded container wi th a deor. After the 
payload canister is posi tioned in the RSS airlock, the RSS interior is cleared of personnel. 
The canister doors are opened, and the dedicated PGHM is extended and remotely latcred 
58 
-.,...:::.0,' '-er:~:-w--'------ .-' . 
. 'f hi ha'" be'\" M., ....... ;I'·;;. .. '/" 'i."+ .... · '.'" 
.,' ' ... 
'---' 
\ 
:- .. 
--
, . 
\ ' 
0180-26777 -2 
to the waste payload cargo element trunnions. The latches securing the waste payload to 
the canister longerons are then remotely released, and the PGHM and waste cargo are 
retracted into the shielded container. The container door is then closed. 
Personnel can reoccupy the RSS at this time and proceed with normal STS launch 
preparation activities. Personnel are cleared once again at about T-20 hours to allow 
waste payload cargo element installation in the orbiter cargo bay in a reversal of the 
operations that removed it from the canister. Securing of the cargo in the bay and mating 
of interfaces is accomplished remotely. Payload bay wor closure is accomplished 
remotely at T-IO hours. Shadow shields are positioned around the closed payload bay 
doors to allow personnel to reoccupy the RSS for further launch preparation activities. 
Following retraction of the RSS at T -2 hours, distance alone keeps the radiation exposure 
b.. .. low allowable limits. 
Contingency Access. Use of the specialized waste payload cargo integration 
facilities described allows nominal integration operations to be carried out without 
exposure of personnel to any radiation from the waste payload. The relatively low level 
of radiation from the waste payloads (less than 1 rem/hr at 1m from the waste payload 
surface) would allow access to the area around the payload to deal with contingencies 
without exceeding the normal operations exposure limits for individuals in controlled 
areas. An Individual could work on the FSS with payload installed for up to 3 hours 
without exceeding the 3-rem dose limit for a calendar quarter. This factor provides a 
powerful means of coping with "glitches" or minor problems encountered during waste 
payload cargo integration. 
7.3 LAUNCH SYSTEM 
The launch system transports all elements of the space disposal system from the 
launch site to low Earth orbit. The reference launch system uses two launch vehicles 
which offer an attractive combination of low risk and low cost. The waste payload is 
launched on an uprated version of the space shuttle which uses liquid rocket boosters. 
This vehicle minimizes risk by offering a number of intact recovery modes in the event of 
a launch abort. The orbit transfer system is l.:lunched using a shuttle-derived cargo launch 
vehicle, which offers almost twice the payload of the uprated STS at slightly lower cost 
but which has no intact abort capability. Combining these venicles in a dual launch 
mission scenario allows taking advantage of the low risk of the winged orbi ter while using 
the more cost-effective SDV to boost the heavier but less critical orbit transfer system. 
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The uprated STS is used to transport the waste payload from the KSC launch site to 
a circular low Earth orbit at an altitude of 370 km and an inclination of 38 deg. 
7.11.1 General Arrangement and Key Elements 
The uprated STS general arrangement and key dimensions are shown with key 
vehicle characteristics in Figure 7.3.1-1. Two liquid rocket boosters flank the external 
tank, which contains propellant for the three orbiter uprated SSME's. The orbiter is 
attached by struts to the upper side of the ET. Key elements include the ET, LRS's, and 
orbiter. 
GENERAL ARRAtlGEMENT 
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CHARACTERISTICS 
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MODlFICA TlOIIS • FULL CROSS WEIGHT LANDING' 
SAFETY • FLOTATION SYSTEM 
PROVISIONS 
Figure 7.3.1-1. Urrated STS General Arrangement 
External Tank. The external tank is identical to the lightweight version developed 
for the existing STS. It contains the liquid hydrogen fuel and liquid oxygen oxidiZer and 
supplies them under pressure to th~ three main engines in the orbi ter during liftoff and 
ascent. When the main engines are shut down, the external tank is jettisoned, enters the 
Earth's atmosphere, breaks up, and impacts in a remote ocean area. It is not recovered. 
Major components of the ET are the monocoque LOX tank, the semimonocoq'..le LH2 
tank, and the unpressurized intertank which contains most of the ET electronics. All 
60 
, 
- .. _--
"~ .... -
-...... 
0180-26777-2 
components are fabricated from aluminum alloy. The ET is 97m long, 8.38m in diameter, 
and weighs approximately 33,.503 kg when empty. 
The entire external tank is covered with a 1.27-cm cork-epoxy composition sprayed 
or premolded to withstand localized high heating during boost. It is then covered with a 
2.54- to 5-cm spray-on foam insulation. The LH2 tank insulation also precludes liquid air 
formation on the external surface. 
The external tank is attached to ,the orbiter at one point forward attachment and 
two points aft. In the aft attachment area, there are also umbilicals which carr)' fluids, 
gases, electrical signals, and electrical power between the tank and the orbiter. 
Electrical signals and controls between the orbiter and the two solid rocket boosters also 
are routed through those umbilicals. 
Uquid Rocket Boosters. The two liquid rocket boosters are self-contained systems 
containing propellants and figures. In operation they boost the ET for the first 2 min of 
flight. At the end of the boost period, the two LRB's are separated. After separation, 
RCS thrusters reorient the booster to an aft end forward attitude and maintain that 
attitude through atmospheric reentry. Clamshell doors close over the engines and seal off 
the booster engine compartment, providing thermal protection for reentry and water 
protection on landing. Parachutes are deployed to place the stage in a horizontal atti tude 
and to decelerate the booster to about a 25 m/sec velocity. Solid rocket motors 'provide 
final deceleration to a soft landing on the water. After landing, the LRB's are recovered 
by ships for refurbishment and reuse. 
Major LRB components include the basic structure and the main propulsion and 
recovery systems. 
The basic structure consists of three propellant tanks, an intertank structure, and an 
engine compartment. RP-l i,s contained in the nose tank with LH2 and L02 in an integral 
tank in the aft body, separated by a common bulkhead. Propellant lines from the RP-l 
and LH2 tanks are carried to the engine compartment in a tunnel along the outside of the 
body. The engine compartment section is made of integrally stiffened skin supported by 
frames and the engine thrust structure. The conical shape provides the required clearance 
for the engines and the necessary base diameter for the hinged clamshell doors. During 
ascent, the doors are positioned at either side of the engine compartment. After booster 
separation, the doors ::u-e pivoted to the closed position and sealed. 
The main propulsion system consists of four uprated space shuttle booster engines 
which burn LOX and RP-l and are cooled by LH2• The engines have a sea level thrust of 
2.39 x 106N each and operate at a specific impulse of 331 sec (sea level). Vacuum thrust 
and specific impulse are 2.61 x 106N and 361 sec, respectively. 
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The recovery system includes separation rockets, drogue and main parachutes, 
terminal deceleration rockets, and airbags to cushion impact. Radio and optical beacon
s 
act as location aids to help recovery. 
Overall length of the LRB is 46.94m and tank diameter is 4.69m. The engine 
corr.partment maximum diameter at the flare is 7.1m. Dry mass of the LRB is 66,971 kg. 
Orbiter. The orbiter is the crew- and payload-carrying unit of the shuttle system. 
It is 37m long, has a wingspan v! 24m, and weighs approximately 75,000 kg without fuel. 
The orbiter is fully reusable. It carries cargo in a payload bay IS.3m long and 4.6m in
 
diameter. The orbiter'S three main liquid rocket engines each have a thrust of 2.1 x 10
6N. 
Orbiter modifications required for the space disposal mission are discussed in later 
sections. Complete details on the orbiter'S large number of systems are available in 
a 
variety of NASA publications. 
7.3.1.2 Launch Vehicle Characteristics 
Basic characteristics of the launch vehicle are also shown in Figure 7.3.1-1. Gross 
liftoff weight (GLOW) is 1.857 x 106 kg. This is composed of a booster liftoff weigh"t of 
0.98 x 106 kg (for two liquid rocket boosters) and an upper stage (in this vehicle, the 
orbiter and ET) liftoff weight (ULOW) of 0.377 x 10
6 kg. The booster propellant load of 
LOX, RP-l, and LH2 (Wpl) is 0.S41 x 106
 kg. LOX and LH2 in the ET (Wp2) equal 
0.705 x 106 kg. Vehicle mass at MECO, when all propellants have been expended, is
 
0.171 x 106 kg. 
7.3.1.3 Performance 
The uprated shuttle delivers 47,000 kg of payload to the reference 370-km altitude 
orbit at 38-deg inclination. 
7.3.1.4 Cargo Accommodation 
The orbiter cargo bay is IS.3m long and 4.1m in diameter. Mechanical interfaces 
for the uprated shuttle are assumed to be identical to those of the existing orbite
r 
specified in the space shuttle system payload accommodations (JSC 07700 vol. XIV). The 
flight support system for the waste payload described in section 7.5 has been designed to 
conform to these standards. 
7.3.1.5 Abort Mc.des 
The uprated shuttle has three intact abort alternatives, depending on when abort 
becomes necessary. These are to return to launch site (RTLS), abort once around (AOA), 
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and to abort to orbit (ATO). 
In addition, an abort to water landing is possible for many failure modes. While not 
an intact abort, a water landing followed by actuation of the orbiter flotation system 
(OFS) described in section 7.3.1.7 would pose a relatively low risk to the waste payload. 
Most mission contingenq,es· would resul t in one of the three intact abort modes illustrated 
in Figure 7.3.1-2. The following paragraphs briefly describe the abort modes illustrated. 
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Figure 7 .3~1-2. Urrated STS Intact Abort Options 
Return to launch Site. This mode will be used in the event of a main engine failure 
between liftoff and the point at which the next abort mode (AOA) is available. 
The space shuttle (orbiter and external tank) continues to thrust downrange, with 
the two remaining main engines, the two OMS, and the four aft +X RCS thrusters firing, 
until the remaining propellant for the main engines equals the amount required to reverse 
the direction of flight. 
A pitch-around (plus pitch) maneuver is then performed at approximately' deg/sec, 
which places the orbiter and external tank in a heads-up attitude, pointing back toward 
the launch site. Main engine cutoff is commanded when altitude, attitude, flightpath 
angle, heading, weight, and velocity/range conditions combine for acceptable orbiter-
63 
\ 
! 
1 
--' 
. ~. - ...... __ ...... -..t . 0,. I'4r. 
0180-26777-2 
external tank separation (tank impact no closer than 24 n. mi. from the U.S. coast) and 
orbiter glides to the launch site runway. 
Abort Once Around. This mode will be used from approximately 2 min after norma! 
booster separation to the point at which the abort-to-orbit mode becomes available. 
Again, this abort would occur in the event of a main engine failure. 
The space shuttle vehicle continues to thrust with the remaining main engines and 
the OMS and aft RCS +X thrusters. The OMS and RCS thrusting periods terminate when 
the amount of propelJant remaining in these two systems will support two OMS thrusting 
periods after MECO. 
Main engine cutoff is followed by jettisoning of the external tank. The OMS 
thrusters are fired after jettisoning the external tank to obtain an apogee of an 
intermediate orbit. The second firing of the OMS places the spacecraft into a suborbital 
coast phase and "free return" orm t for the desired entry interface. The flight 
conditions-range, flightpath angle, headings, and velocity-at entry resulting from this 
orbit will be selected to enable the orbiter to glide to a suitable landing site runway. 
Abort to Orbit. This mode begins after the AOA point is passed and al~o would 
occur in the event of a main engine failure. The space shuttle continues to thrust with 
the remaining main engines to main engine cutoff and external tank jettison. The OMS 
thrusters fire twice, to insert the orbiter into orbit and then to circularize the orbit., The 
orbi t coast time a! ti tude and the coast time before the deorbi t maneuver depend on when 
the abort was initiated. The deorbit, entry, and landing would be similar to a normal 
mission except for carrying the waste payload. For some failures very close to MECO, 
normal orbital operati'ons coUId be accomplished. 
7.3.1.6 Modifications for Space ~isposal Mission 
The only modification required is strengthening of the structure and landing gear of 
the orbiter to enable landing after abort while carrying the full 47,OOO-kg payload 
represented by the nuclear waste payload. 
7.3.1.7 Dedicated Waste Payload Safety Provisions 
The only specific system added to decrease risk to the waste payload is the orbiter 
flotation system. The OFS will keep the orbiter and waste payload afloat in the event of 
a water landing to aid location and recovery. 
The system is an inflatable ruggedized Kevlar bladder inflated by redundant gas 
generators which, when inflated, occupy empty space in the cargo bay, forward ~f' the 
FSS. The inflated bladder is 4.57m in diameter and 7m long, providing an inflated volume 
of 119.82 m3• It is secured to the orbiter payload bay longerons and the flight support 
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system by steel cables and will support a combined orbiter and payload mass of .13,400 kg 
in a nose-up attitude. The orbiter already carries location beacons and will have a large 
radar cross section in the floated condition. The mass of the flotation system is 
estimate~ at 3,400 kg. 
7.3.2 Orbit Transfer System Launch Vehicle 
The SOY is used to transport the 80t orbit transfer system from KSC to the 
reference circular orbit at 370-km altitude and an indination of 38 cfeg. The general 
arrangement, key dimensions, and characteristics of the SOY are illustrated in Figure 
7.3.2-1. 
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Figure 7.3.2-1. Shuttle-Derived Vehicle General Arrangement 
7.3.2.1 General Arrangement and Key Elements 
The SOY uses the same ET and LRB's as the uprated shuttle. The two liquid rocket 
boosters flank the ET in an arrangement identical to the uprated shuttle, but the shuttle 
orbiter is replaced by a cargo orbiter which uses the same ET mechanical interfaces; The 
ET and LRB's are described in section 7.3.1.1. The remainder of this section describes the 
car go orbi ter. 
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Cc!rgo Orbiter. The cargo orbiter is shown in Figure 7.3.2-2. It is a three-part 
vehicle designed to ile directly interchangeable with the orbiter in terms of mechanical 
interfaces and main propulsion. Its larger volume for cargo and reduced inert mass 
compared to the shuttle orbiter allow transportation of cargo larger and heavier than can 
be carried by the shuttle. The cargo orbiter is compo.;ed of three major elements: the 
r ... ------ 30.75 -----4 .. '"", .... _: 
'- EXPENDABLE CARGO 
SHROUD EXTERNAL THRUST 
STRUCTURE 
pIA MODULE 
CARGO SHROUD + EXT. THRU~T STRUCT, 
CARGO ORBITER INERT MASS 
Figure 7.3.2-2. (:argo Orbiter General Arrangement 
28.381 
9.370 
37.751 
expendable cargo shroud, the external thrust structure, ar.dLhe recoverable propulsi(\nl 
avionics (PI A) module. 
Expendable Cargo Shroud. The cargo shroud is an expendable passive cargo eon-
tainer. Its construction is aluminum honeycomb with intermediate support frames. Major 
frames are located at the .for~ard ET attach point and at the aft end where the shroud is 
connected to the PIA module. The portion of the shroud aft of the forward ET attach 
point is carried to orbi t. The remaining portion, including the conical nose cap .is 
jettisoned during ascent as soon as Q-Ioads permit. This facilitates payload release on 
orbit and maximizes payload. Payload release on orbit is accomplished by translating the 
orbit transfer system forward until it clears the remaining portion of the shroud. A rail 
system guides the separation. The shroud is backed away by the PIA module after 
sufficient ini tial clearance with the orbi t transfer system has been achieved. 
External Thrust. Structure. S,,"uctural connection of the cargo shroud to PIA module 
is accomplished with an external thrust structure of AS 3502 graphite-epoxy struts 
attached to the cargo shroud at four points. The aft end of the thrust structure attaches 
to the PIA module skin at four points. Release mechanisms at these points provide for 
separation of the PIA module. The thrust S··'lcture attaches to the ET with two fittings 
that duplicate those of the orbiter. 
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Following insertion of the payload into the prescribed orbit, the PIA module 
performs a retroburn to insert the cargo shroud into an orbit with a perigee low enough to 
ensure destruction during shroud reentry. The PIA module then separates from the cargo 
shroud and thrust structure and reinserts itself into circular orbit to wai t for reentry and 
landing at the launch si teo 
PIA Module. The PIA module is designed to incorporate the main propulsion and 
propellant delivery systems from the STS orbiter along with the necessary avionics, OMS, 
and other systems in a ballistically recoverable capsule. Its shape is dictated primarily by 
aerodynamic balance requirements at entry. The PIA module shown in Figure 7.3.2-2 is 
also configured to be compatible with the orbiter TSM. The module's exterior geometry 
was determined by the location of the shuttle orbiter umbilical panels. The width of the 
orbiter body at the forward P.dge of the panel determined the maximum allowable 
diameter of the PIA module at that point. A retractable cover provides protection for 
the umbilical panel disconnects after separatIon from the TSM. 
The capsule structure is an all-aluminum shell structure using skinlstringers with 
frames for stiffening. The thrust structure consists of titaniumlgraphite-epoxy beams 
which dire<:1!y mount the three SSME's. The beams terminate at four points which provide 
mechanical attachments to the external thrust structure. The design of these attach-
ments is similar to that of the orbiter/ET attachments. Design of the thrust structure 
accommodates passage of propellant feedlines. 
The three SSME's of the PIA module are in the same relative location as in the 
current orbiter. The routing of the propellant feedlines has been revised to accommodate 
the relocated ET lorbiter disconnect valves at the module surface. The helium purge 
bottles and hydraulic power units for thrust vector control are also rearranged from. the 
orbiter configurations to fit the module contour. 
Auxiliary OMS propulsion for the PIA module is provided by two STS OMS engines 
with 26,6&8N of thrust each. The OMS engines are each mounted in a removable pod to 
enable servid'ig in the hypergolic maintenance facility. The required propellant is less 
than that of the shuttle orbiter because of reduced impulse requirements for the SOV 
mission, and this aids in the PIA module packaging. A thermal control system similar to 
that in the orbiter is required to prevent propellant freezing. Placement of the two OMS 
pods is above and below the SSME cluster on the PIA module vertical centerline. 
Approximately 24 hr after launch, the PIA module deorbi ts and returns to a soft 
landing near the launch site. Reentry thermal protection is provided by shuttle-type 
reusable surface insulation (RSl). Initial aerodynamic deceleration is provided by drogu'e 
and main parachutes. Final deceleration for a soft landing is achieved by solid rocket 
motors (SRM) mounted on the base heat shield. The PIA module lands on three 
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telescoping landing feet mounted on the aft end. The landing feet provide impact 
attenuation to accommodate deceleration system errors. 
The PIA module avionics system is derived from the STS system by (1) eliminating 
all display electronics and voice communications, (2) eliminating pilot landing and 
navigation aids, (3) eliminating the aerosurface actuation system, (4) modifying the 
deceleration and landing system, and (5) reducing the number 0' ~I)mputers from five to 
three. Onboard performance monitoring and recording equipment is incorporated to 
support post-flight refurbishment, maintenance, and other operations. Additional avionics 
are added to control the descent and recovery phases. 
7.3.2.2 Laooch Vehicle Characteristics 
Launch vehicle basic characteristics are shown in Figure 7.3.2-1 and are identical to 
those of the uprated STS. The increased payload of the SOY is provided by the decreased 
inert weight of the cargo orbiter (37,751 kg) compared to the shuttle orbiter (75,000 kg) as 
the injection mass at MECO is constrained to be equal. 
7.3.2.3 Performance 
The SOY delivers 84,000 kg of payload to the reference 370-km-altitude circular 
orbit at 38-deg indination. 
7.3.2.4 Cclrgo Accommodation 
The SOY cargo shroud, as defined for the space disposal mission, provides a dear 
volume, 6m in diameter by 25.5m long, topped by a truncated cone 6m in diameter at the 
base, 4.2m long, and 2m in diameter at the top surface. The orbi t transfer system is 
supported by a 4.57m-diameter support ring at the base of the injection stage body shell, 
which takes X-, Y -, and Z-Ioads, and by three fittings at the station of the forwMd ET 
pickup point, which accommodate X- and Y -loads only. Separation is accomplished by a 
linear-shaped charge at the base interface and separation nuts at the forward fittings. 
Guidance during separation is provided by a rail system which guides rollers mounted on 
the injection stage. 
7.3.2.' Abort Modes 
Abort modes for the SOY are undefined. In general, the payload COuld not be 
expected to survive any abort except an abort to orbit. The PIA module, by itself, could 
probably accomplish something similar to the RTLS, AOA, and ATO abort mode:. avail.able 
to the orbiter. 
68 
1 
" 
/ 
·-'-0·- .•. _ .............. ,.,. ... ...,.., ______ s.r""'- __ • ___ ••.• ._~.o, ~~ ..... , -_ .. _._ ." •.... _~.~, .~ 
0180-26777 -2 
7.3.2.6 Modifications for Space Disposal Mission 
The only modification to the SOV configuration described in reference 3 was to 
extend the payload shroud length by about 7m to accommodate the orbit transfer system 
stack. The performance impact of this change is negligible for two reasons: (1) the 
extension is on a portion of the shroud subjected to aerodynamic loads only, and (2)' the 
entire .portion of the shr~ud. f!Jrward of the ET interface ring, which includes the added 
length, is jettisoned early in the ascent trajectory. 
7.3.2.7 ~cated Waste Payload Safety Provisions 
N/A. 
7.4 ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 
The orbit transfer system is composed of a delivery orbit transfer system, which 
transfers the waste payload system frC'm low E~rth orbit to the final destination, and a 
rescue system which ensures delivery of the waste payload to the planned destination in 
the event of delivery mission failures. The rescue system is based on using the vehicles 
developed for the delivery mission, modified by the modular addition or "kitting" of 
specialized rescue systems. 
This section is Cii ... ided into two parts. In the first, major elements and subsystems 
used in the nominal delivery mission are described. In the second, addi tional components 
, ' 
used in the rescue mission are described, along with tile way they are integrated with the 
delivery mission elements to accomplish the rescue mission. 
7.4.1 Delivery Mission Orbit Transfer System 
The delivery mission orbit transfer system is used to transfer the waste payload 
from a 370-km altitude Earth orbit to the destination circular heliocentric orbit at 0.85 
AU. The reference orbit transfer system is a two-stage vehicle that burns liquid oxygen 
and liquid hydrogen. The first stage, or injection stage, is recovered for reuse; the second 
stage, or SOlS, is expended. The orbit transfer system general arrangement and key 
characteristics are shown in Figure 7.4.1-1. 
The four primary orbit transfer system elements are also shown in Figure 7.4.1-1: 
(1) The injection stage places the SOlS, payload adapter, and payload into heliocentric 
transfer orbit and returns for reuse. (2) The interstage supports the SOlS and payload 
adapter during ascent to low orbit and, during th'! injection stage bum, also supports the 
mass of the waste payload. It is jettisoned after SOlS separation. (3) The SOlS spends 165 
days in transfer orbit and then performs a 12-min burn to insert the payload into' the 
69 
.... 
-, 
j 
,. -, .... , .- ..... -
ELEM!Nn 
0180-26777 -2 
111 ENGINE BELU RETRACTED. 
121 370 .... LOW EARTH ORBIT TO 
HEUOCI:NTRIC ORBIT AT 0.05 AU. 
LENGTH 111 
DIAMETER 
MASS IH LEO 
PAYLOAD 121 
79.829 ., 
3O.ao1.l k, 
Figure 7.4.1-1. Orbit Transfer System General Arrangement 
des~ination orbit. (4) The payload adapter allows the orbi t transfer system to dock wi th 
the uprated space shuttle in orbit for transfer of the waste payload and provides for waste 
payload transfer and structural support. 
7.4.1.1 Injection Stage 
The injection stage is an L02/LH2 propellant OTY that uses aerobraking to 
accomplish the reduction in velocity to circularize upon return to LEO. The general 
arrangement and key configuration features of the vehicle are illustrated in Figure 
7.4.1-2, with top-level mass properties. A detailed mass statement for a closely related 
point design vehicle is presented along with mass trending data in Appendix C. The 
foUowing sections briefly describe the vehicle and its systems. Primary systems include 
structure and airborne support equipment, aerobraking, thermal control, avioniCS, power 
supply and distribution, propulsion, attitude control, and interstage assembly. 
Structure. AU of the vehicle external body shell except for the avionics ring is 
fabricated from graphite-epoxy. The main propellant tanks are fabrica~ed from 2219 
aluminum and are designed for a 20-mission service life. Fiberglass struts are used to 
support the liquid hydrogen tanks, with graphite/epoxy struts used to support the lIquid 
oxygen tank and the main engines. Trunnion fittings made of titanium are used to 
interface with the launch vehicle. Pyrotechnically actuated payload release mechanisms 
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LHZ TANK FORWARD DOME 
(1) ENGINE BELLS RETRACTED 
SHROUD LINES 
LENGTH (1) 
DIA 
MASS AT STARTBURN 
PROPELLANT MASS 
INERT MASS 
Figure 7.4.1-2. Injection Stage General Arrangement 
17.64 III 
4.57 III 
64.809 kg 
58.967 kg 
5570 kg 
are provided for interstage separation. The vehicle side of the vehicle-ASE interface has 
a total of 36 recept .. cle fi ttings for the vehicle latch and release mechanisms mounted on 
the ASE. Most of the electrical power, avionics, and attitude control systems (ACS) are 
mounted on the aluminum avionics and equipment ring. 
Aerobraking. The aerobraking capability is achieved by the modular installation of a 
ballute deceleration subsystem on the aft body shell. It consists of the ballute, ballute 
inflation system, installation provisions, and pyrotechnic devices for the deployment and 
release of ballute prior to and after reentry. A global positioning system (GPS) receiver 
and processor subsystem is added to the vehicle avionics to provide the precise position 
determination required for the aerobraking maneuver. These addi tions increase the dry 
mass by 83 kg. 
Thermal Control. Thermal control of the OTV is accomplished by both active and 
passive techniques. The passively cooled avionics are mounted on the aluminum ring 
section, with the components which operate during ascent in the orbiter located in the 
upper quadrant. The thicknesses of the mounting shelf and the external ring are tailored 
to accommodate component thermal requirements. Flexible optical solar reflector 
(FOSR) covers the external ring surface. Waste heat rejection from the fuel cell system 
is provided by an active cooling loop with a radiator mounted on the t02 tank support 
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body shell. Freon 11 is used for the working fluid. Heaters are used on the ACS storage 
tanks, feedlines, and thrusters and for batteries and the fuel cell product water dump line. 
The cryogenic propellant tanks are covered with blankets composed of 23 layers of 
double-aluminized Kapton. To prevent air liquification and ice formation within the 
blanket, a ground purge is used during prelaunch .. ;'Jvi ties and ini tial portions of ascent to 
LEO. 
AvioniCs~ The avioniCs subsystem is identical to that of the Fhase A OTV 
configuration (ref. 4) and perfcrms all guidance, navigation, and control functions; handles 
commLllications to the orbiter and ground; and, with the orbiter-mounted ASE, interfaces 
with the orbiter avionics. The avionics is a dual-string system which includes 
two computers and is communications compatible with both STON and TORS. Two GPS 
receivers are used to provide precise navigation for the aerobraldng return maneuver. 
Power Supply and Distribution. The electrical power supply and distribution sub-
system, designed for 28V operation, is powered by redundant, low-pressure, modified 
orbiter H2/02 fuel cells, each rated at 2.0-kW nominal/3.5-kW peak. Dedicated reactant 
storage tanks are used with reactant expulsion similar to the orbiter design. A 25 A/hr 
nickel-hydrogen utility battery is also provided. The system design provides for redundant 
power distribution units. The load demand on the power supply is approximately 2 kW 
during coast and 3 kW during mai,; engine operation. 
Propulsion. Main propulsion is provided by two Pratt & Whitney RLIO-lIB engines, 
which have a stowed length of 1.778m to facilitate stowage in the STS orbiter .for 
recovery and provide a total of 66,720N of mainstage thrust. The main propellant tanks 
have usable capacities of 8423 and 50,543 kg of liquid hydrogen and oxygen, respectively. 
The propellant delivery system uses 0.0.57m delivery lines, tank sump-mounted prevalves, 
and 0.144m fill, drain, and dump lines with redundant parallel durnp valves. . Tank 
pressurization is accomplished using autogenous pressurization during engine mainstage. 
Separate space and ground (orbiter) vent systems are provided. A schem3tic diagram. of 
the complete propulsion design is shown in Figure 7.4.1-3. 
Attitude Control. The ACS u:;es hydrazine monopropellant with pressure blowdown 
positive expulsion, 12 IUS rea.:tion engine modules (REM) for a total of 24 thrusters, and 6 
propeUant storage tank assemblies. Each of the six 0.533m-diameter titanium tanks 
provides a usable propellant capadty of 54 kg. Propellant expulsion is accomplished using 
a flexible diaphragm "nd N2 pressure blowdown from 2620 kPa to 690 kPa. The thrusters 
provide 133N of thru ...... with 2620 kPa inlet pressure and 36N at 690 kPa inlet pressure. 
Specific impulse is 23.5 and 230 sec at the U3N and 36N thrust levels, respect~vely. 
Propellant tanks, REM's, and all plumbing are mounted on the avionics ring section. 
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Figure '1.4.1-3. Main Engine Propul3ion Syrtem Schemattc 
7.4.1.2 Interstage 
The Interstage assembly, which supports the SOlS during launch and ascent and both 
SOlS and waste payload during injection, consists of structure, separation, and wiring 
systems. The general arrangement and key characteristics of the int<'1"stage are shown in 
Figure 7.4.1-4. 
The structure subsystem consists of a 4.57m-diameter graphi te-epoxy honeycomb 
shell with rings at the forward and aft end;; and longitudinal stiffeners also fabricated 
from graphi te-epoxy composite. The 3.34m length of the interstage provides clearance 
between the retracted bell of the SOlS engine and the forward rnul tHayer insulation (~tLl) 
blanket of the injection stage LH2 tank. 
Eight separation fittings on each of the forward and aft rings accommodate 
explosive bolts used for OTV and SOlS attachment and separation. The wiring system 
links SOlS and injection stages. 
Total mass of the interstage is 254 kg. A summary mass statement for the 
interstage assembly is contained in Appendix C. 
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Figure 7.4.1-4. Inter.stage A.ssembly General AlTangement 
7.4.1.3 Placement Stage tSOIS) 
The 5015 is an expendable cryogenic propellant stage designed to support the waste 
payload during the 165-day post-injection coast in transfer orbit and to perform the 
circularization or placement maneuver when the destination orbit radius of 0.85 AU is 
reached. The general 'arrangement and key features of the stage are illustrated in Figure 
7.4.1-5. 
The 5015 is essentially a smaller version of the injection CTV with changes in the 
thermal control, avionics, and electrical power subsystems to handle SOlS-peculiar 
functions. 
Structure. Major 5015 stn:ctural elements include the body shell, avionics compart-
ments, sunshield, and propellant tanks. 
The cylindrical body shell provides structural support and meteoroid protection for 
the propellant tanks and avionics compartment. It interfaces with the orbit transfer 
system interstage at the rear and with the payload adapter at the front. The body shell is 
a honeycomb sandwich structure fabricated from O.25-mm graphite-epoxy facesheets and 
nomex core. Forward and aft graphite-epoxy rings accommodate the interstage and 
payload adapter interface fittings. Intermediate rings provide mounting interfaces for the 
propellant tanks. Meteoroid shields of O.25-mm aluminum are spaced 60 mm from the 
outer honeycomb facesheet to act as meteor bumpers for the propellant tanks. During the 
74 
, . 
.' 
.' , 
i . 
\ 
i I 
\ 
\ 
.\ 
.. 
'\ \ 
\ I 
\ 
\ 
0180-26777 -2 
ORIGIN!.:" :. :' • ..,. •.•.. ' 
OF POOR QU:.:"i7Y 
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"MAIN ENGI'" 
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'".46H ~ k, 
LENGTltI1l ' .. n_ 
C'A: SUHSHIELD 5..3IRo 
DIA: MfTtOROID '-G9no 
eUW'ER 
MASS AT STARTBURN 13,ti04.1 
PROI'ELLANT MASS 11.224 k, 
INERT MASS 2.21>! kG 
Figw-e 7.4.1-5. Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) General Arrangement. 
165-day cruise, meteoroid protection for the oxygen tank is provided by a dedicated 
conical aluminum shield aft of the body shell. 
Avionics are housed in two thermally isolated avionics compartments mounted to 
the inside of the body shell forward of the LH2 tank. The compartment provides correct 
operating temperature for the avionics components without transferring heat into the 
prope:::nt tanks. Each compartm.ent is exposed to the solar flux at the forward end 
through penetrations in the sunshade and to space on the outboard side through a cutout in 
the body sheU. The correct thermal balance is maintained using passive-thermal coatings, 
MLI, and heaters. MLI is used to isolate the relatively warm avionics compartments from 
the propellant tanks. 
The sunshield protects the forward end of the SOlS from direct solar flux during the 
165-day cruise phase. It overhangs the SOlS diameter sufficiently to prevent direct 
illumination of any other portion of the vehide during the limit cycle excursions in pitch 
and yaw imposed by the attitude control system. The shield is a conical hO!'feycomb 
sandwich structure fabricated from O.l-mm glass-reinforced epoxy facesheet arid' nomex 
core. Its outside is covered with FOSR, and it is shielded by an MLI blanket from the rest 
of the SOlS. 
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The main propellant tanks are fabricated from 2219 aluminum. They are of all-
welded construction and are sized for a single-mission service life. Fiberglass struts are 
used to support the liquid hydrogen tanks, and graphite-epoxy struts support the liquid 
oxygen tank and the main engine. 
1bermal Control. Configuration changes in the thermal control subsystem used on 
the OTV are required because of the 165-day coast from 1 AU to 0.8.5 AU. The stage 
remains oriented during coast in a head-on attitude to the Sun. The sunshield mounted on 
the front end of the vehicle reduces the incident heat flux. The number of MLI layers has 
been increased from 23 to 40 to prevent excessive bolloff. Avionics thermal control is 
provided passively by the thermally isolated avionics compartment. No active thermal 
control is required because solar array and batteries, rather than fuel cells, provide 
electrical power. 
Avionics. This subsystem accomplishes all guidance and control functions and, in 
cooperation with the ground, all navigation functions. [t provides communications with 
the ground and handles interfaces with the orbiter-mounted flight support system during 
waste payload transfer and with the injection stage and SDCLV. 
The avionics system was derived from systems defined for the third stage. of the 
NASA inertial upper stage (IUS) studied by BAC, with modifications to provide for looger 
mission duration and increased reliability. A basic diagram of the system is shown in 
Figure 7.4.1-6. The avionics system is composed of a guidance and navigation sensor 
group, data management group, communications group, rendezvous support group, and 
power control group. 
Guidance and Navigation Sensor Group. Redundant sensors are provided for Sun, 
stars/Earth, and linear acceleration. One of each type of sensor is mounted in each 
avionics compartment in locations that satisfy FOV requirements. Each sensor interfaces 
with all three command units. 
Data Management Group. The data management group consists of three command 
units (CU) and three signal interface units (SIU). Each CU consists of a digital processor, 
memory, timer, an integral power supply, and power switching and distribution relays. 
Driving circuits for the RCS valve drivers are integral with the unit. Each CU is capable 
of executing all vehicle control functions independently. In normal operation, one uni t is 
prime and two are dormant. Redundancy management is accomplished by ground 
command. 
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The three SIlJ's interface the CU with the commlU1ir:ations group transponders and 
with the hardwired signals transmitted throughout the SOlS umbilical. Each SIU 
Interfaces with a single CU and with both communications groups and the SOlS umbilical. 
Communications Group. The communications group provides redundant communica-
tion between the SOlS command lU1its and ground control. It consists of two transceivers, 
an RF switch, and four omni antennas. Each transceiver consists of an IUS transponder 
and power amplifier and a diplexer. The SIU's of the data management group interface 
wIth the transponder. Both diplexers are connected to the RF switch which allows either 
transceiver to talk through ei ther of two omni antenna pairs. Each pair of omni's provides 
a 4-pi steradian FOY for SOlS communications. Space disposal control Earth station will 
have sufficient ERP to talk to the omni's during aU stages of the nominal disposal mission. 
~se of the NASA Deep-Space Network (DSN) on a contingency basis would allow 
commmications and tracking at the maximum range (about 2 AU) reached during rescue 
missions. 
Rendezvous Support Group. Redundant rendezvous transponders are provided to aid 
waste payload transfer and rescue operations (if required). The transponders are mounted 
on the payload adapter to satisfy FOV requirements. Either transonder can be switched 
by any of the three ClJ's. 
Power Control Group. The power control group drives the redundant main .facing 
thrust vector controllers and handles the main engine control functions. The redundant 
thrust vector controllers interface with the three CUts and the pi tch and yaw actuators on 
the main engine. Each thrust vector control (TYC) controller can drive both actuators. 
The main engine controller is a dedicated uni t which sequences the integral solenoid 
valves on the RLIO-IIB engine to run the engine through its start (and shutdown) sequences 
after being ini tiated by either of the three CUts. 
Power Supply and Distribution. Figure 7.4.1-6 also shows a block diagram of the 
electrical power system. Cruise electrical power is provided by a 14_m2 solar array. This 
is a state-of-the-art silicon array with 8-mil cells, 6-mil coverglass, and 2-mil substrate. 
Two 89-Ah batteries provide redundant power storage. Dedicated regulator charger and 
power switching units are associated with each of the three CUts to provide high 
reliability. Batteries, regulator charger, and switching uni ts are mounted in the avionics 
compartments. The solar array is mounted on the sunshield outer skirt. 
Propulsic.. .. Main propulsion is provided by a single Pratt & Whitney RUO-IIB engine 
which has a stowed length of I.778m and provides 66,720N of mainstage thrust. The .main 
propel!dnt tanks have usable capacities of 1663 and 9561 kg of liquid hydrogen and oxygen, 
respectively. Figure 7.4.1-7 shows a schematic of the main propulsion system. The 
78 
bOUNO "ILIUM J----O()-c)--__ lUff\,y 
.-- - - - ~r-:l.o1-R"r"'-' __ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'''LL.DRAIN. 
IDUIG'SYSTEM I 
!ALL. DRAIN. jDW='VALVI 
I 
I 
0180-26777-2 
I • [~c!I'!!I "UIT L ___ Lt!z. !,,,!K.!~E!£~ __ )::'LV_ . _ 
I'RUSURIZATI~ $Ul'I'L Y 
AUTOG!H!OUS 
I'RUSUIlIZAT10N 
TANJ" VA£.VI 
QUAD 
... - ,n 
o IOLPlOIO VALVI 
~ HlUUMOPlRAnOVALVI 
o 
~ "'!$SUA!! REGULATOR 
Figure 7.4.1-7. 5015 Main Propulsion System" Schematic 
propellant delivery system uses 0.057m delivery lines, tank sump-mounted prevalves, and 
0.IC2m fH1, drain, and dump Hnes with redundant parallel dump valves. Tank pressuriza-
tion is accomplished using autogenous pressurization during engine mainstage. Separate 
space and grou.,d vent systems are provided. Reliability has been augmented for the 
165-day cruise mission by providing a redundant helium supply and regulators, LH2 
thermodynamic vent valves, and autogenous pressurization tapoff valve!':. 
Attitude ControL The ACS uses hydrazine monopropellant with pressure blowdown 
positive expulsion. The ACS uses 12 [US REM's with two thrusters each and four 
propellant storage tank assemblies. Two dusters with eight thrusters each located on 
both the z-axis and the y-axis provide redundant attitude control and three-axis 
translation capabilities. 
Each of the four 0.533m-diameter titanium propellant tanks provides a usable 
propellant capadty of 54 kg. Propellant expulsion is accomplished using a flexible 
diaphragm and N2 pressure blowdown from 2620 kPa to 690 kPa. The thrusters provide 
133N of thrust with 2620 kPa inlet pressure and 36N at 690 kPa inlet pressure. Specific 
impulse is 235 and 230 sec at the 133N and 36N thrust levels, respectively. Propellant 
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tanks, REM's, and all plumbing are mounted on the inside of the body shell forward of the 
L~ tank (Fig. 7.4.1-5). 
7.4.1." Payload Adapter 
The payload adapter mounts to the front of the SOlS and has four primary functions: 
(1) ·It provid~ a passi~e docking collar which allows the OTV to dock with the orbiter in 
LEO to allow waste payload transfer. (2) It provides guidF.: rollers to aid waste payload 
transfer from the orbiter-mounted FSS. (3) It provides structural support for the waste 
payload during injection, transfer orbit cruise, and placement operations. (4) It provides 
two mechanical latches and a trunnion socket to reversibly secure the waste payload in 
position. 
Primary elements of the payload adapter designed to perform these functions are 
shown in Figure 7.4.1-8 and include the docking ring assembly, waste payload transfer 
DOCKING GUIDE 
DOCKING RING ASSY 
FITTING (THERHAL ISOLATOR) (
SOlS trITI;RFACE 
~=-"A 
WASTE PAYLOAD TRANSFER 
GUIDE SYSTEH 
LENGTH: 4.17m 
DIA: 4.57m 
HASS: 454 kg 
Figure 7.4.1-8. Payload Adaptp.r i'rimary Element3 
guide system, reversible waste payload latch system, structure, thermal control, and the 
SOlS interface fl ttings. 
The docking ring assembly includes docking guides and capture and hard-docking 
latch strikers. No active components are included. Components are integrated 'with the 
box section docking ring which provides structural support for all components used in 
docking. The ring also supports the two rendezvous transponders. 
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Two raiis equipped with eight rollers each engage the waste payload system guide 
rails to guide the waste payload during normal and rescue mission waste payload transfer 
operations. The rails are supported by the oocking and payload interface rings. The 
rollers are dry lubricated to ensure operation after extended exposure to the space 
environment. 
The reversible waste payload latch system is designed to provide passive, fail 
operational latching of the waste payload during normal operation and to allow mechani-
cally operated unlatching during rescue operations. The normal latching operation is 
shown in Figure 7.4.1-9. Two spring-loaded jaws capture the waste payload lateral 
SPRING 
JAWS 
rUWASTE PAYLOAD 
~ LAT'RAL TRUNNIO, 
SEAR __ --f--~?:! 
PUSHROD 
SEAR 
PRELATCH LATCHED 
Figure 7.4.1-9. Payload Adapter Reversible Waste Payload Latch System 
CAMS 
LOCK 
JAWS 
trunnion when the trunnion displaces the sear which holds the jaws open. Two cams linked 
to the displacement bar rotate into positions which lock the jaws in the closed position as 
the trunnion moves into capture position. Jaws are unlocked only if required by a rescue. 
To prever.t inadvertent unlatching, the locking cams can be retracted only by a sh~t­
driven mechanism. Because the SOlS does not carry a drive for the shaft, ur!atching can 
only be accomplished by a dedicated drive mechanism carried on the docking ring of the 
rescue SOlS. 
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The two latches are mounted on the payload interface ring and carry aU waste-
payload-induced X- and Z-loads from the waste payload lateral trunnions into the ring and 
adapter structure. Y -loads are reacted by the trunnion of the aft waste payload which 
fits into a trunnion fitting, located in the center of the SOlS interface structure. 
Reaction loads in the X-direction, caused by the offset between the waste payload 
trunnion and center of gravity, are reacted by the latch fittings. 
Structural support for docking, payload guide, and latch mechanisms is provided by 
the space frame adapter structure. Primary structural elements include the docking and 
payload interface rings, the SOlS interface ring as~embly, and the struts which make up 
the fully triangulated space frame connecting them. All components except the docking 
ring, which is fabricated from aluminum, are graphite-reinforced epoxy. Eight fittings on 
the periphery of the SOlS interface ring interface with thermal isolators to mount the 
adapter to the forward ring of the SOlS body shell. 
Payload adapter thermal control is required to control structure interface dimen-
sions and to minimize heat transferred into the SOlS. Dimensional control is established 
by limiting thermal excursions using passive coatings and selective application of MLI 
blankets. Thermal input to the SOlS is minimized by adjusting the adapter thermal 
balance to establish a low equilibrium temperature and by using glass-fiber-reinforced 
epoxy thermal isolators to connect the adapter SOlS interface ring to the SOlS body shell. 
7.4.2 Rescue Mission Orbit Transfer System 
The rescue orbit transfer system is a derivative of the delivery mission orbit 
transfer system modified to accommodate the incre:lSed duration and more complex 
operations of the rescue mission. It consists of a delivery mission orbit transfer system 
plus ~ standard SO!S modified by addition of a rescue kit. These elements are assembled 
into three distinct configurations used in executing the mission: (1) the rescue vehide, 
which provides mission control after insertion for all phases and provides for rendezvous 
with the failed vehicle, transfer of the waste payload, and final solar orbit insertion; (2) 
the pursuit configuration which carries the rescue vehicle to the target after injection; 
and (3) an injection configuration which injects the pursui t configuration into its initial 
transfer orbit. 
7.4.2.1 Rescue Vehicle 
Rescue Vehicle Requirements. Rescue mission requirements which differ from the 
requirements of the standard delivery mission are summarized in Figure 7.4.2-1. Naviga-
tion to within terminal acquisition range of the target vehicle involves two propulsive 
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RESCUE VEHICLES 
• PLACE RESCUE SYSTEM AT FAILED VEHICLE 
• 2 PHASE TRANSFER 
• TWO 1.2 KMlSEC VELOCITY IMPULSES 
• UP TO 308 DAYS LAUNCH TO RENDEZVOUS 
• NAVIGATE TO WITHIN TE~MINAL ACQUISITION RANGE OF TARGET VEHICLE 
•. ACCO~P.LISH AUTONOMOUS TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING 
• COMPUTER 
.IMU 
• RENDEZVOUS RADAR 
• MONITOR/COMMAND C~PABILITIES 
• TRANSFER PAYLOAD TO RESCUE VEHICLE 
• EFFECTORS FOR PAYLOAD TRANSFER 
• ORIENT SOlS FOR PLACEMENT MANEUVER 
• INITIATE SOlS AND JET1ISON RESCUE PECULIAR HARDWARE 
• SOlS COMPLETES PLACEMENT AT 0.65 AU 
FAILED SOlS 
• BEACON TRANSPONDER SURVIVAL UNTIL RESCUE 
.·MAINTAIN STABLE ATTITUDE DURING TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING 
Figure 7.4.2-1 •. Re!cue Sy!tem Top-Level Requirement.! 
maneuvers accomplished in the pursui t configuration using the deep-space network to 
track the onboard beacon transponder. Target vehicle and rescue vehicle r~lative 
positions are monitored and the maneuvers required for closing are calculated on the 
ground and uplinked to the rescue vehicle. The initial navigation phase is completed when 
the rescue vehicle arrives within 1000 km of the vehicle to be rescued. 
Requirements peculiar to the rescue vehicle include rendezvous and clocking. with 
the failed SOlS, waste payload transfer to the rescue vehicle, and orientation of the 
rescue vehicle to the placement burn orientation, followed by the jettison of the r.escue 
kit and sunshield. The SOlS then performs a normal placement to complete the 
deployment mission. Total duration for these operations is approximately 18 hr. 
This sequence dictates requirements for computer capability, an inertial measure-
ment unit, rendezvous radar, and monitor/command capabilities including closed-circuit 
television and a high data rate downlink to allow ground monitoring of terminal 
rendezvous operations. Payload transfer to the rescue vehicle requires docking provisions 
on both rescue vehicle and the vehicle to be rescued and effectors to accomplish payload 
transfer. The final requirement is to orient the SOlS for the placement maneuver and 
initiate the SOlS autonomous placement operations. 
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Rescue Vehicle Configuration. The rescue vehicle design uses a standard SOlS for 
-:he insertion maneuver. Addi tional capabilities required for rescue are provided by 
equipping the vehicle with a rescue kit. Elements of the rescue kit are illustrated in 
FigL:re 7.~.2-2 ::tnd include the rescue avionics ring, the active docking adapter, and the 
crlt sunsl;a~e. 
RESCUE AVIONICS RING---. 
RENDEZVOUS 
RADAR 
ANTENNA 
( 2 PLACES) 
LENGTH 
OIA. 
MASS 
0.64 II: 
4.39 III 
1582 kg 
ACTIVE DOCKING ADAPTER 
LENGTH 5.0 III 
OIA 4.57 III 
MASS: 572 kg 
Figure 7.4.2-2. SOlS Re3cue Kit 
LENGTH 3.5 III 
OIA 4.57 m 
MASS 78 kg 
Rescue Avionics Ring. The rescue avionics ring internal arrangement, equiP":'ent 
complement, and sunimarymass properties are illustrated in Figure 7.11.2-3. Pri~ary 
components include the reaction control systefTl~ propellant tankage, communication 
subsystem, a redundant inertial measurement unit, rendezvous radar electronics, com-
puters, and closed-circuit television electronics unit which includes a high data rate RF 
subsystem and a deployable high gain antenna. Components are mounted in an equipment 
support ring which provides structural support and thermal contrOl; the general arrange-
ment is similar to the avionics equipment ring used by the injection stage. A 
3.1m-diameter hole in the center of the equipment section provides for transfer of the 
waste payload. Outboard mounting provides the widest possible field of view for the 
rendezvous TV camera, the gimbal-mounted rendezvous radar antennas, and a boom-
mounted high gain antenna. Additional structure consists of the struts used to interface 
the rescue kit with the SOlS-mounted active docking adapter. 
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• EQUIPUENT COUPLEUENT 
1. Hz tt4 TANK 
2. TRANSPONDER 
3. :zo WATT POWER AMP 
... COMl'UTER 
L DATA DUSISIGNAL CONDITIONER 
.. SIGNAL IrnERFACE UWT 
7. ReDUNOAf~T INERTIAL 
IiiEASUREMENT UNIT (RIMU) 
.. R£'~OEZVOUS RADAR ELECTRONICS 
.. CCTV ELECTRONICS 
10. POWER DISTRIBUTION UNIT 
• aROSS WEIGHT (kg) 15SZ 
DAY WEIGHT 1153 
RESIDUALS 1G 
RESERve PROl". 3!l 
NOMINAL PROP. 371 
Flpe 7.4.2-3. Re3cue Avionic3 Ring 
Active Docking Achpter. The active docking adapt~, in addition to providing t 1e 
waste payload support and waste payload transfer functions 01 the waste payload adapter, 
has its docking ring mounted on extendable impact absorbers to allow the rescue vehide 
to perform an active role in docking. Motorized actuators draw the docking ring into a 
hard-docked configuration after the initial shock-absorbed contact. In the hard-docked 
condition, electrical and mechanical interfaces are completed with the docking ring of the 
~ailed 5015. The mechanical interface, along with a drive motor on the active docking 
adapter, allows driving the shaft which unlatches the failed vehicle's waste payload 
adapter payload retention latches. An electric-motor-driven cable and winch system then 
draws the waste payload into the rescue-vehicle-mounted active docking adapter. 
The adapter configuration with the avionics ring installed is shown in Figure 7.4.2-3. 
Its ring and space frame construction and 5015 interface features are identical to the 
normal waste payload adapter. Addition of the active docking ring and its associated 
support hardware adds 95 kg to the 454 kg of the base adapter; the waste payload transfer 
mechanization adds a further 23 kg for a total of 372 kg. 
Aft Sunshie1d. The aft sunshield provides thermal control for the vehicle cryogenic 
propellant during the Sun-oriented coast portion of the pursuit mission when the negative 
x-axis of the rescue vehicle is pointed at the Sun. The sunshield also mounts a solar array 
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and redundant Sun sensors used for vehicle power <.nd pointing during the cruise portion of 
the mission. Th~ sunshield is of honeycomb sandwich construction using glass-fiber-
reinforced epoxy face sheets and nomex core. The conical portion of the shield is 
stiffened. Thermal control is provided by passive thermal coatings on the outside and 
extensive use of multilayer insulation blankets. Total mass of structll"e, thermal control, 
supplementary power, and Sun sensors is 78 kg. 
Gross weight of the rescue kit is about 2232 kg. The kit dry mass including avionk.s 
ring,'adapter,"..:nd su~hield is about 1821 kg. Consumables, primarily propellants for the 
reaction control system, amount to 426 kg. This propellant loading is adequate for all 
SOlS rendezvous and docking operations involved in rescue. 
!!.~cue Vehide Assembly. Assembly of the rescue kit and SOlS into a rescue vdlicle 
is illustrated in Figure 7.4.2-4. The rescue kit is strut mounted to the active docking 
adapter. At the conclusion of rescue operations, the avionics ring and sunshield are 
"\ 
RESERVE KIT 
• ACTIVE DOCKING 
• RESCUE AVIONICS 
Figure 7.4.2-4. Re3cue Vehicle A,~~il1bly 
" jettisoned, converting the rescue vehicle back to a standard SOlS. 
KITTED 
RESCUE VEHICl.E 
Key features of the assembled rescue vehicle, including a summary mass state:ment, 
are shown in Figure 7.4.2-5. 
The aft sU"lshield encloses the retri\cted engine bell to provide the thermal control 
needed to minimize bolloff of cryogenic propellant during the cruise and pursuit phcises of 
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STANDARD SOlS 
-HAIN PROPULSION 
13605 kg 
-ACS THRUSTERS 
-STAR SENSORS 
WASTE PAYLOAD ADAPTER 
-PLUS-
RESCUE KIT TOTAL: 
AVIONICS RING 
-TARGET ACQUISTION 
15821tg 
-RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKItlG 
-NAVIGATION 
-GROUND MOtU TOR ItlG 
-ADDED RCS PROPELLANT 
-ADDED ELECTRICAL POWER 
-J ETT I SONABLE 
ACTIVE DOCKING RING 95 kg 
-IMPACT ATTENUATION 
PAYLOAD TRANSFER MECH. 2Jlg 
AFT SUNSHADE 78kg 
-THERMAL CONTROL 
-SUPPLEMENTARY POWER 
- SUN SENSORS 
RESCUE VEHICLE uROSS 
454 kg 
1773 kg 
15837 kg 
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Figure 1.4.2-5. Rescue Vehicle Key Features 
the mission when the sunshie1d is kept pointed at the Sun. The steerable high gain an~enna 
of the avionics ring, shown in the deployed position, is used for the high data rate 
downlink required for dosed-circuit television mOnitoring of the rescue operations. The 
active docking ring is shown in deployed condition. The similarity of the overall 
configuration to the standard SOlS illustrates the straightforward nature of the conver-
sion. 
The mass of the standard 5015 is increased from approximately 13,60.5 kg to about 
1.5,837 kg by the addition of rescue provisions. The largest increment is provided by the 
1.582-kg avionics ring. The active docking adapter adds .572 kg and the aft sunshade adds 
78 kg. 
7.4.2.2 Pursuit Configuration 
Pursui t Configuration Requirements. The basic mission profile for rendezvous wi th 
the failed SOlS in heliocentric orbit is describ~d in detail in section 6.2.2 and illustrated in 
Figure 6.2-2. The reference trajectory requires two velocity changes of 1.19 km/sec 
each. The first velocity impulse at injection plus 1.54 days places the rescue vehicle in the 
. pursuit trajectory which phases it for target vehicle intercept at 308 days. A second 
velocity impulse at this point matches velocity with the target vehicle, leaving the rescue 
vehicle in the same orbit as the target vehicle in preparation for rendezvous. 
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Pursuit Vehicle Configuration. The pursuit vehicle configuration uses a standard 
SOlS docked to the rescue vehicle, described in section 7.4.2.1, to provide the pursuit and 
rendezvous velocity impulses. At the conclusion of the rendezvous insertion bum, the 
expended standard SOlS is separated, leaving the rescue vehicle (now in the configuration 
shown in Fig. 7.4.2-5) ready for rendezvous and waste payload transfer. 
The pursuit configuration described is illustrated in Figure 7.4.2-6 and consists of 
the rescue vehicle docked to the waste payload adapter of the standard SOlS. After 
SUNSHIELD SOLAR ARRAY 
STANDARD SOlS 
+ Y IN ECLIPTIC 
'PLANE 
STANDARD SQIS: PROPULSION FOR 
-PURSUIT PHASE INJECTION 1.19 km/sac 
_ RENDEZVOUS PHASE INJECTION 1.19 km/sec 
RESCUE VEHICLE 
_ CONTROL FOR ALL MISSION PHASES 
- TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS AND 
PAYLOAD TRANSFER OPERATIONS 
_ FINAL PLACEMENT 1.28 km/sec 
Figure 7.4.2-6. Pursuit Vehicle Configuration 
injection and between maneuvers, the pursuit configuration flies with the rescue vehicie 
sunshade pointed at the Sun, allowing the rescue vehicle to shade the standard SOlS. AU 
the control functions are provided by the rescue vehicle; the standard SOlS serves as a 
propulsion module only. Its propulsive capability is adequate for the two 1.19-km/sec 
maneuvers required for the pursuit phase of the mission with the rescue vehicle itself 
performing the final 1.28-km/sec placement maneuver. 
The same system is used with a slightly different delta-V split for the Earth orbit 
rescue mission illustrated in Figure 6.2-1. 
7.4.2.3 Injection Configuration 
, ,~ Injection Configuration Requirements. The injection configuration is used to inject 
the pursuit configuration into the rescue transfer orbit. The mission profile is virtually 
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identical to the standard delivery mission. The slightly increased injection delta-V (3.S 
km/sec versus 3.27 km/sec) is more than ofiset by the substantial decrease in injected 
mass (20,lSO kg versus 4S,114 kg), allowing a substantial performance reserve. 
Injection Configuration Description. The injection configuration of the rescue orbi t 
transfer system is illustrated in Figure 7.4.2-7. The injection configuration is assembled 
on orbit from a standard delivery orbit transfer system delivered to LEO by a shuttle-
derived cargo launch vehicle and a rescue vehicle which is carried up in the uprated 
shuttle orbiter. After orbiter rendezvous with the previously deployed orbit transfer 
system, the rescue vehicle is deployed from the orbiter and in the first exercise of its 
• AUTONOMOUS ASSEMBL V 
IN LEO 
RESCUE MISSION ORBIT 
• TRANSFER SYSTEM: 
INJECTION CONFIGURATION 
Figure 7.4.2-7. Injection Configuration. of Rescue Orbit Trcm...1 er System 
functions, which serves as a final cherkout, rendezvouses and docks wi th the standard 
delivery orbi t transfer system. Injectio.1 of the pursuit configuration to its ini tial transfer 
orbit is then accomplished by the injection stage which uses an aerobraking maneuver to 
return to low orbit for recovery by the orbiter. 
7.' FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM 
The waste payload flight support system serves three primary functions in associa-. 
tion with the interpayload support structure described in section 7.1. It supports theduaI. 
waste payload in the STS cargo bay, incorporates an external docking ring which allows 
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orbit transfer system docking prior to waste payload transfer from the orbiter to the orbi t 
transfer system, and provides a tilt table and gUide rails which interface with the waste 
payload guide rails to guide the waste payload during transfer to the orbit transfer 
system. Key features are illustrated in Figure 7 • .5-1. Two built-up titanium T -frames, 
braced by tubular titanium struts, transfer loads from the dual waste payload to four 
longeron fittings and two keel fittings which interface with the space transportation 
system. 
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Flight Support System General Arrangement 
An extendable docking collar is stowed during launch and ascent and extended prior 
to orbit transfer system docking by support struts that incorporate linear actuators and 
impact attenuators to reduce the docking loads. 
A tilt table, driven by two linear actuators, rotates the waste payload 90 deg prior 
to waste payload transfer. STS interface avionics and a TV camera to aid docking are 
mounted on the forward T -frame. 
Operation of the flight support system is illustrated in Figure 7.5-2. During 
operation, the orbit transfer system docks to the extended docking collar. The STS 
orbiter performs the active role in this docking sequence. Waste payload is transferred by 
rotating the transfer cradle 90 deg, using the linear actuators, allowing the waste payload 
90 
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WASTE PAYLOAD TRANSFER ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 
SEPARATION (ORBITER ACTIVE) 
Figure 7.5-2. FUght SUpport System OparatCon DetaU 
to be translated through the center of the joined ring-shaped docking collars to i ts .fj~a1 
location in the orbit transfer system waste payload support structure. The orbiter then 
undocks and backs off, and the orbit transfer system is powered up to initiate transfer to 
the destination. 
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8.0 REFERENCE SPACE SYSTEMS OPERATIONS DEFINmON 
The objective of this effort was to define operations to the level required in order 
to: 
1. Determine the impact of assembly operations on the design of the waste payload 
system. 
2. Define the major ground support facilities required at the launch site. 
3. Define the complete timeline for all flight operations involving the waste payload in 
the nominal delivery mission. 
4. Define those operations and sequences involved in conducting the nominal rescue 
mission. 
The approach was to base the waste payload assembly operations on manufacturing 
sequences for the reference waste payload defined in section 4.0. The 1980 MSFC study 
of space disposal was used as the basis for setting launch site facility requirements. 
Timelines for the nominal delivery mission were adapted from actual time lines for the 
STS and IUS, modified for the space disposal trajectories. The sequence of rescue 
operations was derived from those developed in the 1980 MSFC space systems study. 
S.l WASTE PAYLOAD FABRICATION AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS 
The sequence of operations involved in fabrication and assembly of the waste 
payload is illustrated in Figure· 8.1-1. Discrete operations are enclosed in the individual 
boxes. Bulleted headings below the boxes describe fixtures and equipment used in .the 
operation; bulleted headings above each box describe the facility at which the operation 
takes place. 
Operations begin with fabrication of core and shield components at the shield 
fabrication vendor's facility. Shield tiles have been assembled to the Inconel shield shell 
and the assembled halves are transported to the waste payload fabrication and assembly 
facility, which is assumed to be co located with the facility where the waste form billets 
are fabricated. 
The first step in waste payload assembly is the loading of the waste form billets into 
the core, followed by the sealing of each bore. These operations are accomplished using a 
billet loading machine at the core load station. Following billet loading, the loaded core. 
is transferred to the shield assembly station where the core is installed into the lower half . 
of the shield assembly. The upper shield half assembly is then dropped into place and the 
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Wa3te Payload Fal:rication and AS3cmbly Flow Diagram 
waste payload is transferred to the inspection station where the fit of the shield halves 'is 
verified, clearing the waste payload for welding operations. Following transfer to the 
weld station, the electron beam welder vacuum chamber is pumped down and the waste 
payload is rotated as the electron beam welds the two shield halves together. From the 
weld station, the welded waste payloac.i is transferred back to the inspection station where 
the electron beam weld is inspected and verified as ready for flight. Following inspection, 
the waste payload is returned to the shield assembly station where the final row of 
closeout tiles, left uninstalled to allow access for the electron beam during the welding 
opera tion, is now installed. Closeout tile installation is followed by transfer of the waste 
payload to the shielded loading dock where it is installed in the shipping cask for shipment 
to the launch facility by rail. 
Figure 8.1-2 is a schematic of a conceptual waste payload assembly facility. No 
attempt has been made to illustrate the billet fabrication or storage facilities. The path 
of the waste payload core is illustrated, beginning at the core load station to the shield 
assembly station, inspection station, and weld station. Following the weld, the waste 
payload moves through the stations in reverse order and is loaded into the shipping cask in 
the shielded loading dock. Waste payload transfer is accoanplished by rail system and a 
shielded overhead crane. An adjacent unshielded area provides for receiving and 
inspection of the shield and core components and for control of the waste payload, 
:;-' asseanbly operations. 
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8.2 LAUNCH SITE OPERATIONS' 
Launch site operations are divided into three primary phases. The first is conducted 
in the nuclear payload processing facility, where the individual waste payload assembl.ies 
are joined by the interpayload support structure to form complete waste payload systems. 
The second phase is mating of the integrated waste payload system to the orbiter 
c:omponent of the upra~edspace transportation system. The final phase, prelaunch 
operations, is conducted immediately prior to launch vehicle ascent. 
Operations in the nuclear payload processing facility are illustrated in Figure 8.2:'1. 
Waste payload assembly operations begin with the unloading of the shipping cask. After 
unloading, the individual waste payload assemblies may be placed in the storage canyon 
for later buildup or transferred to the assembly canyon for the beginning of waste payload 
assembly operations. In the assembly canyon, the first waste payload assembly is installed 
on the buildup fixture using a shielded overhead crane. The same crane is used for the 
installation of the interpayload support structure on top of the first waste payload. The 
second waste payload is placed on top of the interpayload support structure, and captivE' 
connecting bolts are tightened using a remote operated impact wrench to complete the 
assembly. The assembled waste payload system is lifted by the shielded overhead crane 
and installed in the flight support system which has its payload transfer cradle rota ted to 
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Figure 8.2-1. Launch Site Ope:-ation:r Flow Diagram 
the vertical position. The flight support system payload transfer cradle is rotated to 
horizontal and latched remotely into its flight position. The integrated waste payload 
system and flight support system may now be either removed to the storage canyon for. 
holding for a later flight or transferred to the shielded loading dock for installation in the 
shielded payload cannister. 
Mating of the integrated waste payload cargo element, comprising the flight support· 
and waste payload systems, to the uprated STS orbiter begins with transport of t.he 
shielded payload canister to the erection area by a standard MMSE canister transporter; 
In the erection area, the canister is tilted upright and reinstalled on the canister 
transporter, which takes it to the rotating service structure at the launch pad. Using the 
crane located in the rotating service structure, the payload is hoisted up inside it and 
installed in the dedicated PGHM. After installation into the payload ground handling 
mechanism, the waste payload is retracted inside a shielded container and a shielded door 
is closed to allow personnel access to the interior of the rotating service structure 
required for orbiter prelaunch operations. At this point, the uprated STS is transported to 
the pad from the VAB on the mobile launch platform. The RSS is rotated into position and 
mated to the orbiter and the orbiter configured for installation of the waste payload cargo. 
element. Installation of the payload is followed by verification of payload interfaces; .. 
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Personnel access to the interior of the RSS is provided at this point by mobile shadow 
shields, which move into place around the installed waste payload cargo element. 
Prelaunch operations begin with verification of payload launch readiness, using a 
dedicated waste payload checkout system. This step is followed by the final launch 
preparations, including closing of the payload bay doors, loading of the crew followed by 
cabin closeout, clearing of the launch pad, hazardous servicing of the launch system, and 
retraction of the rotating service structure. Following this step, countdown operations 
using the launch processing system and the waste payload checkout system are conducted 
leading to ascent and the beginning of flight operations. 
8.3 FLIGHT OPERATIONS FOR NOMINAL OEUVERY MISSION 
Flight operations for the reference nominal space disposal delivery mission are 
divided into orbiter ascent operations, low Earth orbit operations, orbit transfer system 
injection operations, and solar orbit insertion stage operations. Figure 8.3-1 shows the 
entire sequence of operations. 
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Figure 8.3-1. Nominal Wa.ste Payload Delivery MiMion Flow Diagram 
8.3.1 Orbiter Ascent Operations 
The sequence of operations involved in orbiter ascent is illustrated in Figure &.~-2. 
Operaticns begin with ignition of the space shuttle main engines and the liquid rocket 
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Orbtter Ascent Operations 
boosters. Approximately 9 sec into the flight, a 2-sec pitchover maneuver is initiated, 
followed by boos.er separation at 2 min 4 sec and cutoff of the space shuttle main engines 
at about 6 min 38 sec. Af'~r another 30 sec, the external tank is separated; and 
approximately 12 min ·into the flight, the first burn of the orbiting maneuvering system 
engines inserts the vehicle into a,:, elliptical transfer orbit with an a.poapsis altitude of 
approximately 270 km. At 45 min 30 sec into the flight, the second orl:>iting maneuvering 
system burn circularizes the orbit at a., altitude of 270 km. Five minutes are required ~or 
verification of a safe orbit, followed by a 12-min operation which reconfigures the orbiter 
general-purpose computers for on-orbit operations. By 67 min into the flight, the payload 
bay doors are opened. By 69 min 40 sec into the ascent, the orbiter cooling system has 
been activated and the orbiter is ready to begin low Earth orbit operations. 
3.3.2 Orbiter LEO Operations 
Operations performed by the orbiter in low Earth orbit include rendezvous and 
dockir.g with the orbit transfer system, checkout of the orbit transfer system, waste 
payload system transfer operations, and separation. The entire sequence of LEO 
operations is illustrated in Figure 8.3-3. Each box contains the name of an operation, 
number assigned to the operation, and the elapsed time for the operation. The larger 
dotted boxes correspond to the individual events on the top-level operations flow shown in 
Figure 8.3-1. Each dotted box contains the elapsed time for the entire sequence of 
operations enclosed. 
Rendezvous operations begin at the completion of ascent operations and. are 
illustrated in Figure 8.3-4. The first operation is orientation of the orbiter· and 
97 
. -.. -~.,.,.~.-~-~- .-•.. _-.• --. _ .. - .. -..... -------- -._.- -_._._._-----~-_._._---_. 
I.t I 
will" '.1.1.. 
,Uly'MO 
.. ~ _Uti 
"""' IfU. 
1.2.4 COAST IN 
:;'lgw-8 8.3-3. 
0180-26777 -2 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
"" .. ".". I 
I 
Orbiter Leo Operations 
ORBIT 
DIRECTION CO""AND 
~OOCIC 
~S7 
~1" .. I ... ·--... ,I.,f-.... ...,.tIt -...-
• iJ APPROACH 
• TRAILING POSITI'm· 
• TAIL DO~ 
• USE VIDEO DISPLAYS 
• PRIMARY RCS 
• LHV ROTATIOPIAL MODE 
• ACCELERATION & PULSE 
• TRANSLATIONAL MODES 
1.3 ORIHTER/OTS DOCKING 
OPERATIO/IS 
Ffgw-6 8.3-4. Leo Rendezvous and Docking OperatiOTl3 
acquisition of the orbit transfer system tr~nsponder, using one of the orbiter'S two K~b~ln'd 
radar /communications systems. Acquisition is followed by computation of the ph.lSing 
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orbit insertion maneuver using the orbiter general-purpose computer. A single orbit:'1g 
maneuv~r ~ystem burn places the orbiter into the elliptical phasine orbit. A 90-min coast 
in the phasing orbit is followed by a second orbital ma~euvering system burn, which ;>lat:es 
the orbiter in the same orbit as the orbit transfer system, approximately 101(.." t·,?'r.inli iT 
Orbiter and orbit transfer syste:n docking operations are also i1lu')t:"a ~ed in ,: ,;:..:rr 
8.3-3. The first step is to command the orbit transfer systern to dock!nr, ~H<.t .. ,·,;t : its 
reaction control system shut down using a lo.v-power command link fr~';;! 'ir>~' o':;·!:.:-r. 
Followinb verification of orbit transfer system achievement of docking sta~'!~, the or~iter 
approaches along the velocity vector in a tail-down orientation until the docking collars 
on the waste payload adapter and the orbiter-mounted flight support system contact and 
soft latch. After the initial latchup, the flight support system actuators pull tho docking 
collars back into the hard engagement position. Electrical and mechanical umbilical 
connections between the orbit transfer system and the flight support system are made at 
this time. 
Verification of hard docking and engagement of the umbilicals is followed ily orbit 
transfer system checkout which is accomplished by means of a data link with the grour.d-
mounted checkout facilities. Orbit transfer system functional checks are followed by' 
dispositioil of the vehicle as to suitability for flight. Waste payload system transfer 
operations follow the verification of the orbit transfer system for flight. 
Transfer operations are illustrated in Figure 8.3-5. The initial step is to rotate the 
waste payload system 90 deg within the flight support systern using the transfer cradle •. 
After latching in this position, the waste payload carrier is extended to translate the 
waste payload systern from the flight support system into the waste payload adaptor of 
the orbit transfer system. After latching to the waste payload adaptor, the payload 
carrier is retracted back into the flight support system lea'/ing the waste payload firmly 
mounted to the orbit transfer system. 
Waste payload transfer is followed by separation from the orbit transfer system. 
After maneuvering the orbiter to the proper attitude for orbit transfer system separation, 
the orbiter general-purpose computer is used to update the injection stage glJidance 
system. This is followed by disconnection of the orbit transfer system umbilicals, 
extension of the docking collar, and unlatching of the waste payload adapter docking ring. 
The orbiter then backs away from the orbit transfer system along the velocity vector at 
about 0.3 m/sec. At this point, the orbit transfer system begins the sequence of injection 
operations. 
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WASTE PAYLOAD TRANSFER 
TRANS-
LATION 
ORBIT TRANSFER SYSTEM 
$EPARATION (ORBITER ACTIVE) 
Ffgure 8.3-5. Wast" P.Iyload Trarufor OperatCon Detail 
8.3.3 Orbit Transfer System Injection Operations 
The sequence of operations involved in injection of the solar orbit insertion stage 
and waste payload into heliocentric transfer orbit is illustrated in Figure 8.3-6. Injection 
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operations begin 30 sec after separation from the orbiter with activation of the injection 
stage reaction control system. A thermal and contamination maneuver is followed by an 
OTV stellar attitude update to initialize the. vehicle inertial platform. OTV ordnance is 
enabled and the mission sequence is started 30 min after separation from the orbiter. A 
nominal 30-min wait in low Earth orbit phases the vehicle for injection. At the conclusion 
of the phasing period, the orbit transfer system is maneuvered to the final attitude for 
injection. This maneuver is followed by independent attitude verification conducted from 
the orbiter or the ground. Verification of correct injection attitude is followed by 
transmission of an execute command. Without transmission of the execute command, the 
injection sequence would be halted at this point. If the execute command is transmitted, 
the injection stage ignites at the scheduled time for the 33-min injection burn. Following 
main engine cutoff, the reaction control system is used to correct residual pitch and yaw 
rates. An axial trim burn is then conducted by the reaction control system to correct 
injection burn velocity vector errors. 
OTV solar orbit insertion stage separation operations begin as the orbit transfer 
system yaws to the correct attitude for solar orbit insertion stage separation. A final 
check is run by the OTV to verify that the solar orbit insertion stage is in the correct 
status for separation. This operation is followed by SOlS separation, which is accom-
plished by firing the pyrotechnic separation nuts which secure the solar orbit insertion 
stage to the interstage. Preloaded separation springs provide necessary separation 
impulse. Following separation, the solar orbit insertion stage holds attitude in the 
beginning of its own autonomous operations and the OTV begins the sequence of 
operations which will lead to its recovery for reuse by the orbiter in low Earth orbit. 
8.3.4 SOlS Operations 
Solar orbit insertion stage operations are illustrated in Figure 8.3-7. Operations 
begin with the post-separation phase. The stage holds attitude .for 1 min and then yaws to 
allow its Sun sensors to acquire the Sun, which serves as the primary attitude reference 
during cruise. Following Sun acquisition, the pitch and yaw limit cycle which will govern 
the vehicle attitude during the cruise phase is initiated. The first 12 hr of the cruise are 
used to verify by telemetry to the ground that the pitch and yaw limit cycle is being 
executed within the limits required to ensure that propellant consumption limits are not 
exceeded. 
With post-separation operations completed, the 5015 enters the cruise phase of its 
mission, which lasts for 3899 hr. During this period, the vehicle keeps its x-axis pointed 
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Ffgure 8.3-7 ~ Nomfnal Delivery Mf~on SOlS Operation:! 
at the Sun, using limit cycle attitude stabilization about the y- and z-axes with· no 
stabilization about the x-axis. 
The end-of-cruise operation is signalled by time-out of the SOlS cruise timer. The 
initial step in placement operations is damping of roll rates which is accomplished using a 
rate gyro package as the primary roll reference. Damping of roll rates is followed'oy 
vehicle roU about the x-axis until its Earth sensor acquires the Earth. Following Earth 
acquisition, the vehicle yaws to the correct burn heading for the placement burn, which is 
followed by a 10-min period for verification from Earth that the burn heading is correct. 
Telemetered Earth and Sun sensor readings allow remote verification of the correct burn 
heading. If the heading is correct, no signal is sent to the 5015 and the vehicle continues 
in the placement sequence. If an anomaly in the position is discovered, an override signal 
from the ground control center allows control of the vehicle to be taken over directly by 
the ground. 
Following verification of the burn heading, the 12-min placement burn is executed 
by the main engine, placing the vehicle in the destination heliocentric orbit. The vehicle 
beacon transponders are left on for 96 hr after the placement maneuver to allow ground 
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verification of the placement burn. Placement burn verification is followed by permanent 
shutdown of the SOlS, leaving the vehicle and the waste payload in the destination 
heliocentric orbit. 
8.4 DEEP-SPACE RESCUE OPERATION SEQUENCE 
The sequence of operations involved in a nominal deep-space rescue mission is 
illustrated in Figure 8.4-1. The sequence begins with the insertion of the rescue system 
and the orbit transfer system into low Earth orbit by the same launch system used in the 
Figure 8.4-1. 
KEY: 
1. X .. UP RATED STS OPS 
Z.X- SOY (LRB) OPS. 
l.X- OTV OPS 
4. X- SOl SOPS 
S.X- PURSUIT SYSTEM OPS 
6.X" RESCUE SYSTEM OPS 
7.):. FAI LED 5015 OPS 
'NominG! Deep-Space Re"cue MiMion Operations Flow Diagram 
nominal delivery mission. Following an autonomous rendezvous of the rescue system with 
the orbit transfer system in low Earth orbit, the rescue system pursuit configuration is 
injected into the rescue transfer orbit by the injection stage, which returns to low Earth 
orbit for eventual reuse. Following separation from the injection stage, the rescue 
system, now in the pursuit configuration, coasts in the rescue transfer orbit to perihelion 
where the pursuit phase injection operations leave it in the pursuit phase cruise orbit. At 
the termination of pursuit phase, the rescue system is inserted into the rendezvous orbit 
and rendezvouses and docks with the failed SOlS. Following waste payload transfer from 
the failed stage to the rescue system, the rescue system separates and orients itself for 
the final placement burn. After orientation and initiation of SOlS autonomous operations, 
the rescue kit is jettisoned and the rescue SOlS executes a normal placement burn, leaving 
itself and the waste payload in the destination heliocentric orbit. 
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This section summarizes some of the conclusions reached as a result of this study. 
1. Waste form parameters for the reference cermet waste form are available only by 
analogy. Detail design of the waste payload would require determination of actual 
waste form properties. 
2. The billet configuration constraints for the cermet waste form limit the packing 
efficiency to slightly under 7596 net volume. The effect of this packing inefficiency 
in reducing the net waste form per waste payload can be seen in Figure 4.1-5. The 
cermet waste form mass per unit mass of waste payload is lower than that of the 
iodine waste form even though the cermet has a higher density (6.5 versus 5.5). This 
is because the lead iodide is cast achieving almost 100% efficiency in packing. This 
inefficiency in the packing of the cermet results in a 20% increase in number of 
flights which increases both cost and risk. 
3. Alternative systems for waste mixes requiring low flight rates (technetium 99, 
iodine 129) can make effective use of the existing 65K STS in either single- or dual-
4. 
launch scenarios. 
A comprehensive trade study would be required to select the optimum orbit trunsfer 
system for low-launch-rate systems. This study was not conducted as part of the 
present effort due to selection of the cermet waste form as the reference for the 
study. Several candidates look attractive for both single- and dual-launch systems 
(see sec. 4.4), but due to the relatively small number of missions, a comprehensive 
comparison of life cycle costs including DDneE would be required to select the best 
system. 
S. The reference system described in sections 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0 offers the best 
combination of cost, risk, and alignment with ongoing NASA technology develop-
ment efforts for disposal of the reference cermet waste form. 
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10.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The reference space system selected for this study is virtually identical to system 
DL-2 described in the 1980 MSFC study. Accordingly, the recommendations from this 
study are not specific to this effort and should be considered an amplification of those 
from the 1980 study. Bec.ause .of the very preliminary level of definition of the space 
system, the following recommendations address generic issues and are not specific to the 
reference system described in sections 7.0 and 8.0. 
1. Further analysis of the reference integral shield waste payload system aimed at 
validating its ability to withstand terminal velocity impact should be conducted as 
the first part of a comprehensive waste payload accident-effects analysis for this 
concept. This effort would provide preliminary verification of the technical 
viability of the waste payload system and, by implication, the entire space disposal 
system. It would also be the first step in a more extensive effort aimed at the 
validation and qualification of the waste payload system. 
2. Because of the influence of waste form packing efficiency on the mass of the waste 
payload, research should be directed at relaxing the fabrication constraints on the 
cermet waste form in the interest of achieving better packing efficiency. Up to a 
2096 to 2.5% reduction in the total number of missions for disposal of a given mass of. 
cermet could be achieved. 
3. A preliminary study of the contingency rescue mission in more detail than reported 
in past studies is required to identify concepts and define areas more specifically for 
. . . . .' 
further study. The goals of this effort should be to: 
a. Establish the quantitative risk benefits of maintaining the contingency rescue 
capability, as opposed to maintaining the nominal rescue mission capability 
only. 
b. Establish the fundamental technical viability of contingency rescue in deep 
space. 
c. Estimate cost for implementation (particularly DDT&E costs). 
These tasks will determine whether contingency rescue is an enabling capability for 
space disposal and, if it is, will provide the basis for decisions on the level of 
emphasis to be applied • 
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While the 0.85-AU heliocentric orbit destination was selected as a reference for this 
study, further analysis should be conducted of space disposal destinations in the 
geolunar system. If the stability of such destinations could be verified to the same 
level as that of the reference 0.85-AU destination, substantial cost and risk benefits 
could be realized, including the following. 
a. Geolunar destinations could be important if further studies of the contingency 
rescue mission find it infeasible or impractically expensive due to acquisition, 
tracking, or rendezvous/docking problems. Rescue can be accomplished witnin 
weeks from any location in the geolunar system, and the restricted ranges 
involved make passive tracking of failed vehicles possible. 
b. 
c. 
By selecting a geolunar destination, the possibility of high-energy reentries in 
the far future due to loss of a payload in deep space could be eliminated. This 
would minimize the long-term risk of loss of containment posed by high-energy 
reentry. 
Use of geolunar system destinations would allow elimination of the placement 
stage with complete reuse of the injection stage, which could be an unmodified 
version of the OTV planned by NASA for operation in the 1990's. The resulting 
reduction in DDT&E and production costs should be evaluated. 
Efforts should be aimed at defining the best geolunar destination and validating its 
stability to the same level as the ref(~rence 0.85-AU heliocentric orbit destination. 
Validation would. allow .realization of the cost and risk benefits of the geolunar 
destination. 
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ACRONYMS 
"- ABOTV aerobraked orv 
ACS attitude control system 
AOA abort once around 
ASE airborne support equipment 
ATO, abort to orbit 
, ' 
AU astronomical unit 
BAC Boeing Aerospace Company 
BCl Battelle Columbus laboratories 
CU command unit 
DDT&E design, development, test, and evaluation 
DOE Department of Energy 
DSN Deep-Space Network 
EB electron beam 
ERP effective isotropic radiated power 
ET external tank 
FOSR flexible optical solar reflector 
, FOV field o~ view t r FSS flight support system 
GLOW gross liftoff weight 
GPS global positioning system 
HlW high-level waste 
IPSS interpayload support structure 
.---~ 
IUS inertial upper stage 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
lCC life cycle cost 
lEO low, Earth orbit 
llOrV long-life orv 
lRB liquid rocket booster 
MECO main engine cutoff 
MLI multilayer insulation 
MLP mobile launch platform 
MMSE multi mission support equipment 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
" , NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration ! 
.:. ,. 
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NPPF nuclear payload processing facility 
I 
\ OFS orbiter flotation system 
OMS orbital maneuvering system 
ONI Office of Nuclear Waste Terminal Storage Integration 
ONWI Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation 
OPF orbiter processing facility 
ORNl Oak Ridge National laboratory 
OTS orbital transfer system 
OTY orbital transfer vehicle 
PIA propulsion/avionics 
Pb 1129 2 iodine 129 
PGHM payload ground-handling mechanism 
PSMC Payload and Sequential Mass Calculation (code) 
RCS reaction control system 
REM reaction engine module 
RF radiofrequency 
RSI reusable surface insulation 
RSS rotating service structure 
( RTlS return to launch si te 
SOClY shuttle-derived cargo launch vehicle 
SOY shuttle-derived vehicle 
SES solar electric stage 
SIU signal interface unit 
SOlS ~lar orbit insertion stage 
SRM solid rocket motor 
SSME space shuttle main engine 
STS space transportation system 
Tc99 technetium 99 
TSM tail service mast 
TYC thrust vector control 
UlOW upperstage liftoff weight 
YAB vertical assembly building 
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SUBJECT Space Disposal of Nuclear Waste/Containment Based on 
Waste Form Melting 
Waste form containment within the integrally shielded core. which 
is des~ribed in attachment 1. requires that the waste melting 
temperature cf 1200°C not be exceeded. 
Thermal modeling and analysis of the disposal ves5~1 was performed 
for a 0.85 astronomical unit orbit. see attachment 2. An upper 
limit for the waste temperature was determined to be about 700°C. 
well below the l2000 C melting point. 
For the shielded core thermal configuration which was addressed. 
it is concluded that containment is not jeopardized due to 
melting of the waste form. 
Additional analysis showed th3t a waste heat generatio~ rate of 
O.OZ2 ~/cm3 would be required to attain the l2000C melting temperature. 
See Flgure 3.1 of Attachment 3.' 
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Attachment 1 - Waste Core/Core Shield Thermal Geometry 
The waste core structure consists of a ZC4 SS sphere with 59 mm 0.0. holes 
bored in a hexagonal close-packed pattern, with a 60 rom center to center 
spacing. . 
Figure 1.1. Waste Core Drilling Pattern 
The waste form (CERMET) is fabr.icated into cylindrical ·billets·, 29.45 ntn 
radius by 58.9 mm length, which are stacked end to end within the core 
structure void. Ths axial packing of the billets is enhanced in by inserting 
at partial-length billet so. as to bring the billets flush with the surface of 
the core structure. 
Figure 1.2. Billet Arrangement in the Core 
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A 0.05 /MI void is assumed to separate the billet's' circumference from the 
core side walls, and fillcr plugs are used to maintain billet orientationl 
decrease the thermal resistance to heat ,transfer from the core. The CEru1ET 
thermal conductivity was taken to be 9.5 W/M-K, and its volumetric h~at 
generation'rate equaled 0.0065 W!cubic em. 
. 
The waste vessel's core is protected against physical damage by a 22 mm 
thick spherical shield made from 300 Series Maraging Steel. The concentric 
shield is separated from the core by a 1 mm gap. The thermal conductivities 
for the Haraging Steel and that for the 304 Stainless Steel were both 
conservatively taken to be equal to 10 W/M-K. \ 
A 5 cm thick graphite radiation shield is bolted to the Maraging shield; 
with a contact conductance of 300 W/sq M-K. A thermal conductivity of 
75 W!M-I< for the graphite shield was also used. 
The graphite shield is protected against damage by a 0.5 cm thick shell m~rle 
( from 304 SSe The protective shell is attached to the outside surface of the 
graphite shield by a room temperature vulcanizing resin to ensure good 
thermal contact; 
All of the waste vessel's radiative surfaces: the outer stainless-steel shell, 
the inside surface of the Maraging steel shield, the outside surface of the 
stainless-steel waste core, and the individual billets are assumed to be. 
flamed spr~yed ~ith aluminum oxide; the oxide's radiative properties are . 
defined by 
Csolar!£infrared • 0.26/0.80 
A sketch of th~ waste vessel configuration is given by Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3. Cross-section of Nucl ear \iast.e Disposal Vessel 
(waste billets not shown) 
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Attachment 2 - The~al Modeling and Analysis 
A hcn~~ba'ance on the waste vessel is initially performed so that the vessel's 
.. 
average outsfde surface temperature may be found. The waste heat generat.fon 
rate withfn the core (Qi) is evaluated by .. 
Q1 • (volumetric generation rate) (total billet volume) 
• (J. 00&.) l!t 5"2 ~ 000 ("Itt' • 390() tA/ (2 .1 ) 
e'1'II' 
The solar heating rate (Qs) at a 0.85 astronomical unit (AU) orbit.is 
calculated by Equation (2.2). 
<Os :r (aJ.rrJ"fJlru~) l!,o/Q7 IZ.(@ 1 ~.1I.) (vrs-.r"'lrVrcldttl".c-a) 
{: 01".111111 t#sl41ltlf Il j 
., <J.2~ ~w/.#c .E(t:1't'A1)2. /010 W (2.2) 
(o.iJ.;~~)1. 9 . 
Th~ Yl::ssei surfac.c tE:IRt>c:rature (To) 15 determined by Equating the total 
surface heating rate to the rate at which the surface rejects heat (Qr)' 
<0 <10 O.r • t!)1- -:: C er 7;9 qf)} 
~~/ow -
This yields an ave~age exterior surface temperature for the vessel of 
328 K. 
C6 
(2.3) 
( 
- ' 
( 
! " 
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The temperature at the outer surface of the Maraging shield (T
m•o) may now be calculated. 
: 
Notice that to a good approximation that the temperature at the outer 
surface of the Maraging shield may be taken to be equal to the temperature 
at the vessel's exterior surface. 
Thermal modeling of the waste core and of the Maraging shield is performed, 
to enable simplified methods for determination of an upper (waste 
temperature) limit. Due to the symmetry of heat generation in the waste 
core. the maximum waste temperature will occur at the mid-length point 
of the centrally located billet tube (see Figure 1.3). In order that an' 
~rpcr b:~~d fer th~ ~axirn~~ wa~tc temper~turc ~e fc~nd, the te~~~rJt~re ( _ gradient along the central billets' axis is maximized. From Fourier's law 
of heat conduction, the temperature gradient along the billets' axis is , 
given to be proportional to the heat transfer rate along the same axis. An 
upper found for the waste temperature is therefore formulated by requiring 
an adiabatic boundary at the billets' circumference. This model is shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1. Cross-Section Depicting the Thermal Model for the Waste Core and the Maraging Shield. 
LONG ITUD I HAL 
BILlETS' AXIS 
I 
, 
CORt 
IIrDPLAliE 
CONDUOION ,~REA •• (2.95 Cl:Il2 
• 2.13 x 10-3 r:iZ 
Note that due to a contract conductance at the interface between individual . 
(2.5) 
billets, the temperature drop along the longitudinal billets' axis is greater 
than that for a continuous waste cylinder of the same active length. Also 
C7 
I.,' ~:,,-_.....,. ... :y", •• ,,,,,,--'--
l ;-
. -~ 
, -. 
• t 
"PAgt: ~ Oi ~ 
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shown in Figure 2.1 is the heat transfer path from the outermost billet to 
. the outer surface of the Maraging Steel shield. The thermal resistance of 
• 
this linear path is' larger than that for a radial pathi thermal resistance 
is inversely proportional to the heat flow area. It follows that the 
temperature rise from the outside of the Maraging steel to the outermost 
billet'as calculated'by tha linear path model will be an upper bound. 
By using the thermal model that has been described, an upper bound for the 
~aximum temperature at the inside surface of the Maraging shield (Tm,i) is 
determined by 
7;,,~,. = ~" .. 'tJ (-/(1 P.;'J~ 
• 330 + 35'"nJ (~) = ¥07 I\" 
.. /0 
where qj is the axia'l heat flux from the billet stack. The waste core's 
I. ou~s1d~ surface temperature (Te,o) ;s evaluat~d oy Equation (2.7). 
, / 
~o'l" 'll (2- -I- ~ -.1) i- J;~ 7F c!"A~03 LA~o., / 'J 
., 3;/0 (g -.1.1 t- W7 9 5:~1'3Jl1/O-:" 0.8 :/ 
The-eor-e. surface temperature is calculated to be about 539 K. The thermal, 
resistance of the 1 mm thick layer of 304 Stainless Steel is very small, 
and therefore the layer may be taken to be isothermal. The temperature 
dif~erence at the billets' interface is determined by neglecting the con-
duction heat transfer mode. 
+ -where, T IT 
n n 
the upper/lower temperature at the nth billet 
interface (see Figure 2.2). and 
t~e heat flux passing through the nth 
i~terface (see Figure 2.2). 
C8 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
(2.B ) 
I 
\. .' 
( 
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The temperature difference between the opposing ends of a billet with an 
adiabatic circumferential surface is determined from Equation (2.9). 
where. 
+ Tn+l: 
the lower temperature at the nth billet interface 
(see Figure 2.21. 
the higher temperature at the nth + 1 billet interface 
(see Figure 2.2). 
xn+l/xn: the axial distance from the core midplane to the 
nth/nth+1 billet interface, and 
II. 
q : the billet volumetric heat' generation rate. 
With both tt,,~ core !:lIrface t~mppratllre (T1o = SR9K) and the billet-stack 
boundary heat flux (Q10 ; 3510 W/m2) known, the upper,temperature at the 
10th billet interface (T10) is evaluated from Equation (2.8) to equal 
680 K. Utilizillg Equation (2.9) with x10 = 54 em and x9 = 48.1 cm, the 
lower temperature at the 9th interface (Tg) is calculated to b~ 701 K. 
Using this bootstrap technique, as given by Equations (2.8) and (2.9). the 
waste temperature at the core midplane is found to equal 951 K. or 678°C.' 
For the given waste core and shielding thermal geometry. an upper bound on 
the maximum waste temperature is 700°C. 
C9 
" 
(2.9) 
j 
~-:: ... , 
~"-.'\ 
core 
mid plane 
" 
\ 
\ 
. -. 
'. 
,,--.. 
f 
Figure 2.2~ Solution for the Billets' Axial Temperature Gradient 
T • 
n 
w 
--..:tq •• 10 • 351 0 ;t 
I ''"''-- • 
n: bl1let interfllce ,. 0 1 
Xn (em) • 0 0.9 
2 3 4 
6.8 12.7 18.6 
5 6 7 8 9 . 1 0 T 10 • 589 K 
24.5 30.4 36.3 42.2 48.1 54.0 
() 
-o f i ,n (~) • 0 59 
H 
442 826 1209 1593 1976 2360 2743 3127 3510' 
Tn - .(K) 
Tn+ (K) 
951 951 946 935 919 896 865 
1951 949 942 929 910 maximum waste temperature • 951 K • 678°C 885 
826 
852 
773 701 589 
810 755 680 
• 
, .~': .. ,~ : ........ -";" ~ 
c 
-co 
o 
I 
N 
'" 
...., 
...., 
...., 
I 
N 
• ., 
.. :, 
" 
_ ... ,~.tI''''' Of' nr. ., ""':. 
I ,._"_ ..•. , ,._.-•....... -. ." ~--~ . __ ._., -...... ., .... ....-.... _._,". 
L 
r [ 
i 
• i 
I . 
! 
~. 
/. 
t-
'\' 
- 'O,i 
pf.\GE \5 
OR\G\NP-\. QUAU-rl 
Of POOR 
Attacnment. ....... w!::. 
Page 1 of 1 
0180-26777 -2 
Attachment 3 - Cermet M~lting as a Function of the 
Vol~~etric Heat Generation Rate 
_ .. w I ........ ~ _ .. __ 
The thermal model presented in Attachment 2 ;s parametrically analyzed by 
varying the waste volumetric heat generation rate. The analysis technique 
used parallels that given by Equations (2.1) to .(2.9) 
Figure 3.1 depicts the results that were obtained. It was found that a 
heat generation rate of 0.022 W/cm3 would cause melting at the center of 
the waste core. 
Figure 3.1,Wost~ ContolMlent Based on Varying Themll loads 
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Preliminary SOLAR Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) Reliability Analysis 
November 6. 1981 
2-3810-0001-173 
A b~ part analysis of the SOlS design & mission indicates the baseline SOlS system has a preliminary reliability prediction of .901 for its complete mission profile and that a reliability of .995 is feasible without excessive cost and mass penalties. 
The baseline configuration analysis (Attachment 1) is based upon the provided system configuration and the defined mission profile from OTV release to system shutdown. This design incorporates some equipment redundancy ~or reliability and safety purposes. It has a mission reliability prediction of .901. with the major failure probability occuring during the Qormant cruise phase. The failure potential is nearly equally divided among the four-major subsystems (see Table 1.1). 
. 
In addition to the baseline system analysis the SOlS design was optimized for reliability from its basic functional design. This analysis indicates the SOlS mission reliability can be increased from a minimum equipment design value cf 
.745 to .995 with approximately a 40% increase in mass. The reliability of the optimized SOlS design is limited to the .995 region by certain equipments where redundancy i~ not practical. 
For complete resolution of the optimized design a detailed analysis would be necessary. Several assumptions are used in the optimization process which make both the exact mass penality and reliability figures dependent upon more specific analyses. HO\'1ever. the optimization does provide good visibility to the design potential and optimum configuration. 
/J ( ::::J / ' (-, :,< ,. _ /v C~ -:<--'--_ 
Roger C. Ha 11 
hvj\(JJ 1- ~-".t::X' ___ 
Michael t. Janssen 
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ATTACHMENT I 
This attachment consists of a series of charts which outline the reliability 
analysis of the baseline SOlS configuration and mission. A negative exponential 
reliability model is assumed and the future OTV technology study (CR- ) 
1s the primary source of configuration data. 
The study results are 'suri"ma~'fzed in Tab'le 1. Both system and subsystem relia-
bilities are shown by mission phase in addition to mission totals. Most of the 
basel ine subsystem designs contain redundancy in criti.cal area.s and no subsystem 
appears to have a disproportionate failure potential. 
Dy mission phase its obvious that the cruise phase has the highest failure pro-
bability. This is due entirely to its long duration (180 days) and not the 
result of any design deficiency. 
Figures 1 through 4 detail the SOlS subsyst~m analysis. These include the relia-
bility block diagrams; mission success criteria, component failure rates. and 
b:1Sic reliability estimates by e.quipment and mission phase. 
Figure 5 shows the appropriate duty cycle for each equipment; i.e., its on-off. 
history by mission phase. In addition, it defines the phase durations and sonie 
mission phase groupings made for analysis purposes. These groupings combined phases 
which had similar equipment duty cycles and were made to simplify the analyses. 
The. power subsystem analysis, Figure 1, shows that the singTe battery and heater 
represent the majority of its failure potential and would be candidates for design 
refi nernen ts. . 
The baseline avionics subsystem, Figure 2, shows the CPU string to have the highest 
failure potential. This string is already redundant and no--other reliability 
enhancements are apparent in the remainder of the avionics equipment. 
The propulsion subsystem, Figure 3, has three major c:ontributors to its failure 
potential. The hydrogen and oxygen systems both have a single thermal vent valve 
to relieve pressure build up as necessary. These valves are each single failure 
points. The main engine is also a single point \'lhich has a significant failure 
potential but redundancy is not anticipated for this equip~ent. 
03 
.~--------- ----------._._---- -.-
, . 
, 
f (' 
. -
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The main failure potential in the ReS subsystem. Figure 4 •. is in the hydfozine 
regulator valves and man~fold system. Sufficient redundancy exists in the REB 
systems to provide a high reliability prediction for these elements. 
D4 
·j'-
t (i.. ' 
ATTACHMENT II 
An effective 'fJay to achieve high reliabil ity is through the use of redundant 
components. Rather than introduce redundant components into a design in a random 
fashion, Boeing employs the Single Thread Reliability Optimization Program 
(STROP) computer model. Starting with a single thread (non-redundant) system, 
STROP sequences redundant ~dditions to the system in accordance with the maxi-
mum incremental improvement in system reliability with respect to the minimum 
incremental'increase in' system weight (~R/~W). 
The results of this analysis disclose. both the weigr.t required to meet a given 
reliability goal and the maximum reliability which can be achieved within a give~ 
\·:e·ight constraint. It is a powerful tool which has been employed in t:'e design 
of many Boeing space arid weapons systems. STROP also optimizes reliability 
with respect to cost. The results of the optimization provide a guide to program 
management in the achievement of.required reliability. 
, . 
This program (STROP) was applied to the basic SOlS design to assess its relia-
bility potential and associated system weight increase. To implement this process, 
the baseline SOlS design shown in attachment 1 was reduced to its minimum equip-
. . 
ment functional design, Figure 2.1. ~he STROP program then adds redund~nt 
additions of a specific type, either standby'or parallel, for the SOlS design. 
These redundant additions are shown in Table 2.1 with their corresponding system 
weights and reliabilities. The first addition is the helium regulator valve, the 
second addition includes the power distribution t.:nit. c:orrmand unit and si9nal .' 
interface unit as a single bloc~ and so on. A plot of the system reliability vs 
~he attendant system weight is.shown in Figure 2.2. . 
Figure 2.2 shows the reliability potential of the SOlS to have an upper limit 
near .995. This limit is associated with'certain equipment e.g., the main engine. 
where redundancy for reliability p'JrpO$es. is not feasible. The system reliability 
potential is in turn limited by the reliability of these equipments. 
The results show significant reliability i~provements for the first 20 to 24 
equipment additions r~quiring approximately a 40% increase in weight. The potential 
reliability increase is nearly exhausted at this point and the marginal reliab'i1ity 
increases beyond these additiOns appears to be negligible • 
. 05 
,-., 
. , 
C'O 
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.' 
In interpreting these results, it should be noted that they represent the potential 
of the SOlS design to perform its mission. Several design assumptions and simpli-
fications were used in the STROP analysis which make an exact reliability assr.s-
ment dependent upon m9re detailed analyses similar to those in Attachment 1. A 
reliability vs cost optimization could also be performed. However, the reliability 
vs weight optimization analysis herein does provide a clear representation of the 
SOlS reliability potential to program design and management. 
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APPENDIX E 
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO SYSTEH SAFETY DOCUMENT 
AND CONFO~~CE TO SYSTEM SAFETY GUIDELINES, 
SECTION 4.0, "SYSTEM SAFZTY ASPECTS FOR REF-
ERENCE CONCEPT" 
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BOEING AEROSPACECOMPANY ---
Dr. Eric E. Rice 
Space Systems and Applications Section 
Battelle's Columbus Laboratories 
Columbus, ~~ 43201 
Dear Eric: 
A Division of Th, Boei~ Comp., 
2-4032-0031-121 
10/19/81 
Here are the results of our review of the second draft of the ·System GUidelfn 
Docunent for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Spacem• It is a comprebensive and i~~ortant 
document and will be a valuable aid in our definition of the reference space system 
The document "las revlC'tred in 010 steps. In the first, reccln"'..ended ~harges to 
the document itself were identified. In the second, the reference space syste.'!I was 
reviewed for conformance to Section 4.0,··Syst~~ Safe~ Aspects for the Reference 
Concept8 • Results of these efforts are described below. 
1.0 RecnmendP.d Charqes to Docum:?n~ - Most changes. recon:nended are intended to brir ' 
the sp~ification into closer ccnrormance with th~ approach to waste payload protec. 
tion adopted by the 1980-31 study without c~~promising their generality~ Deletion c 
references to elements of th~ waste payload no longer used 'is suggested; addition of specificatio~s for the w~ste fonn support structure, or ·corew is also recommended 
as the core can be considered a generic el~~nt of~the waste p~load. An addition 
to Section '2.3.3, on/or near pad or ascent booster accident enviro~7.ents covering 
shuttle crash conditions is included. 
Revisions are shoWn with a short rationale for each change included. Enclosure 
8A8 is a copy of the relevant pages from the doclE1'<l!nt with recc.rm'~ndedrevisions in-
dicated. Enclosure "S8 summarizes the rationale for each change. Rationales are keyed to the markups in the document. 
2.0 Conformance to System Safety Document Guidelines Section 4.0, aSystern Safe~ 
Aspects for Reference Concept - Resul ts of our review of the reference systco 
for conformance are summarized in Enclosure C. Each statement of conformance is 
keyed to the appropriate paragraph in the draft dOCL~nt. In general. 'complete com-
pliance is indicated for nominal conditions. Compliance for s~~ accident condi-
tions remains TBD pending further analysis. 
-
RPR/rdr 
Enclosures 
cc: Pete Priest 
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TABLE 3. SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF CONTAINMEnt 
Componento lUscicD Phaoeo 
Vacta Fo~ <!) • Fabricatioa/Assembl1 
\J MTe. f;rM1 Stll'I cJr .s 'Ov~~ 
• Mechanical 
• ,~'. 
~. Pr1m~r,y Container 0 terreatrinl Transport 
• Chemical 
ComEonent 
Vaste Form 
. 
Primary 
Container 
Flight Radia-
tion Shield 
Impact Absorber 
Ablation Shield 
Shipping Cask 
*. Radiation Shield 
~. Impact Absorber 
~. Ablation Shield 
• Shipping Cask 
• Launch Sito Handling 
o Launch to Earth Orbie 
• Orbit transfer to Destination 
TABLE 4. THERHAL GUIDELIHES FOR. COllTAlllHENl' or 
BIeR-LEVEL YASTE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Mission Phase 
Orbit 
Fabricationl Terrest-r1al Launch Site Launch to Transfer to 
Assembl! Transpcre IIlI.ndl1ng E:1rth Orbit Destination 
40% Melel 40% Meltl 40% Meltl 40% Heltl 40% Meltl 
90% Helt· 90% Helt 90% Helt 90% Helt 90% Melt 
40% Heltl 40% Heltl 40% Meltl 40% Meltl 40% Heltl 
90% Helt 90% Helt 90% Helt 90% Helt 90% Helt 
40% Heltl . 40% Meltl 40% Heltl 40% Heltl 40% Meltl 
90% Helt 90% Melt 90% Helt 90% Helt 90% Melt 
40% Meltl 40% Heltl 40% Meltl 
90% Hele , '90% Helt 90% Melt 
-
40% Helt/- 40% Helt/-' 40% Helt/.,..-
DOT, l\RC 
Reg. 
*Note: The normal absolute temperature limit is given first: the accident absolute temperature limit is given second. If the melt absolute temperatures are not 
appropriate for the material. in question, then the 50% of the fabrication 
absolute temperature should apply. 
E4 
.. 
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2.).1.2. w",Te 1Ot~ r"'ftfot\ ~"e,t:vre (At1?-c.J-I). 
2.2.3.2 Primary Contniner 
12 ® 
ORIGINAL p~G£ IS 
OF POOR QUftUT\' 
The primary contciner, dea1gned to enclose the vaste form throughout all mission phases beyond waste form fabrication, ls also the primary containment boundary. The the real limit for normal conditions io 40% of the melt absolute temperatUre. For accident conditlong)-~~c£f~he ab~olute melt temperature ls the guideline. Mechanical licit. ar~.~ Y!CI~eno~al~nd Itlmatc strengths or lov dispersion (~ccident). Chemicni 11m.1t3 are c-over by existing federal. regulatiolllS (U.S. NRC, 1978). @ , 
VSl ~ Q. ~..,fo,fT 6..i7Qf' 
2.2.3.\4- Radiation Shield ,.) ~~ ~.,..""" Ie 
~ lbe radiation shield for flight should be designed to function during aU mission phases through tr~l.nfJfer to the final destination. The t'adiation shield should be supplemented vith auxiliary shielding materials, as needed during varioulJ aission phasC!o, such that radiation exposuro licit: arc not reached. For mcchz1nicZ1l lJtron8t~, 90% of the yield (!lorn41) and SO% of the ultiaate (accident) streall 11c1t8 apply (ult1lcate doeo not apply for launch and orbit transfer operation:s). Thermal lio1es are 40% of the melt-'absolute temperature (normal conditions) and 90% of the absolute melt temperature (aCCident coaditionlJ). ChemicAl requlrecenta "Ul be similar to those in existing federal regulations (U.S. NRC, 1978)'. 
Radiation shielding limits for the payload package (1000 m~enlhr at 1 c) have been assumed for conditiOns not covered by existins regulatlon~. Conservative limits (such as those for transportation) have Dot been selecteddue.to the sensitivity of the overall system design (payload/shield c:ass ratio) to the dOSQ limits. Rather, the guideline limits chosen reflect the fact that the vaste payload p~ckag6 utll be isolated fro~ the general F~blic throughout all but a small fraction of its lifetime • 
. " . . .' 2.2.3.~ Impact Aboorber and Ablnticn Shield 
... ~. 
The impact absorber and ablation shield, have similar containment limits. For the real guidelines,. 40% of the melt (n~rmal) and 90% of the melf,l~~Me;P -I.. absolute temperature apply to the impact absorber; 40% of ~lt! 1: . ~ro-"., temperature applies as the upper limit for the ablation shield under normal I conditions. For mec:ha.nlcnl. strength, yield (normal) limits exist. The ' !lbsorber .and· ablation shield uill be cheaically non-reactive uith. other coutainment layer:: _(simihr to. oche,r •• DOT/NRC regulations).: .:rhey ViU be non-pyrophoric. The impact absorber is designed to absorb mechanical energy during accidents. The yield strength of the absorber.cateria! is expected to be, exceeded. Therefore, the ablation shield. which is designed to reduce heating effects during possible reentI}' phases, is not expected to survive ground or vater impact • 
(, , 
2.2.3.~ Shipping Cask. . '., 
Dudng ground-based Earth transport, the h!gb-:-level Volste package \lfll be enclosed v1thl~ a shipping cask. Current u.s. federal regulations [10 eFR 71 
E.5 
• 
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( 
( 
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h3d tnragraiXt 2.3.3.2 as follows: 
2.3.3.2 Waste Foon Support Structure 
'!be WlSte foon support structure, or core, is designed to (1), provide 
structure support to the waste payload durin; all missIon phases by providIn; 
the mechanical interface between waste form and primary container. (2), 
provide a thermal COn:luctanc:e path frcm tr.... waste form to tb! primary 
container, and (3), enhance the primary container structural integrity by 
servirg as a solid, incanpressible core with elastic modulus canparable to the 
primarY container material. 
E6 
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• An. impact in the worst orientation into 25 C water at • velocity 
10 percent higher than the predicted teredn&! velocity, followed 
by a descent into the ocean to a depth corresponding to a 
hydrostatic pressure of 12,000 N/c:2• ~r~ --'-'1.. 
"c." " ~~ 2.3.4 P.eentry Acc:1"den~ 
~ The payload package shipped to its space destination must be able to withstand 
@ inadvertent reentry into the Earth's atmosphere and 1cpact onto the Earth's 
surface without the dispersion of significant quantities of r~dioactive 
material. The reentry environments tbat must be considered for each type of 
disposal mission are defined as follows: 
• A decaying reentry trajectory (shallow angle Skylab type) to 
provide maximum heating energy possible " 
• A reentry trajectory (steep angle) which provides the maximum 
heating flux possible 
• An. impact in the worst" orientation onto an unyielding surface 
(western granite) at a Velocity 10 percent higher than the 
predicted terminal velocity or an impact onto land such that the 
reentering waste payload is buried in lou conductivity soil (k • 
TBD), but the waste fo~ does not reach 90% of the melt absolute 
temperature. 
• An icpact'in the worst orientation into 25 C water at a vdocity 
10 percent higher than the predicted terminal velocity, followed 
by a descent in:o the ocean to a depth corresponding to a 
hydrostatic pressure of 12.000 N/cm2. 
The re"sponse of tln! "payio~d package to the reentry environments mentioned 
above should be, calculated after the possible reentry conditions have been 
determined by analysis for a specific disposal mission type. 
2.4 Criticality 
The radioactive waste payload package must be subcritical (calculated 
K-effective +30 < 0.95) for normal operatioD.!l or any pOSSible credible 
accident during processing. fabrication, handling, storage. or transport to 
the space destination. Calculations should show that any credible change in 
waste fom geometry and any credible grouping of packages \1111 net cause 
K-effective +30 to exceed 0.95. 
2.5 postaccident Recoveri 
-- " 
Fostacc1dent recovery teac.s should be made part of the operational disposal 
system. They should be responsible for all accident' recovery operations. 
including accidents involving processing. payload fab,rlcatlon and railroad 
-
E7 , 
• 
. -
, -
'" " ( 
, 
0180-26777-2 
.... 
Insert -c-
.. I 
IJHIGINr.L i.J;,·.G~ I~ 
OF POOR QUALITY 
An impact \oIhlle restraincl in tho flight support system mounted in the 
Orbiter cargo bay at any of the canbinations of velocity and direction as 
show in the followirg figure, followed by a 'IBD crushin; load imposed by the 
Orbiter structure. 
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The reference vaGt~ form for apace dispocal i. the Oak Ridge National 
LaborAtory (ORNL) iron/nickel based cermet (ceramic/~et~ catrix), 4 disper-
sion of ceramic particle a in a continuous metallic phase. This vacte fora has 
been cbosen over oth~r vaste fomo becl1use of tbe expected responsea to 
possible accident envlronQent~. Tho cermet is expected to have a vaste load-
ing of tbe'ord~r or 67.4% vh~re 100% 10 defined as bigh-level waste in oxide 
fora. The thermal conductivity is expected to be about 9.S Yatto/Q-C and the 
density is about 6.S g/cc. C t'V~~ """,-rtt . 11'4(~ "a" ~rTUW' 
I tm 3.3 ~aste Processing and Payload Fabrication 
The cermet vaste form vould be made into cylindrical billets approximately S 
em long and S em in diat:eter. They vould be placed into a soUd ItphericAl 
steel container system vhere holes have been mUled into the solid spbere 
accommodate the V3ste form bUleta. Figure 3 sboys the vallte container/ 
integral shield concept. At the payload fabrication facility, after the 
bUletll have been installed into the ,~ontainer system, the -lid- on' the 
container/integral. shield vould be pla,~ed into podtion <lnd then velded with 
an electric beam. The thicl: atee! c:ontainer wall serves 4tJ a radiation 
shield, as well as an impact stNct.ure to protect against breachelJ of 
containment. Before further handliog, the container outer vall vould be 
deconta::dnateC!. Individual graphite reentry tiles vould be placed on the 
container by means of bolt9. Then tvo half shell:J of steel vould be placed 
around the graphite covered ~phere (see Fi~re 4) and ~eal veldcu. Then the 
system ia placed into a shipping cask for shipment to the launch site: 
3.4 Shipping Cas~ and Ground Transport Vehicles 
For transport from the vaste processing and fabrication faciIities, the vasta 
package would be housed in a shipping cask. The cask vould be licensed by the 
. U.S. ImC and vould be transported by raU to the launch site. The cask systell 
VO\Ild-rcqu 1.4 an active cooling systemJ( IF r~lItf,J. ~ /fO\ / 
"'" U ft'tM:Je, NJtr/ ~ 
3.S Launch Site Facilities and Operations 
Upon arrival at the launch site the vaste package vould be removed from the 
cask and placed into its flight support structure system and stored for 
launch. 
3.6 Uprated Space Shuttle Vehicle 
The Uprated Space Shuttle vehicle is defined as having oxygen/RP-l Uquid 
rocket boosters (LRB's) replacing the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's). Thi3 not 
only provIdes for a 45,000 kg ayload, but allovs increased safety for' the 
launch ascent phase and a lower launch cost. 
.' 
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, 
, The, cermet· waste· form would be made into cyUndrlcal billets 
approximately 5 au lo~ and 5 an in diameter. They would be placed into a 
solid Sfberical waste form support structure or core. '!he core has 241 
parallel holes bored in it to acccxnodate tOO sUCked cylindrical billets 
(Figure 3). At the payload fabrication facility the billets would be 
installed in the core us1rl;) an autanatic loucHng machine. Covers at both eOOs 
of each bore would be installed to retain the billets. 
'!he loaded core would then be lowered into the lower half of the 
container/integral shield. '!he upper half of the integral. shield would then 
be lowered into place, and upper and lower shield halves are then 
electron-beam Wllded togetht!!r. Almost all of the graphite/steel -tiles- would 
l~ pre installed on the shi£:1d halves usirg boys prior to shield assembly. A 
-belt- around the equator would be left free of tiles to allow the 
electron-bec:m weld. Following the weld, the remaining tiles would be 
installed using remote hmdling equipnent, (see Figure 4). 'Ihe waste payload 
is then ready for placement in a shipping cask for transportation to the 
lalnch site. 
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FIGt1RE 3. YASTE CONTAINER AND INTEGRAL RADIATIOll SHIELD '-'G 1.J,1,. 
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For not~a1 conditiona, a cermet temperature of 1050 C (90% of fabrication abso-
lute temperature) will not be exceeded. For accident conditione, 11 ccrm~t tem-
perature of 1280 C (90% of melt absolute temperature) shell not be exceeded. 
Criticality requirements wlll also ba met. 
~.1.2 gaste Processing and Payload Fabrication Facil1tic~ 
The design and operation of these bcnitiea will follow. current proposed 
re&~lations, as specified for reprocessing plants. 
4.1.3 ShippinG Casks and Cround Transport Veh1~les 
Sb1pP1n3 casQ and. ground tr:1nsport vehicles Will comply with DOT and NRC 
regulations. Tha maximum outside di~~tor of the shippIng cask v1l1 be 3.05 
meters (10 feat). mum required for bent rejectiolI, a redundant cooling 
system for the obippiC3 cask vUl Ix! required. 
TO"''''''' . 
WMU ~ ~~I'0n: S"trl'a"' .... t'e 
4.1.4 f?2!«ld J?d"'~~M~:;-
. a..... 
lor normal condition9, the ~stain!e~8 stee~ ontn1ne shsll not exceed 
a t~~r3ture of 416 C (40%.ot melt absolute! temperatura. 110 cheeied and 
pbys1c:al interaction w11l occur betueen tbe! cettet waste fom and the con-
tainer. For accident conditions, th:! pdcary container must not exceed a 
temperature of 1280 C (90% of melt absolute temper:1ture).· ®. fn.tM~1 CCMi(;U"er' ~. 
4.1.~AF1igbt Radiation S~1elding V·' 
Radiation shielding including outer layer shielding contributioruJ for flight 
systems, ,,111 be designed to licit radiation to no more than 1000 ere!:! per 
bour at 1 meter from the package surface under normal conditions. The snield 
itself, when stripped of all outer -non-shielding- layers ot the payload pack-
age, v1ll not exceed 2000 mret1 per bour at 1 meter froe the shield. Auxiliary 
shielding v111 be designed such that radiation ~~posure limitu (see Tables 1 
and 2) for ground personnel and flight crews are not exceeded during bandling 
.. 
..; 
.. 
... 
erations. ~"\~\' 
,_.1\, .p-- ,,...1'<1 
temperature limit for tbe ~til!nl~ii? steel f!1ght .. 
radiation shield G 416 C ~O% of melt absolute temperature) •. ' For accident 
/4-, conditions, the <!(tainlei27Steel radiation shield oust not exceed the tecpera-~ ture of 1280 C (~O% of melt absolute temperature). 
~i !l~.1.6~: S;''':"r.!:oJ I',DTJI.., r~dew,. fTf' A-cWl ... t 
,,:,.Kq.srt. 1~/c,,4 r,>T~ clll~l"" Co"ttif1~c:..rA s,T~;; ..... J 
1 ~ .ne..rQQ:atr1".c:'.-;ra-for the Reference Concep~h::deG -'J," l"dc s:os-pc .. • ",:h~ 
:~.W~star vehicle roeAt17 Gystcll2 and the :'301'0;:11. pae1Eage reeRtry -oy3te~ 
. .,. ~ 
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~'1~£\\"~ .... . Y- t(\,poV"l 
AnI'! @DJ!3 'riS h @ -Cut dm v;,ii-e "payload - ~clude p~~rldons t~ \ 
survive ex~c:ted on-pad and reentry ac:cident environaenta. The s)'lltea must 
. inc:lude: (1) proviaions for a~sorb1ng the expec:ted ~ernal impac:t loadB; (2)' 
; a fire and reentry thet'l:lal protection system; (3) a transmitter for rec:overy •. 
. The therc.:U protection system vill not ablate more than 50% of its initial I 
: th1c:kneslS during postulated vorst-c:ase reentry environment!]. The outer side \ 
~ of the package will have proper labeling. - _ 
-. 
, 
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(fiF honefer yelde}," reel!Lty sV!Jtc~ Space Shuttle Orbiter. It has the 
capability to detach froQ the ET and perform a controlled man~uvcr to 4 proper 
safe landing site (return-to-launch aito, abort-to-contingency landing strip, 
abort-to-orbit, ~bort-to-aea or abort-to-Iand) at alQoat any tiUl:t in tha 
f11ght. The Orbiter haa sophisticated and redundant guidance and control 
cyatealJ t cn elaborate the real protection oystem, aD well as II mnnned crev, 
which will all aid in the safe ratun to Earth of the: payload p&ckage 40 a 
result of a critical ascent booster oystem failure. In ~ddition, tho Oroiter 
viII carry a structural pallet (supports thU waste during launch) that will 
reduce the Orbiter crash landing loads placed on the payload package. Aloo, 
the Orbiter will provide systecu which will allow for Orbiter flotation in the 
event of & .ditching at sea. 
The reentry system for the waste payload package must Inclu~e provisions to 
survive expected on-p.:d and reentry accident environmenta. The syatec Il!uat 
include: (1) provia1oruJ for absorbing the expected externnl. iapact loado; (2) 
a fire and reentry thermal protection sy~tea; (3) a transmitter for recoverY. 
The thermal protection syt!tCQ vUl not ablate more than 50% of its 1n!tbl 
thicknesd during postulated worst-case reentry environcenta. The outer'sida 
of the pacrwage will have proper label1ng. 
4.1.7 Launch Sita Facilitie8 
the bunch pad used for launching nueled.r wasta into space should be a 
dedicated pad. The nuclear Payload Preparation Fa~iUty (NPPF) should be 
designed to be a total conta1ncent fac:1lity. 
4.1.8 Uprated Space Shuttle ~unch Vehicle 
The Uprated Space Shuttle launch vehicle design will reflect consIderations of 
lkeeping on-pad accident environments as lov 8a possible. The overall a!nicua 
veM.cla launch reUability vUl be grenter than 0.999 (Itc:~uing one chance in 
1000 that the Orbiter vehicle will be catastrophicall? 109t during liftoff aDd 
ascent). The External Tank and Liquid Rocket Booster design will include 
destruct systems, properly located, which provHe for a mlnicum explosive 
yield of the Uquid propellants when a catastrophic event is in process or 
vhen life or property on the ground is at risk. Every effort viI! b~ made to 
save the payload and crew from adverse accident envi~onm~nts. 
4.1.9 Earth Parking Orbit3 
into the flight Intermediate Earth Farklng orbits shall be 
profiles of space traDGportation systems to alloy a 
orbital decay ~f the nuclear waste payload package ~~~~~~~~~ before 
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; 
ll~ ~dgC" \1111 have 8 cOClb1.ned a1sa1.on del1very reliD.b1l1ty greater ;'hn~ Achievement of del1vary 1. defined 8S startlng in the proper Earth park103 orbit and ending wit~10 the bounds of the fol1ovina: o.aS! .01 AU TO i> And 1.00 + 0.20 de&rcca inc:llll4t1oo. , ~@ -
• 
. " 
j 
-
, 
4.1.11 Space D~atination 
The nominal spac:e destination solar orbit at o.as AU, 1- fro1:l the Earth'. orbital plane, v1ll be verified by proper analysts to provide! an expec:ted-i:olation t1ce of at least onc 1:I111ioo years. 
4.2 Safety Aspec:ts of Mis3ion Ph~sea 
Salct" aspecte for the Referenc:e Concept durIng the var10UlJ c.1ssion phases havo been developed over several ycars of stud". The philosophies presented 
. here are 1l:!portant to the future safa developcent of the spac:a dlspo:itU. concepts. Safety atlpec:ts pec:ulbr to acc:1dcntll and malfunction contingenc:y plans for the genernl. phase. of the spaC:Q disposal. rdssion are llsted and addressed belou: 
• Ground transportation frca the payload f.t.bricatloll sites to- the lo:unch s1 te . 
• Preflight operations prior to ignition of the Shuttle's engines 
• Launch operations froa the l.l1unch pad to achieving park1cgorblt 
• Orbital operations. 
4.2.1 Ground Transportation 
Ground transport (Via raUl of the! shipping cask would b~ assiBD,ed to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which would suppl" the nec:essar" acc:1dent rec:over" plaUG and systems, as needed., TWo ~pes of incidents that must be consldered are: loss of aux1l1ar" cooling to tho waste container, and possible breach of the waste container with a loss of radioactive material. In case of coolin:: loss, adequ.ate provisioIUJ should be made to have self-cont3ioed, auxiliary cooling units availablo within reasonable tieo. Monitoring equip~nt for both container temperatura and radiation will be required during all ground transport operations. A c:on~inuou= c:apabllit)' t~ cope vith a container breach vill be necessar". A spee1ally tr~ined accident recovery crew will always be ready to ac:t, 1£ necesGary. 
4.2.2 Preflight Oper3tion~ 
Contingency plans should be provided for potential malfunctions and accidents that could occur while waste payload pack.lges are in the Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility (NPPF) , being tr.:msportcd to the launch pad, beJng transferred fro1:l the pad Payload Changeout Room (peR) to the Uprated Space 
E16 
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S)'I tems and procedures. tn addi don to some of tlose mentioned above, "'hich 
vould minimi:e the ha:ard c~uocd b1 auboYltem failures during the boost pha,e 
are: 
• 
•• Intact abort. con be implemented after a fev aecondD into the 
flight. Throe typea of int&ct aborts ara possible for the Oprated 
Spaco Shuttle. These arc: the rcturu-to-launch-dtCl (RUS) , 
abort-once-around (AOA) and abort-to-orbit (ATO). 
• Contingency aborta could lead to dther a return-to-land (run",ay 
or crash land) or to a ditching at sea. 
• Design of the boost trajectory to avoid land overflight, for exa~ 
ple the 38- inclination orbit, should help in redudng overall 
risk for the early portion of the fli&ht • 
4.2.4 Orbit~ Operations 
The orbit transfe~ vehiclo COTV) propulsion phase provides for transport~t1on 
from lov Earth orbit to tho intermed~te destinatioa. In tha initial year~* 
of the disposal misoion th::t ON vauld ~ a high-thrust, c:he:rlcnl propuldon 
(liquid hydrogen/Uquid oxygen) stage. To mln1m1::e possible failures tho 
follov1ng systemo, procedures and design guideUnes are envisioned: 
• The use of cot':!El!.:lnd 1>TV engine 'shutdown in the event of a grossl,. 
inaccurate propulsive burn 
• The capability to separ~te the Solar Orbit Insertion Stage '(SOlS) 
and attached payload froa the OTV and the usa of the SQrs to place 
the payload in 4 safe otbit for eventual recovery by 4 rescue vehi-
cle or Shut tIe Orbiter' • 
• A jettison systca incorporated into tho SOlS payload adapter to 
separate the vaste payload froQ the OTV/SOIS configuration when 
necessary ~o preclude 4 possible reentry 
• The use of 4 rescue vehicle to retrieve 4 vaste payload stranded 
in any given orbit @ ~"e. ®O 
• The use of redundant systems vhere -fea~ible to ensure higb 
reliability 
.Later on, low-thrust technology (e.g., solar electr1c propulsIon using argon 
propellant) might be used. ~lth lo~thrust systees, both the probabilIty of 
reentry and magnitude of an explosion are decreased_ In addition, there Is a 
much longer decision and response tiee available 1n case of a calfunction of 
the low-thrust propulsion systeos while in lov Earth orbit. Rc~ever. because 
of the large solar arrays needed, the probability of sobr array dacage 
caused by an lepact uith on-orbit. can-made debris could beco=e significant 
1n the future. 
E17 
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• On-orbit OTV launch crew to obtain instantaneous visual and tele-
metric at~tu. of th= OTV propulsive burn (froQ the Orbiter) 
• The proper design of trajectories and propulsive burna of tho OTV 
to reduce the probability.for reentry, 1f a failure occurs 
• A vacta fora which helps insure intact reentry and recovery of the 
payload, should an. unplanned reentry occur and the requirement 
·that the. wacta payload will not melt after self-burial in. lov con-
ductivity ooU 
• The use of thermal protection material on the outside of the 
package to reduce the risk of atmospheric dispersal on the ground 
and in the ai~. as well as an outer steel shield to protect the 
reentry material in. the case of explosion 
• The use of 4 relatively high melting point container and shield 
material sca n c.! ::teel to reduce the risk of atmospheric 
disposal of wasta. @ 
the Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) provides for transportation. from an 
intermediate to the final dcstinntion. For tho Reference Concept, the SOlS ia 
used to reduce the aphelion. fro;Q 1.0 to O.SS AU. Systems, procedures and 
design requirecents envisioned to. minimize hazards due to SOlS failures are: 
• The usc of a rescue vehicle to retrieve a cooperative or non-
cooperative payload stranded in any orbit in heliocentric or Earth 
orbital spnca ~ ~ 
. V:::;1 e.£-rerZwc ~1iJ1 : 
• The uae of redundant SOlS system;s where ~ to ensure high 
reliability ..
• The proper use of trajectorieo and orbito inclined to the Ear~h's 
orbital plane that exhibit long~term orbital stability 
10"9 /,,,41 ® 
• The use o~track1ng systems on board the SOlS to aid in deep' space 
rescue operations. 
4.2.5 Rescue Operations 
Provisions must be made to rescue the SOIS and the nuclear waste paylQ~d in 
Earth orbit in the event of a fa~lure of the OTV during the Earth escape burn. 
The approach is to rendezvoua and dock the rescue OTV with the SOIS and 
continue the mission from the failed orbit. The rescue mission is based on 
the precise that, With proper control of the OTV launch. any failure of the 
OTV will result in an. elliptic orbit about Earth. The mission profile for 
payload rescue 1s to deliver .3 rescue OTV to low Earth orbit. transfer by a 
burn of the OIV to a phase-adjust orbit, and transfer from the phase-adjust 
orbit at the proper time for rendezvous and docking with the falledsysteo. 
The lifeti:e of the rescue OTV. considering the coast tioe in the phase-adjust 
orbit. ~ust be as much as 300 hours. compared to the 50 hours for O!V lifetime 
on the nocinal reference oission. 
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After injection into deep space, the nuclear vaste payload could fail to 
achieve itD stable destination orbit, because of a prcC3turc shutdown of the 
OTV engine beyond Earth-escape conditions or 4 failure of the sors to ignite 
at solar orbit conditions. SCudletJ that addreso the probability of £arth 
reentt'7 under theal! failure conditions have recocm:ended the use of 4 deep 
space re!Jcue c18alon capability M a vay of further reducing the overall risk 
during thb phase of the aladon (Ric!!, E. E., and coworkers, 1980b). A deep 
space rescue abdon capability 18 defined as the ability to send Another 
propulsion systea (e.g., OTV and SorS) to rendezvous vith the failed payload 
in solar orbit and to place it into the desired stable orbit (circular 0.3S AU 
solar orbit). A capability for uncooperative payload .rescue Q1!1 a~ need to 
De provided. T 
'\M~y. @ 
s.o DEFINITIOn OF TERMS 
The following te~ are defined 1n the c~ntext of -the safety 
guidelines as used in this docucent: . 
• 
Ablation Shield - a layer of protective package ~teria1 attached to 
the outside surface of the payload. It is designed to reduce tha 
heating effect~ during inadvertent atmospheric reentry. 
Acc!denc Conditions - as contrasted to-nOt'CIal conditions, are low in 
probability and high in severity. The corresponding phIlosophy for 
the contaiament barrier is to survive accidents with lov consequences 
rather than remain in an operable state. 
·ALAnA - lesa than maximum allowable and as low as reasonably achiev-
able: Federal regulations require this-principle to be used in most 
nuclear technology license applications. 
Bat'iier ~ any·medium or mechanism by vh1ch either release of encapsu-
lated radioactive vaste material is retarded significantly.· or human 
access is restricted. Examples of barriers are: vaste form, primary 
container, and isolation. . 
Containment - a condition in which a hazardous material is isolated 
from the environcent to an acceptable degree. 
Criticality - a measure of the capability of sustaining a nuclear 
chain reaction in a package containing fissile materials. 
Deco~posit1on - any significant change in physical or checicat 
properties resulting 1n a reduction 1n ~echanical strength, etc. 
DOT - Department of Transportation; regarding handl141g of nuclear 
materials, Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations,. Parts 
173.389-173.399. 
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Enclosure -8-
Suarnary of rationale for recoomeooed cllarges to System Safety Guidelines 
Docl1llent. 
1. Clan;e table of contents to conform to recommended changes in section 
titles. 
2. 1dd \oeste form support structure as a generic element of the waste payload 
or contairment system. 
3. 1dd statements to indicate that the ccmp:ments of the contaiment system 
may be partially or totally integrated (as in the current reference 
system, where primary container, radiation shield, impact absorbtion and 
ablation shield functions are perfotmed by the ccmposite steel/graphite 
shield). 
4. 1dd functional description of the waste form support structure. Perhaps 
specific thermal, mechanical an:) chenical guidelines for the waste payload 
support structure should be a::lded to Tables 4, 5 and 6. In general they 
should be identical to the guidelines for the prUnary container. 
s. Percent of yield should be specified. 100' is normal for this kind of 
spec. 
6. Safety factor on yield stren;th must be applied if 100% of yield in normal 
operation is specified. An alternate approach ~uld be to specify a 
mechanical limit of 75% of yield t.n:ler mrmal conditions. 
7. Ablators usually do mt melt. Tanperature limits should be specified in 
terms of minimun temferature for ablation. 
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8. h1d STS crash comi tion to launch am ",scent accident emirorment 
description (see Appendix A). 
9. 'Ibe su:igested revisions in enclosure -A- incot'tOrate the C!SSembly sequenCe 
that we. ~e developed in association with the Doein;) manufacturilXJ 
organization. 'Ibis assembly sequence will be docunented in our reference 
concept description for our reference waste payload configuration. 
10. With the 5 kw limit on thermal dissipation, the reference waste payload 
does mt require active cool1n':J if vepts for free convection of air are 
provided in the cask system. 'lhis approach is superior to ~ivo 
coolin':J, loWers cost arx1 risk am simplifies handlin;J by eliminatin':J the 
requirements for connect and disconnect of coolant lines. 
11. New art and captions are enclosed as part of enclosure -A-. '!bey are 
identical to the configurations in our reference concept description, and 
will brin; the safety guid~l1nes dcx::unent into conformance. 
12. Incot'tOrate description of the waste form support structure, and prov.ide . 
conformance to the reference waste payload concept. 
13. Reflect the integrated nature of the primary container am flight 
radiation shield in' the reference concept, am brin;J terminology into 
conformance with the reference waste payload description. 
14. The primary container in the refereoce concept is E.2!:. stainless steel.' 
Even steel may be superseded by a super-alloy such as ioconel or 
hastelloy. Section 4.1.5 should reflect the correct material. 
15. Md description of reentry system provisions to Section 4.1.5 to reflect 
integrated nature of radiation shield/contairment/reentry arrl thermal 
protection in reference waste payload concept. 
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16. Title cMn:Je am ad::Utions to paragraEtt. Brin;s title into conformance 
wi th reference concept cescr1ption in preparation at eoeil'¥J and reflects 
the canprehensive (rot just reentry) protection function provided by the 
space shuttle Orbiter. tbte that reentry system description is moved to 
4.1.5 to reflect integrated nature of steel/graphite shield (provides 
contaiment, impact absorbtion, raHation shield arx1 reentry protection 
factors) • 
17. D!1ete in a:cordance with nunber 15. 
18. Chan;e to reflect true requirement - more specifically six months is too 
general. 
19. Cllarx3e terminology to better reflect actual system (\tbich includes 
elements like F.S.S. which are rot upper sta;es) am to conform to the 
reference concept description. 
20. ktual valoo is lo\<p-r than 0.99. See enclosure C ccmnents on paragraph 
4.1.10. 
21. D!lete jettison system. waste payload is mu:h better off wi th SCIS wtl'ich 
has beacons am dockil'l3 provisions, lnadvertant reentry by SOlS is 
prevented by system. fail-,safe design. SOIS in effect becomes -lifeboat-
for waste payload. 
22. use of redl.1D1ant Sjo!Stems is -feasible- far beyard the p:>int where it is 
effective in reducil'l3 overall risk. Here, use of effective better reflects 
the intention of the specification. Perha~ -effective in redu:ing system 
risk- soould be substituta:i for -effective to ensure high reliability-. 
23. A specific material callout is not necessary; stainless steel is incorrect 
in any case. 
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24. Tracking systems must be long lived to be useful for deep space rescoo. 
25. Uncooperative payload rescue may not be required to achieve acceptably lew 
levels of long term risk. A study of this issue is definitely needed. 
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Enclosure ·C·: Conformance to system safety Qlidelines 
Conformance to system guidel ines for major elements of the reference 
concept for space diSf.Osal are described below. 
4.1 Safety Aspects of Elements: 
4.1.1 Waste Fonn: 
Complete Conformance - Waste form maximun temperature under n::xnina1 
corxlitions is 700°C « 10SOoC) conformance for accident corxlition 
limits is 'IBO. 
4.1.2 Waste Processing and payload Fabrication Facilities: 
N/A to space system: canpUanca is toE function. 
4.1.3 Shipping Casks and Ground Transport Vehicles: 
N/A-to space system: canpUan::e is toE function. 
4.1.4 Waste Fonn Support Structure: 
Maximun temperature of the waste Ftlyload 5Upp:)rt structure is about· . 
697°C - this is about 49% of the absolute melt temperature (1422oC)·. 
It ~uld be a good idea to raise the spec limit to SOt of the melt 
absolute temperature, if the 40\ w:1S an arbitrary choice, or al-
ternatively·to pick·an alloy with a melting temperature of 1742oC. 
Actually, the 40% of melt temperature limit is only exceeded 
wi thin a rCkiius of about 30 an from the core center. '!he core 
surface temperature is 316°C. Conformance for accident corxlitions 
is 'IBO. 
4.1.5 Primary Container and Flight Radiation Shielding: 
Complete Confo~nce - Shield temperature (at the inner wall urxler 
nominal conditions is calculated at 134°C (well under the spec 
temperature of 416°C. 
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Temperatures l.I1der accident conditions renain to be evaluated. 
Six hardened recovery beacons have been added to the waste 
payloGld at a mass increase estimated at 30 kg per wast!;: ~yload. 
4.1.6 Waste Payload Protection Systen: 
Complete Confornance - An Orbi ter flotation system has been 
addEd to the flight suppot t system. '!be system is an 
inflatable ruggEdized nylon bladder inflated by a gas 
; generator which when inflatEd occupies empt.y space in the 
cargo bay, forward of the F.S.S. It is secured to the 
t 
orbi ter payloa:l bay l003erons an:! the flight support system 
usir'¥J steel cables, and will suPPlrt a canbined orbiter an:! 
payload mass of 113,400 kg in a ~se-up attitude. 'lbe 
orbiter already carries location beacons and will have a 
large radar cross section in the floated concH tion. 'lbe 
mass of the flotation system is beill3 estimated. _ 
4.1.7 Launch Site Facilities: 
Complete Conformance - Complete conformance will be provided by 
design. 
4.1.8 Uprated Space Shuttle Launch Vehicle: 
Conformance TBO based on actual STS reliability numbers; 
suggest that 0.999 be crlopted as a goal for the present. 
4.1.9 Earth Parking Orbi~: 
Conplete Confomance - Wi th reccmnerrled cha~e in 
wordilJ3 as specifiErl in enclosure -8-. 
4.1.10 Orbit Transfer System 
Suggest chargio; 0.99 to 'ISO pendil'XJ defini tioil of 
optUn\.ll\ value. Actual value for existin:} reference 
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system is stUl bairg determined, but will be less 
than the cumulative injection stage reliability of 
0.98610. lbte that for risk estimation pur{X)ses the 
system is fail safe with a probability of 0.999999 • 
'Ibis is probably the nllT'.ber that s.'lould be specified 
to ens\~e low risk. 
Co~lete Conformance 
SAFET'l ASPECTS OF MISSION PH.~ 
Ground Transportation: 
N/A to space system: DOE fun:tion 
Preflisht Operations: 
Complete conformance will be provided by design. 
Launch O~rations: 
Complete conformance will be provided by design. 
Orbital O~rations: 
Complete Conformance - With recommended chan;e to 
wordin;J as specified in enclosure -B-. 
4.2.5 Rescue Operations: 
Co~lete Conformance - Wi th recornmended c:han:Je to 
wordin;J as specified in enclosure -B- • 
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